Mr. Speaker, I hope that my colleague from London West will stay with us just a few moments more. I am pleased to speak in this House and I would like my colleague to know that over the past 26 years, I have been a legal aid lawyer as well as defence counsel in criminal law for the last 10 years. As a criminal lawyer, I regularly argued cases in court, trying to convince the court to accept my arguments. I will attempt the same here, Mr. Speaker. If I slip up, as I probably will, and call you “Your Honour”, please forgive me. I hope that my argument—and I believe it will indeed be an argument—will enable us to address this very important debate in the House today in an orderly manner, without the interference of court sanctions.
The Bloc Québécois finds it difficult to vote in favour of this bill. We will therefore vote against it, for a number of reasons I will explain. This is a very difficult bill that reduces the number of options available to the court when sentencing a person.
I have with me the bible that I kept with me every day I argued a case in court a while ago. I keep up to date on what is going on in criminal law, so I hope you will permit me to read section 718 of the Criminal Code. This section is clear about the objectives of sentencing, which are:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harmcom done to victims or to the munity; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
The objectives and principles that a judge must be guided by during sentencing are clear. The judge must individualize the sentence. The individual that appears before him must receive a sentence adapted to the crime committed. This is not what Bill C-9 proposes. The bill would increase the length of imprisonment for dozens, possibly around one hundred new offences. One example comes immediately to mind. Someone charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm can be sentenced to a maximum of 10 years. Under Bill C-9, a prison sentence would automatically be imposed. This is unacceptable.
If my colleagues across the floor listen to my entire speech--and the brilliant interpretation being provided--they will understand that such a sentence is unacceptable for several reasons. First of all, in a number of major decisions, the Supreme Court has stated that the primary principle that must apply during sentencing is that of individualized sentencing. That would be lost with this bill. In fact, Bill C-9 would put an end to individualized sentencing.
I would go even further. Not long ago, the Supreme Court had to rule on conditional sentences. If the members across from me are listening carefully, they will recognize a decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 2000. It was a landmark decision that has been continuously applied by the courts ever since. It very clearly explains the criteria that must guide the court when it is about to impose a conditional sentence.
It should be noted that conditional sentencing is neither a policy nor an obligation. It is an additional power the court has when handing down a sentence. It is part of the wide range of sentencing possibilities the court has when it is judging an individual or handing down a ruling that will have a clear impact on an individual's life, family and associates.
The members opposite should listen carefully to what I am about to say. Everyone knows that a Supreme Court ruling is quite serious.
In R v. Proulx, the court said that:
—the provisions on conditional sentencing were enacted both to reduce reliance on incarceration as a sanction and to increase the use of principles of restorative justice in sentencing. A conditional sentence should be distinguished from probationary measures.
Probationary measures are sentencing measures with probation.
Probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool. By contrast, Parliament intended conditional sentences to include both punitive and rehabilitative aspects.
That is the intention.
—conditional sentences should generally include punitive restriction of the offender's liberty. Condition such as house arrest should be the norm, not the exception.
Having been a litigator and defended clients in all sorts of cases, I can assure you that a sentence of detention in one's own place of residence is quite often more restrictive than a sentence of detention in a penitentiary or a provincial prison. For example, when an individual receives a conditional sentence, he generally receives calls at all hours of the day and night to check whether he is home. I will come back to that in a few moments. What is more, he is monitored regularly by the court.
That is what the Supreme Court had to say about it, again in Proulx, a very important case that my colleagues opposite and the hon. Minister of Justice have read. The Minister of Justice was Manitoba's Attorney General. I would be glad to discuss this case with the hon. Minister of Justice in this House. We talked about it last year, the hon. Minister of Justice and I, when we were both on the justice committee.
The Proulx decision states:
—the judge should then consider whether it is appropriate for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community.
The Court must ask itself this question.
—a conditional sentence need not be of equivalent duration to the sentence of incarceration that would otherwise have been imposed.
So said the ruling by the honourable justices of the Supreme Court. Generally, what this means—I have experienced this myself and my colleague the hon. Minister of Justice may perhaps also confirm it since this occurred in the province of Manitoba—is that the court first asks itself whether or not the individual is eligible. If a sentence of incarceration is required, then the answer is yes. The court then decides that the offence committed involves and requires incarceration. Then it asks itself if the incarceration must be served in a penal institution or if the individual may serve the sentence at home or elsewhere. It is at that point that it must pose the question.
