Debates of May 3rd, 2006

Norad

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

Mr. Speaker, maybe it is only the Minister of National Defence who can remember the situation back in 1958 at the height of the Cold War. I know his career was probably just beginning then.

At that time, the Cold War between the U.S. and Russia was at its height. There was tremendous fear in the free world of what the Russians were capable of doing. In fact, they demonstrated it many times with their testing of hydrogen bombs, et cetera. At that time, it was imperative that not only North America but the free world would bind themselves together in treaties to protect themselves from the incursion of the Russian threat.

Those times are now gone, but there is a new threat, as was demonstrated on September 11, which was a reminder that we still have to cooperate as a free world, as a portion of North America, to continue to demonstrate our willingness to participate and to cooperate with the United States for the protection of our continent. The original reasons for the development of Norad and the present reasons are very similar, and I think most welcome by the citizens of both countries.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I was preparing my speech, all alone in my office, I said to myself that I have to salute this, a first: for the first time, we in this House are discussing the text of a treaty that has been signed. To me, this is the equivalent of signing drafts of collective agreements before putting them to the general meeting. That is how I see it. This House could decide that it disagrees with the treaty. The government would then have to go back to see the Americans to negotiate something else or to say that the matter is closed. So this is a first and for that, I salute the government.

You know that the Bloc Québécois has introduced three bills seeking to put an end to the Crown prerogative that means that Cabinet alone may be consulted about documents to which only those people had access and which remained secret. What one expects to see in a democracy is that the documents setting out the general terms of our relations with foreign countries will be submitted for examination by parliamentarians.

I am therefore pleased to see this. Honestly, however, I would have preferred that we be given a little more time. I would have liked to have time to meet in committee and hear witnesses so that we could better understand certain new expressions.

To celebrate how pleased we are to be considering this document, let us recall that sometimes we did not know that correspondence had been exchanged. We were given a news release telling us about an agreement on something or other. Here, we have a document that I have studied, I have peeled back its layers, and it leaves me with questions, but at bottom, we are having to make a decision tonight and we are participating in a debate that is going too fast. We have to decide whether we will continue to participate in Norad, to cooperate in terms of exchanging information and to be part of a joint command for greater effectiveness, given the new threats we are facing today.

I trained as an historian, and so I will always look to the documents. I said to myself that my colleagues might be curious to read the 1958 founding document. I am going to read a few passages. It is interesting because it places us in the context of that time. I must note that there are few changes in the current document. The document is written in the form of a letter.

Mr. Secretary of State,

I have the honour of referring to the discussions that have been held between Canadian and American authorities on the subject of the need to unify the administration of Canadian and American air defence operations and, specifically, to the studies conducted by the Canadian and American military task force and its recommendations. The studies resulted, on August 1, 1957, in a communiqué by the Minister of National Defence of Canada and the Secretary of Defence in the United States announcing that our two governments had decided to establish a unified system of administration of the air defence operations of the metropolitan United States, Canada and Alaska, under the orders—

This seems to me to be the meaning of Norad:

—under the orders of a unified command reporting directly to the chiefs of staff of the two countries.

I will go a little further.

For a number of years, prior to the creation of Norad, it could be seen that Canadian and American air defence had to be considered a single entity. While arrangements concluded up to that point between Canada and the United States permitted the coordination of the separate air defence plans of the two countries, they did not permit the exercise of supervisory authority over all defence equipment.

In 1958, they said this:

New threats require a prompt decision.

The same thing could be said today.

I want to add this:

—to set out, in light of the foregoing and in view of the experience acquired during provisional operations...the following principles are proposed.

1. The Commander-in-Chief of Norad reports directly to both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States, who report directly to their respective governments.

I think it is important to remember that. If we are not happy, we can ask questions in the House of Commons and we have the text. I will continue.

He will abide by an air defence plan approved by the appropriate authorities of both our governments, which will have to take in account their objectives in terms of defending the Canada—United States region in the NATO zone.

It is specific. It is not just anyone. It all stems from a plan that was prepared by each government and then approved by both governments.

By the way, I have been a sovereignist for many years and in every Parti Québécois or Bloc Québécois platform we have always said we would exercise our defence and security responsibilities and participate in Norad and NATO in particular. Accordingly, I think securing the safety of the people for whom this work was done is a security responsibility.

In my research, still in the same vein, since I also wanted to know the impetus behind this text, I understood that it stemmed from the second world war when U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King established the basic principle that would from then on guide defence relations between the two countries.

I did not know it, but “the United States will protect Canada from a possible attack from outside the continent and in exchange Canadians will ensure that their land cannot be used or crossed by enemies of their neighbour to the South”. I found that interesting, but it left me with all sorts of questions.

I could see that I was preparing for a long speech.

I now want to look at the text of this treaty to point out certain aspects that caused me some concern. I am talking about the amendments.

The first aspect that worried me was the addition of maritime surveillance of inland navigation. I raised this question in the briefing session we had. The wording of the preamble worried me because I found it too general. It seemed to me that it was giving Norad permission to carry out mission orders. However, the end of paragraph 1.2 (c), which specifies what is meant by “maritime warning”, reassures me. It says:

Maritime surveillance and control shall continue to be exercised by national commands and, as appropriate, coordinated bilaterally.

Surveillance is Norad's mission; control, as we will see, is the mission of National Defence.

As for national commands, in Canada now there is the Canada Command and in the U.S. there is the US Northern Command. I learned that recently, when visiting the military base in my riding.

I had put the question to the officer in charge of us. I told him I knew that there cannot be any military activity in Quebec, except at the request of the Attorney-General of Quebec.

This is also true for the other provinces, under the Constitution. The officer told me that this principle was still the same and that it is within these parameters that the responsibilities laid down in the text are exercised.

To my mind, it is important to have a text like this one. When something occurs that we do not agree with and we think it is inconsistent with the text, we can go and see the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister, and tell them that something is not right.

Having a text now is extraordinary progress, though I do not agree with the wording. Obviously, no one, apart from cabinet members, looked at that. Sometimes, the text is very vague. This aspect seems important to me.

With respect to the amendment, the fact that this was supposed to be a permanent text bothered me, until I noted that either party may at any time ask for amendments to be made. Once again, if Parliament exercises its powers and says it needs an amendment in this respect, the government cannot claim to be unable to touch the text. We can go over it and ask for amendments. We are keeping an eye on what is happening. Moreover, one party can always advise the other that it is terminating this treaty. That is carried out within the following 12 months. We understand that separating unified commands can take some time.

There is one aspect to which I have not responded. It is in nearly all elements of life in Quebec and Canada, namely the fear of integration.

The foreign affairs committee examined the fear of integration when it did a study on the effects of NAFTA. In the study, what surprised me most was that integration takes place mainly through economic players. It occurs chiefly through these large companies that restructure, that create a market completely indifferent to borders and that thus create a large integrated market. The North-American market can be integrated more readily than the European one. Members will agree that different countries do not have the same electrical outlets. When we travel, we have to take along all sorts of gadgets so we can plug in our appliances. Here, the market is easy to integrate. Does this treaty really make integration easier? Some additions have been made.

In committee, I would have liked to ask some independent experts about these additions. This is not to say that the members of the military we heard were not experts.

The Bloc is in agreement with the principle of the importance of intelligence sharing. However, in view of the Arar affair and its repercussions, we would like to see some guidelines. Personally, this is something I will look at. However, since we have a text, we know that it is done. That also goes for confirmation of Norad's ability to conduct information operations.

Another small paragraph bothered me somewhat. Earlier on I stated my beliefs and they are recorded in the blues. There was the officer who answered my question about control over the territory given by the Constitution to the provinces. I mentioned that there were no military activities, unless they were at the request of the provincial attorney general. We are told that:

This treaty deals with national defence and consequently falls under the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. The provinces and territories will undoubtedly support the proposed improvements because these will enable the federal government to intervene efficiently in emergencies--

Important questions must be asked in this regard.

Once again, we shall see, we have a text and we will ask questions. This is a domestic organization. It has nothing to do with the United States. Thus, we will be able to defend our interests.

In doing the historical research, I found that over the years, Norad has had a number of opponents. First, there were opponents who wanted to preserve the ties with the British Empire. Norad marked the end of ties with the British Empire. There were other opponents who said no to cooperation and collaboration with the United States in the name of sovereignty. These were not Quebec sovereignists, but Canadian sovereignists who did not encourage cooperation with the United States.

There are also people who are concerned. I share a little of our difficulty with having control of the military. However, it is important to understand that Norad is not defence, it is a command unit, a commander for the United States and a deputy commander for Canada. Once an evaluation is done based on information that is mostly shared, there is a plan for defence and a plan prepared for each country, which is supposed to be approved by the governments. We could also ask to see them, but in my opinion that would be a much later stage.

Given all of that, and given the vigilance that we must exercise as citizens, I said to myself that our inland waterways, the St. Lawrence Seaway, must not be invaded, but we are told no because there was already an exchange of information. Now, however, it is being formalized. That does not mean that we are going to see American ships and submarines in the St. Lawrence. That is what I was told. I have the text. So I am going to fight to defend the sovereignty of the territory of Quebec, and at this point in time, still, that is achieved through Canadian sovereignty.

I will conclude by reiterating that in my opinion, it is a great advantage to have a text because with it we are able to ask questions, to track what is happening and, in my opinion, to provide our fellow citizens not only with greater security but also with greater assurance of our ability, as parliamentarians, to know what is happening and to ensure that sovereignty is not sold off. I am talking about three kinds of sovereignty: the sovereignty of Quebec, Canada and the United States.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Speaker, while I thank my hon. colleague for her comments, I do have some experience in Norad and I think she may be missing a couple of basic connections with respect to sovereignty and the kinds of operations that are allowed in the name of air space sovereignty.

I wonder if my colleague could explain to me her understanding of the relationship of sovereignty over North American air space to Quebec sovereignty, to aid of the civil power, which requires the request of a province.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I know that the hon. member does not think I am stupid. I had asked this question earlier regarding inland waterways. I know that what was called air space and then aerospace has, since 1981 or 1988, been regarded as North American.

[Bonnie Brown, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am always interested in the comments of the member for La Pointe-de-l'Île, because I know she is a longstanding member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. I appreciate the fact that she pointed out the value of having the text to review.

Personally, I am always most interested in the maintenance of civilian control over the military. I would like to ask her a question about the text. I would direct the member's attention to article 2 and clause f compared to clause l.

Clause f states:

No permanent changes of station of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available to NORAD operational control will be made without the approval of the national authority of the Party concerned.

I think that is very good, because it states that no real changes can be made unless the government of each of the two countries approves.

Looking at clause l causes me some concern, because it states:

Terms of Reference for NORAD shall be updated expeditiously following the entry into force of this Agreement....Changes in the Terms of Reference, including the addition of other aspects of the missions heretofore identified, shall be made by agreement between the Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States...

Then, almost as an afterthought, it states:

--with approval of higher national authorities as appropriate....

What strikes me is, who is going to decide when that is appropriate? Because essentially, changes to the terms of reference are going to be made by two people and it sounds to me as if they can decide when they have to refer it to the civil authority or not. That raises concerns in my head. That is my first question for the member.

My second question for her goes to clause e, and reflects her mention of the fact that Canadians fear any further integration between the Canadian and the American military. I share that concern, because if this is air and sea, maybe this clause is not too frightening, but if it ever became air, sea and land, it would become very frightening. This clause sets a precedent, should the government decide to go in that direction and to include land, when it states:

Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements is within the authority of commanders having operational control.