Usually, the judge considers that the offence deserves a sentence of three years or 30 months; however, if he wishes the offender or the accused to serve the sentence in the community, he lowers it to two years less a day.
The Supreme Court ruling states, and I quote, “Two factors should be taken into account: (1) the risk of the offender re-offending;” This first factor bears the number (1). It is followed by factor number (2). I have never seen (2) precede (1). Thus, the first question that the court asks itself is whether or not there is a risk of the accused re-offending.
I continue to quote, “(2) the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence”. A consideration of the risk posed by the offender should include the risk of any criminal activity, and not be limited solely to the risk of physical or psychological harm to individuals
The Supreme Court went so far as to state and repeat—and I will repeat here in this chamber— that there is an inviolable principle in our criminal law and that principle is the individualization of sentences.
This is not what the hon. Minister of Justice has in mind in introducing Bill C-9. I took a quick look at the crimes covered by this bill. There are about 100 in total, and all are punishable by 10 years in prison.
The case that comes to mind and the one I had argued, as I mentioned earlier, was impaired driving causing bodily harm. Under this bill, the judge will have no choice but to impose a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years, and that is extremely dangerous.
The Proulx decision is very important. I read it through, and I would again invite the hon. Minister of Justice to carefully reread this important decision. Here is another excerpt from the decision:
The [conditional] sentence imposed by a trial judge is entitled to considerable deference from appellate courts...Absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.
Today, we are faced with an extremely important societal debate. The debate over Bill C-9 is a societal debate. This bill will be a catalogue of prison sentences. The crimes will be in the catalogue and will be punished accordingly. This is not what the Supreme Court intended. The Supreme Court, and society in general, want individualized sentences that take into account the individual's character, the risk of reoffending and the seriousness of the crime.
When these distinctions are made, then we must look at how the court will punish the individual.
Clearly, Bill C-9 is a move toward punitive justice, not rehabilitative justice. Today, sentences must be individualized. The Bloc Québécois believes in rehabilitative sentences much more than repressive sentences. Bill C-9 will create repressive sentences.
It is true that crime has increased in some major cities.
For the first time, however, since the introduction of conditional prison sentences in 1996, Statistics Canada did a study in 2003-2004, which showed that the total number of offenders liable to a new conditional sentence order had decreased, falling from 19,200 to 18,900, a decline of about 2%. Still, we must pay attention. In spite of this decrease from the previous year, the same study reveals that conditional sentences have a major effect on the rate of new detentions, which has decreased by 13% since the introduction of conditional sentences. As a result of this measure, some 55,000 fewer offenders were sent to prison.
With all due respect for the hon. Minister of Justice in this House, he cannot contradict this. Last year, he sat on the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness as the Conservative opposition critic. When he tried to table this same bill, I asked him to provide us with figures showing that the crime rate had increased since conditional sentences began to be given. It was not so; the number of offenders had decreased.
I will go a bit further. This is a rather special sentence. The administration of these sentences, especially conditional ones, falls within provincial jurisdiction because they are sentences of two years less a day. So what will happen if this bill comes into effect? There will be an increase in prison sentences. And who handles sentences of two years less a day, to use the legal jargon? It is the provinces. It is obvious then that passing this bill will entail additional costs, an increase in the financial burden of the provinces. There are two problems. One, sentences are no longer individualized. Two, we switch from the possibility of rehabilitation to repression. Thus, we increase the financial burden of the provinces, which will have to deal with these prison sentences.
I will add something else. Bill C-9 implies the building of more prisons. It seems, however, that on an individual basis (the figures confirm this) it is much more costly to keep offenders in prison than to keep them under supervision in the community. We now have figures to support this. In 2002-03, the average annual cost for a prisoner in a provincial institution was $51,450, compared to $1,792 for supervision of an offender in the community.
I would still have lots to say, but I see that I have less than a minute left. So I will say this. We must at all costs avoid having this bill send the wrong signal. I understand the intention of the Minister of Justice to send a clear signal. With all due respect, I nevertheless think that this is not the right message.
We could send guidelines to the judges. Perhaps not enough prison sentences are given for different crimes. The appeal courts are there, however, to rectify what might be a “bad” decision or a decision that does not comply with the criteria of the Supreme Court.
The evidence may be seen in many cases. Mr. Brault has just been sentenced, and we have just seen that there are other sentences. In fact, the Court of Appeal of Quebec has just declared itself in favour of the fulfillment of prison sentences, when such sentences should have been handed down in the first instance.
Let our courts and judges do their job. They are quite capable. Let us give them some clearer guidelines, though.