Once again, having the text allows us to think into the future. In my opinion, we should watch that clause very carefully if anybody starts talking about integrating land forces.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank my colleague for her question.

First of all, I would say that the matters raised would make for some interesting discussions by a committee examining the issue and making recommendations for the next version of the treaty. However, my experience leads me to believe that the texts, once known, can always be understood by reference to each other, and that the parties never write anything without a purpose.

Clause E of the text seems vague. I am not an expert on Norad and so I will not be defending this matter. However, I know that it is an advantage to have a text because it will be clearer and more specific the next time. If we have concerns in this regard, we can raise them, delve further into the matter, and be vigilant on behalf of the public.

[Bill Siksay, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, there are many Canadians--I am one of them and probably there are some in the member's constituency--who believe that Canada should be out of Norad altogether, that Norad is a relic from the past, that it was something that came out of the cold war and was intended to allow the Americans access to Canadian territory to shoot down Russian bombers that might be headed this way, if there were ever any that were actually poised to do that.

There are Canadians who believe that this is a concern about deep integration between our two countries, a further enhanced military integration. In fact, we have a report of the bi-national planning group, the subtitle of which is about enhanced military cooperation between Canada and the U.S. There are Canadians who see Norad as a key precursor and key part of that enhanced military cooperation.

There are also a lot of Canadians who believe that we should be making more progress on nuclear disarmament and not giving credit to a military operation that has the world's largest nuclear capacity. They have very grave concerns about our participation, agreement and integration into that military system.

I wonder what the member would say to those constituents and people like me who say we should be out of Norad altogether because of those concerns and we should put our efforts into renewing the United Nations, into making sure that UN agreements and the UN are the leaders in this kind of role in our society.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, those are serious questions that my hon. colleague asks. I expected nothing less from him.

I was thinking about these questions on my way to the House. I too wish that we did not need armies. However, we are living in strange times in which there is more and more talk about Darfur. What do the NGOs want in Darfur? They want armed forces with mandates that allow them to shoot. In English they say robust. Such a request had not been made for some time. We will have to see how things develop in the world.

I do not know whether my colleague shares this feeling with me, but one realizes, in seeing the situation in Iran, Iraq, Africa and elsewhere, that events we thought never happened any more still happen. Under the circumstances, is the main concern to put an end to Norad and NATO?

I am obviously in favour of getting rid of nuclear weapons. However, until we can really succeed in doing so—and I will take the specific steps that seem important in this regard—NATO is becoming a political organization.

Late last week, I went to a meeting in Brussels—it was a kind of PPP—in which political representatives and senior journalists took part, as well as business people. There were some NATO representatives there too, including Mr. Scheffer, Mr. Javier Solana and others. They told us that we should make no mistake: NATO is a political organization. At this very moment and contrary to all expectations, it is conducting nine missions on four different continents. People want NATO troops everywhere. The NATO mission involves a certain coalition. Some participants in the meeting replied that it was not NATO that was needed but United Nations troops.

In Darfur, we hope to achieve a peace accord between the rebels and the government in Khartoum. A major UN mission can then be deployed in support of the African Union mission. However, it is still a question of troops. I know that General Dallaire will propose sending another 1,500 Canadian soldiers. Will I be opposed to that? No, I will be in favour

I am not quite answering my colleague. It seems to me that the situation is not conducive to putting an end to Norad and NATO.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with my colleague, the member for Halifax.

It is with some reservation that I speak in the debate tonight. I firmly believe this debate is not in keeping with our democratic traditions and is, therefore, unparliamentary. I want to explain why.

First, this is a debate on a motion that cannot be amended, what the Conservatives are now calling an “up or down vote”. This terminology cannot be found in any of the procedural texts of our Parliament. This is terminology that emerged in the U.S., particularly with regard to the appointment of judges.

It is an ancient right of Parliament to debate as it sees fit and to amend the motions before it. The Conservatives would only allow the House to consider this motion to hold this debate if we waived that right.

A second unparliamentary aspect of this debate is that it is limited by time and not, as is traditional, by the full and complete expression of parliamentary views. It is a longstanding, fundamental parliamentary principle that a question is not put to a vote in the House until the debate on that issue is over.

The Conservatives have essentially invoked closure over this debate before it even started. I ask, why? Why limit debate? What is it about debate that so terrifies the government?

Stanley Knowles, the NDP House leader for the better part of a half century and a distinguished member of Parliament from Winnipeg, said:

Debate is not a sin, a mistake, an error or something to be put up with in Parliament. Debate is the essence of Parliament.

We learned last week from the U.S. Department of State, from a foreign government, that the Conservative Minister of National Defence signed a treaty in secret. The secret treaty was tabled only two days ago in the House. It has not been distributed to the public at large, no citizen consultation and no parliamentary hearings. It is likely that many of the people who voted for the Conservatives on January 23 saw that party's commitment to parliamentary review of treaties as a genuine attempt to engage Parliament and citizens in foreign and defence policy. This hollow exercise tonight, with no opportunity for an amendment, is not a genuine attempt to do those things.

When we scrutinize this treaty we see a sellout of our country. This secret treaty allows for the instantaneous sharing of maritime surveillance information with the U.S., including surveillance over internal waterways, such as the Great Lakes and the Northwest Passage.

A constituent of mine, Derek Wilson of Port Moody, British Columbia, wrote to me on Monday. He said:

I would suggest that the primary reason for including maritime surveillance, from the point of view of the United States, is to have a justification for their military and “support” ships to ply Canada's Northwest Passage without the need to obtain Canadian authorization.

He went on to say:

At some time in the future if there was a Canadian public protest about American vessels transiting the Northwest Passage, as there undoubtedly would be, the American response will simply be, “You guys gave us blanket approval in the perpetual Norad agreement in 2006”.

During and immediately after the last election, the Conservatives made a great deal out of their commitment to Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage. Why, if they have been negotiating to share maritime surveillance concerning the Northwest Passage with the United States, did they not seize the opportunity to secure, in return, U.S. recognition of Canada's sovereignty claim?

Another equally disturbing section of the treaty states, “--arrangements shall be maintained to ensure effective sharing between the Parties, of information and intelligence relevant to the NORAD missions”.

Considering that other provisions of the secret treaty already cover all aerospace and water in North America, what missions are being alluded to here? Is there any intelligence that will not be shared with the U.S.?

The present administration in Washington has recently been caught illegally spying on its own citizens. How does this bode for the honest and sensitive treatment of any information about Canadians transmitted to the U.S.?

This secret treaty also allows for the instantaneous transmission of surveillance information to the U.S. for the purposes of ballistic missile defence. I know there are some members who will doubt this but allow me to quote from the document itself. It states:

NORAD's aerospace warning mission for North American shall include aerospace warning...in support of United States national commands responsible for missile defense.

The NDP opposes Canadian participation in U.S. missile defence and the use of Norad assets for missile defence is but one small step away from Canadian participation. It is clear that the Conservatives, by signing this treaty, are joining their Liberal predecessors in inching slowly but surely toward signing Canada up to U.S. missile defence.

This is just the beginning. The recent report of the Bi-national Planning Group, which actually deserves a debate all on its own, spells out where the American-Canadian defence establishments see us going. The Bi-national Planning Group proposes a wholesale merger of the Canadian and U.S. militaries with joint commands and shared operational control.

The bi-national planning group states in its report that integration must be achieved in an incremental way because of the “small but vocal minority” of Canadians who are worried about losing our sovereignty. The bi-national planning group even recommends much closer cooperation in both security and foreign policy. I am not making this up. The report states:

--Canada and the United States must continue to act as partners; indeed, that the partnership must be expanded, to shape the future of North American defense and security, using all of the instruments of diplomatic, economic, informational and military power.

The treaty before us tonight takes us on to the slippery slope of full continental integration. It deserves to be studied very carefully in committees before being voted on in the House. For this reason, the NDP makes the following proposal. Instead of closing down the debate prematurely and rushing to a vote, why not simply conclude a 12 month extension of the existing unmodified Norad agreement and then refer the proposed new treaty to the standing committees on foreign affairs and defence? To do otherwise would be unparliamentary. To do otherwise would risk compromising Canadian sovereignty and independence.

Canadians need to take note of this debate and of our respective opinions in the House. They need to ask themselves who in fact is standing up for Canada.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with interest to the participation by the hon. member in this debate and I am almost overwhelmed as to where to start with the misinformation that she placed before the House in her remarks.

First, how can there be a secret treaty which has been laid upon the table of the House of Commons? How can there be a secret debate, which is being broadcast nationally, to have a full and inclusive discussion so that Canadians can understand the importance of the Norad agreement for Canada? How can there possibly be a suggestion, where there is a specific reference within the context of this debate, that it is not toward ballistic missile defence?

This simply gives Canada the ability to be at the table and to receive information that affects its national security. What greater threat could there be to sovereignty than to be absent from the debate around the defence of North America, which includes Canada? We do not live in some splendid isolation when it comes to North American threats, whether they be in the air or in the water.

I suggest that nobody believes it would be in Canada's interest to withdraw from Norad nor, I would suggest, which was her last suggestion, that we simply defer this to a parliamentary committee knowing full well, because of the references tonight, that this important agreement will expire on May 12.

I am left to wonder who actually believes this information that has been placed before the House. I can tell the House that they do not believe in Sasquatch or UFOs either.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I wonder if there was actually a question in what the Minister of National Defence had to say.

We have tried to be very serious in the presentation we have made here tonight and present a perspective that is shared by many Canadians across the country. I have heard from a many them, and I know the minister has too because many of them have copied the information that they have sent to me.

What we are suggesting is that it would be totally appropriate to renew the existing Norad agreement for a 12-month basis and bring before the House of Commons, perhaps a shared foreign affairs and defence committee, the text of the agreement that the Minister of Defence signed last week. This would give Canadians a well-deserved and important opportunity to look at what is in this agreement, to see if they support the move to more integration with the U.S. and to hear from them. It should not be a four hour debate in the House of Commons where there is no opportunity for citizen involvement and no opportunity to put forward amendments or any kind of changes that we would like to see or Canadians might like to see.

This does not give us full, open, democratic debate on something as important as our continental defence and we think that is wrong.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I can only echo the staggering disbelief of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the misinformation.

I have a specific question concerning the hon. member's understanding of maritime surveillance operations with respect to illegal drug operations. How does she believe illegal drug operations, whether on coastal waterways or internal waterways, are or ought to be monitored and controlled?

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Mr. Speaker, that is an interesting question. I do not think anyone wants to support illegal drug traffic, certainly not in this House nor anywhere else in the country.

However I would remind the member that we have different laws from those in the U.S. I am not sure Norad is the appropriate place to be enforcing our criminal laws. We have our own sovereign laws in Canada. We have our own police forces that are enshrined with the responsibility to deal with that.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to share this time with my colleague, the member for New Westminster--Coquitlam.

I listened carefully to the comments made by the foreign affairs minister and by the parliamentary secretary. I am not sure how parliamentary it is to accuse the member of presenting staggeringly misinformed facts to the House without addressing the substance of what she said.

What I do know is that the foreign affairs minister and the parliamentary secretary totally and utterly failed to respond to the reasonable, practical proposition put forward by the member who is the NDP defence critic and peace advocate. It makes me wonder about what a farce Canadians will think it really has been over the last couple of years for us to engage through the foreign affairs committee in a debate about the international policy statement that was brought forward on behalf of the government.

Is it so absurd to suggest that Canadians should have the opportunity to be informed of the implications of the agreement that is now before this House? Is it so ridiculous to think that the foreign affairs committee and the defence committee collaborating with Canadians would somehow be a danger to Canada's security? It seems to me the danger is to Canada's sovereignty for us not to be able to take some responsibility for what it is and what the implications are for what we are doing.

Before I turn specifically to the agreement itself, I want to very briefly quote from a speech made by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004 in the run-up to the non-proliferation treaty review process that took place last year.

We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.

What is the relevance of my introducing that into this debate? I do not have time to go through the 10 or so paragraphs of the preamble, but I want to refer briefly to two of them. One is paragraph six:

RECOGNIZING further that, despite non-proliferation and counter proliferation endeavours, efforts by others to acquire nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery pose a major security challenge.

I think that is actually a statement of fact. I do not know that anyone would disagree with that preambular statement, but it is worrisome in the extreme that the real implication, the real meaning of that clause indicates in essence that Canada agrees with the Bush administration that somehow non-proliferation efforts are destined to fail. That is deeply worrisome.

Let us go then to preamble paragraph eight. I will read from it very briefly. It is very difficult for people to follow. It is difficult enough for us on such short notice to really thoroughly examine this, but I will read preamble paragraph eight:

ACKNOWLEDGING that space has become an important dimension of national interest and has become an increasingly significant component of most traditional military activities, and that a growing number of nations have acquired or have ready access to space services that could be used for strategic and tactical purposes against the interests of Canada and the United States.

What we are really seeing here is a frightening indication that we are buying into the notion that there is no confidence that we can really deal with nuclear non-proliferation, with weapons of mass destruction proliferation, through anything but military means. This is a very worrisome thing.

On reading preamble paragraph eight, it is very difficult not to come to the conclusion that what this really means, what is really in the mind of our government in having made the changes to this agreement that we are now asked to ratify, is that effectively we are steadily and surely taking steps, maybe baby steps, but I think significant steps toward Canadian participation in Bush's missile defence madness.

There is a great deal of recognition this should be worrisome to us. The United States is one of the countries that has been very irresponsible in regard to upholding its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In fact, in reviewing some of the documents leading up to the 2005 NPT review, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was identified as one of nine major treaties in which the U.S. government was severely non-compliant. I think it would not be an exaggeration to say severely delinquent.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is absolutely crucial to global security, yet the U.S. is currently in non-compliance with the NPT requirements. When we examine the preamble and then the substance of the agreement that is before us, it is very worrisome that it almost seems as though what we are willing to be part of is a kind of tossing in of the towel on using our international mechanisms to really deal with these growing threats.

We need to be looking at what are the ways that we can in a genuinely multilateral way begin to look at the real threats to our security and what we can do about them as preventive measures as well as defensive measures.

Last fall I had the opportunity on behalf of the Canada chapter of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament to be at the United Nations and to speak on the occasion of UN Disarmament Week. It also happened to be the 60th anniversary of the United Nations. It was of great concern that after the virtual collapse of the non-proliferation treaty process in the spring, six nations, of which Canada was one, came together to really look at the ways to use UN mechanisms that were available to get the non-proliferation process going again.

I heard reliably from a number of sources that the United States was extremely aggressive and the word was used, threatening, to several of those member nations in actively discouraging that there be any attempt made to reignite, to restart that non-proliferation review process.

There were six nations involved. Canada was one as a middle power. What was not only very distressing but as a Canadian parliamentarian and as a Canadian, I found it, and I think most people would find it humiliating that while five other nations were willing to stand up to those pressures brought to bear at the United Nations by the United States, Canada was the one that caved and withdrew.

Our point is that there are many implications to this agreement that we are being asked to ratify. It deserves to be fully aired before the Canadian people. We should use our parliamentary committees to look more thoroughly at what it is we are committing ourselves to do and how it fits into a global structure for peace and security in this very turbulent and dangerous world.

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, let me assure the member that our government does share the very heartfelt sentiment of the member for Halifax that non-proliferation efforts should succeed. We certainly are not throwing in the towel on that. However, in view of the track records that we see in Iran and North Korea, sadly the non-proliferation treaty is not always as effective as we might like it to be and we have to recognize in this world that protecting ourselves with a hope and a prayer is not always good enough. That is why we have to realize that at times defence solutions are required.

However, I want to go back to what the member for New Westminster—Coquitlam said because there were inaccuracies that need to be corrected. She spoke about how the new Norad treaty puts on the table maritime surveillance and how this was a Trojan Horse that the Americans would participate in maritime surveillance. I appreciate there was a concern that the three days they have had to read it is not long enough, but the treaty says, “Maritime surveillance and control shall continue to be exercised by national commands”. That means by Canada Command.

If the concern is that in maritime surveillance being included we do not have an adequate recognition of our sovereignty, in fact, this is a victory for our sovereignty. There is an acknowledgement of maritime sovereignty there and surveillance and command remain exclusively national matters. That was not accurately reflected. In fact, it was inaccurately suggested that maritime surveillance was included.

In terms of the inclusion of the availability of information on ballistic missile defence, that is not new in this treaty. That has been there since 2004, since the previous amendment. In terms of looking at the changes of what is new in this treaty, there is simply no change whatsoever, no step in any direction toward missile defence.

As for the Bi-National Planning Group, I am sure that the member for Halifax West would be happy to share with the House the fact that it is coming to an end. That group is shutting down this month. As a result, any fears the member has from it should be dissipated. I am sure the member would like to confirm that to the House.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Mr. Speaker, the parliamentary secretary and I have a very different notion of what would constitute a victory for sovereignty. It seems to me a victory for Canadian sovereignty and a victory for democracy would be for us to accept the challenge put forward by the NDP defence critic on behalf of the New Democratic Party that we should do as has been done many times before. We should extend the current agreement without making these changes until there is a full airing through our parliamentary committees. We should invite informed researchers, policy experts who have done tremendous work on these issues to come before parliamentary committees and open up the debate.

It is a real worry to people that we are on a path to deeper integration. It is not a partisan comment to say that we are slowly but surely becoming more tightly integrated militarily, in foreign policy terms, in environmental terms, in trade terms with our American neighbour to the south. It is not a hostile thing to say that. It is a statement of fact.

No one can seriously deny that some of the changes are not major changes, but they are further steps in the direction of deeper integration about which many Canadians have had a great deal to say in the context of the international policy statement review process. Overwhelmingly they have expressed real concerns about how Canadian values and vision for a more secure world in which true human security is at the centre of our concerns is really going to be what is going to guide us in carrying out our work on behalf of Canadians.

Who are we here on behalf of if not Canadians to whom we are answerable? How does this in any way respond to the desire of Canadians to be sure that they have some say in what kind of future we chart for them and future generations?

[Stockwell Day, Conservative, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, this is a very important item for us to be considering and debating in the House of Commons, on behalf of all Canadians, and we must keep that in mind. We are here on behalf of all Canadians. We should always reflect upon the first and primary responsibility of any national government, which is the safety and security of its citizens. Therefore, we should look at the renewal of the Norad contract in that light.

Will this enhance the safety and security of our citizens in Canada and, therefore, enhance our national interest? In that light my colleague with whom I will be sharing my time, the member for Provencher, the Minister of Justice, will reflect on these things.

For Canadians who may be interested, but not fully aware of the history of this agreement, I will reflect for a couple of minutes.

In the beginning and moving toward the first half of the last century, changes in how countries went to war against each other were affecting the type of alliances that countries would make to protect themselves.

At the start of the previous century, it was never dreamt that machines would be able to fly through the air and conduct war from a distance on other countries. With the inception of that in the first world war to a degree and then the ongoing capability, as nations like Canada and the United States saw moving through the thirties, not only was air warfare a fact of life, but the ability of airplanes to fly great distances, without having to refuel and to carry heavy bomb loads, was a reality. There was the onset of aircraft carriers.

All of this caused nations everywhere, and specifically Canada and the United States, to realize that there was a need to work together to protect our individual nations and corporately to protect the continent. As far back as 1940 with the advent of the Ogdensburg agreement, the initial makings of the Norad agreement, the air defence agreement to defend North America, started to have its genesis. Through the cold war, it was then evident to everybody around the world, and certainly to us in North America, that countries now had the capability through missiles alone to attack from a great distance and cause terrible damage and harm to another country. The need to work together for the protection of our individual nations, but being linked geographically with the United States to protect the continent, became paramount. Therefore, the agreement was put together.

However, when it was first put together, that Canada would work with the United States, we had, as we do now, issues of our own sovereignty and our own national interests. We wanted to ensure that there would be equal say in this agreement. Therefore, from 1958, and even until today, there is a joint sharing of command. There is literally times when there will be a Canadian commander, who is in the command position at a certain time of night or day in that great mountain, that great cavern in Colorado, directing the operations of the North American air defence system. For part of a shift it will be a Canadian and the other part it will be an American.

As a matter fact, a Canadian was on the command shift during 9/11 when signals and instructions had to go out across North America saying that all planes had to be grounded and that no incoming traffic could come into the United States. It was quite a significant time in history for a Canadian to be in charge of the North American air defence system at that particular time. Now, as is required, there is a renewal coming up for the agreement.

We have to look at the gains that can be made and are made for Canada in terms of our national interest. We always have to put Canadian sovereignty and Canadian national interests first. Through this agreement, our entire southern border is protected at very little cost to us. Ten per cent of the whole agreement falls upon Canadian shoulders, with ninety per cent being picked up on the American side.

When we look at the fact that we can offer protection to our neighbours to the south through observation and our capabilities to the north, and that together we can work to protect our own nations individually and the continent collectively, this is a tremendous advantage for us. There are few countries in the world have that capability and that advantage.

Because of the agreement, we are able to have insight and also influence on U.S. decisions related to military, intelligence gathering and the development of certain products that are needed when it comes to looking at protecting an entire continent. There is the fact that Canadian research and development teams and companies have great access to the type of equipment and capability that make this type of agreement possible. Some 50,000 aerospace jobs alone in Canada depend directly on the agreement. Not that we should be in the agreement just for economic reasons alone, but it is a tremendous advantage to us that we can.

The fact that we are adding a maritime component of this does not diminish in any way our national sovereignty. It simply increases the warning component. If there are threats from sea, not just the air now, in those instances, if they are threats internal to Canada, then Canada has full command. If they are internal to the United States, it has full command in those situations.

We are adding this marine component because we realize the capability now of those who would threaten peace, the nations around the world that have declared themselves to be haters and despisers of democracy and freedom. We need to be able to protect ourselves from ways and means of which they might use to deploy their destructive purposes upon us.

We look at the agreement also in terms of what does it bind us to and are we committed forever? This is an agreement that we want to have based on being a permanent agreement, but with a four year renewal clause. At least every four years it has to be renewed. Should Canada ever decide to get out of the agreement, we can pull out of that on a year's notice.

The commitment level in time and resource is definitely manageable. What is not manageable is our increased risk. People might say that the cold war is over. After the cold war, there was even discussion about whether NATO should exist, let alone Norad.

We know we are into a cold peace now in many ways. North Korea has been very aggressive in terms of its ballistic developments and the warheads that it is capable of putting on to its ballistics. Iran is far from having the capability to launch an attack on North America from its distance, but that is only now. In the future we know these nations increase in their capabilities.

It simply makes sense, and to fulfill our obligation to our citizens, that we do what is responsible as a government, ensuring that the safety and security of our citizens are being put first. It is for these reasons, in my view, that it is very advantageous for us to sign on to this agreement.

I listen to my colleagues, and I am not doubting their care and concern about Canada, but I wish they would be clear. Do they want in or out of this agreement? They use all these words to try and appeal to one group here or one group there. I wish they would just come out and say it. Do they want out of this agreement? They come out with all these verbal attacks and raise all these questions, and there should be questions raised about this agreement. We are trying to address them. If they are not for the agreement, then stand up and say so. They have to make that case and let Canadians know where they are at.

We are for the agreement for all the reasons that we have stated. I hope other colleagues would agree. We are working, at least partially, with an opposition across the floor which was a party to signing amendments to the agreement as recently as 2004. It was in place as a government when it signed on to the agreement. I take for granted, although I do not want to do that in a way that would diminish the members input into this agreement, but I hope we will have that type of collaboration The agreement has served us well. It is also cost saving. As I said, we only have to put 10% of the cost of Norad into this.

The agreement has served us well. It is also cost saving. As I said, we only have to put 10% of the cost into Norad. Yesterday we announced $1.4 billion, in what I think was a pretty positive budget, to go into safety and security toward our borders. However, we would not have been able to apply that yesterday because we would have had to redirect untold amounts of funds to make up for the fact that we were not plugged into a Norad agreement with the United States providing the lion's share of that protective capability.

We are pleased to do this. We are pleased that we have a one-year out clause if necessary. We are pleased to say to Canadians that it is in our best interest and our sovereign interest to continue to sign this historic agreement to protect North America.

[Libby Davies, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very surprised to hear the comments from the minister when he said that the NDP had not been clear. If he heard both our members, who put forward the NDP position, he would have heard some very substantive questions and arguments about why we think this agreement is flawed and why we think it is a clear erosion of Canadian sovereignty.

One of our concerns, and it is certainly a concern that is expressed by many Canadians, is the government is taking a 50-year-old agreement that came out of the cold war, and it served its time, and is trying to give it a new life. One of the questions before us is whether Norad is now being used, in effect, by stealth as a cover vehicle for deep integration with the U.S., resulting in the loss of Canadian sovereignty. This is a very legitimate question, based on what is in the agreement before us tonight.

To come back to the Bi-National Planning Group, it states in its report:

The upcoming NORAD Agreement renewal...is an important step towards enhancing the defense and security of our continent. To continue this momentum a “Comprehensive Defense and Security Agreement” is the next logical step, as it would bring unity of effort and direction to each of the defense, security and foreign policy organizations, including NORAD.

There is a very real question that the government has not answered, and that is, where does this agreement take us in terms of the amendments that we see? We know one of the amendments, amendment h. is:

Arrangements shall be maintained to ensure effective sharing, between the Parties, of information and intelligence relevant to the Norad missions.

There is a great concern that this amendment, and there are others as well, moves us into this arena of shared intelligence and integration and we will lose decision making that we have in this country.

I challenge the minister to say that the NDP is not being clear. It seems to me we are expressing the very serious concerns we have heard from Canadians. What is not clear is where the government is taking Canada in terms of its integration with the U.S. That has not been put forward tonight by the government. It has a responsibility to do that and to come clean with the Canadian people. We would like to hear the government's position on that.

[Stockwell Day, Conservative, Okanagan—Coquihalla, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will attempt to address some of those concerns. I said in my remarks that questions are important. Valid questions are even more important and we are waiting to hear some of those. However, to simply dismiss the agreement by projecting that there is stealth going on is not valid. It is always this creation of the straw man or the straw person that one can deflect any intent to just stand up and make a decision. Bring on the legitimate questions, but do not dismiss it by saying there is some stealth going on when there is no evidence of that.

The member quite rightly talked about the binational planning group. If she is saying there is some kind of stealth going on, she is questioning the Canadians who form half of that binational planning group and assuming it is a group of Canadians that is secretly planning something other than what we are stating here. That stretches the imagination a little. Bring us that evidence because we would certainly want to know if that type of thing was going on.

She talked about the sharing of intelligence. Is she unaware of the amount of intelligence sharing that goes on now to protect our borders alone? We had an excellent pilot project called Shiprider on the Great Lakes just recently where our intelligence and enforcement officers worked together in teams to ensure that the border would be protected. They tried out that particular type of approach, each maintaining their own areas of sovereignty. American officers could not conduct their activities in Canada and we could not unilaterally go into the United States and conduct ours.

Through the sharing of joint intelligence great synergies can develop. No man is an island, no woman is an island, and no nation is an island any longer. We have to share our intelligence capabilities with one another to enhance our degree of protection. I say to go ahead and raise these questions.

The member also mentioned renewing the contract. Of course that is what we are doing. It has been renewed a number of times since 1958. We are saying we will not commit ourselves to something without any kind of renewal and that is why we want to be in a position where every four years we will review this agreement. If at any time Canadians send us the signal that they want us to move out of this, we can do so with a one year notice.

She can talk about consulting with Canadians, as she has, but I have not heard a resounding voice from the majority of Canadians saying, “Get us out of this deal, we do not want to enhance our own protection this way”. I have just not heard that.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians recognize that it is the fundamental responsibility of the Government of Canada to protect Canada and Canadians in an increasingly complex and uncertain environment. This past decade has seen significant and interconnected changes to the international security landscape. Exploring ways to strengthen defence and security arrangements with the United States, including an enhanced role for Norad, is in Canada's national interest.

In response to the events of September 11, 2001, and recognizing the potential cross-border impact of emerging security threats, Canada and the United States have pursued a range of measures to enhance continental security cooperation both at home and abroad.

As part of its response, the United States established the U.S. Northern Command, mandated to protect American sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defence infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

In Canada, the government developed a comprehensive security agenda by investing billions of dollars in domestic security arrangements and creating Canada Command, which is responsible for Canada and its air and marine approaches as a single operational theatre.

Today, the threats to our safety and way of life in North America are inextricably linked to what is happening far beyond our shores. Canada and the United States enjoy one of the most extensive and longstanding defence relationships in the world. The tradition of bilateral cooperation in the defence of North America dates back to 1940 and is a natural complement to the extensive political, economic, cultural, and social ties that link our two countries.

I noted during the debate in respect of softwood lumber how our colleagues in the New Democratic Party are now vigorous defenders of the NAFTA and do not want to see any compromise that would in any way jeopardize that close economic relationship between the Americans and Canada. In that sense, our colleagues, the New Democrats, have progressed. They see the benefit of this economic relationship and in fact are one of the most vocal parties in this House, concerned that the free trade created by NAFTA would be in any way compromised.

They have come a long way in that respect, but now we also have to proceed and put this military agreement into its appropriate context and also demonstrate to our colleagues in the New Democratic Party the benefit that this creates for Canada.

It has been well understood, for more than 60 years, that the North American continent can only be defended cooperatively. We need to work together with our neighbours. We cannot simply say that we will protect the continent from air attack, but that protecting it from marine attack is somehow inconsistent with the principles on which Norad was established. I do not think that is inconsistent. It is perfectly consistent and as threats change, the agreement needs to change, and that is what this new amendment to Norad is doing.

Since 1958, Norad has been a key component of this bilateral defence relationship and a pillar of Canada's global security architecture. More than any defence organization, Norad embodies the binational teamwork that is needed to counter today's transnational threats. I note my colleague's comments in respect to who was in fact directing Norad at the time of the September attack in 2001.

Norad detects and warns of attacks against North America from aircraft missiles or space vehicles, and participates in the surveillance and control of American and Canadian airspace.

The benefits to Canada have been substantial. Norad has provided Canada with enhanced protection from direct military attack. Norad has reinforced Canadian sovereignty by providing influence over American decisions where Canadian interests are involved.

How could we simply allow the Americans to make decisions over Canada? That is what it means to pull out of Norad or in any way limit the influence of Norad. We would have Americans making decisions about Canadian airspace and Canadian waters because the Americans would do that unilaterally in the legitimate defence of their country.

We want to be at the table. We have, through Norad, influence over American decisions that affect our sovereignty. This reinforces our sovereignty.

Norad has ensured that Canada and the Americans are full partners in continental airspace defence. In short, Norad provides Canada with an extremely cost effective capability to exercise surveillance and control over Canadian airspace.

For Canada's investment of approximately $350 million, or roughly 10% of Norad's cost, we receive a degree of security we would never hope to achieve on our own. We should think of it. If we had to provide that security on our own, how would we pay for our social programs? How would we pay for our health programs? Our health and social programs are often financially available to Canadians because Americans are picking up a lion's share of the defence security for this country. To in any way bad mouth the goodwill of Americans in this context is simply unacceptable.

The events of September 11, 2001, underscored Norad's relevance in today's security environment. Norad has since made some important changes to adapt to the new threat environment by increasing operational readiness and its ability to respond to threats from both outside and inside North America's airspace.

Negotiations between Canada and the United States to renew the Norad agreement have highlighted the genuine interest on both sides to enhance the Canadian-American defence relationship in meaningful ways.

We now have a permanent Norad agreement. This change underscores the long term commitment of both Canada and the United States for the joint defence of North America. This, however, does not signify inflexibility, for contrary to the prior requirement of a fixed renewal period every five years, this agreement we are debating tonight calls for renewal every four years or at the request of either party. This will continue to force re-evaluation of the arrangement on a regular basis or when extraordinary events occur that could cause Norad to evolve to meet new challenges.

The new agreement also reflects the reality that threats to North America now come in all shapes and sizes, and from a variety of directions. Significantly, it recognizes that threats to North America do not simply come from the airspace domain. The agreement therefore expands Norad's mission to warn both governments about real and potential maritime threats to the continent. As a result, Canada and the United States now have a more complete picture of the approaches to the waterways of North America.

In conclusion, I began this speech by saying that Canada and the United States enjoy one of the most extensive and long standing defence relationships in the world. Norad has been an essential pillar in the defence of North America. The new agreement is flexible enough to evolve with changing global threats, including maritime threats. Norad has served the interests of Canadians and Canada and I would urge the support of the agreement by the House.

[Denise Savoie, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I fear that the hon. minister has misunderstood the NDP position toward NAFTA, but that is perhaps the subject of another debate.

The member assures us that this Norad agreement is simply an extension of our relationship with the United States. However, in its report, the bi-national planning group describes the extension of Norad as the first step in a gradual process of full integration with not only American military policy, but also American diplomatic policy.

The report refers to establishing a single organization responsible for warning and response in all domains with respect to defence and security.

As I understand it, this could include Canada's participation in ballistic missile defence, something that greatly concerns me and most Canadians. I do not want to assume anything, but I would like a guarantee for myself and all Canadians that the government will not secretly involve us in missile defence, as it did with Norad.

I would therefore ask the minister whether he is prepared to support an amendment to the Norad agreement that specifically and unequivocally excludes pursuing integration with the American military apparatus and Canada's involvement in any ballistic missile defence system.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Indeed, Mr. Speaker, I would like to know what the NDP position is on NAFTA. I know that in the last election their candidate in my riding ran on a platform of how he was proud to be associated with a party that opposed NAFTA and wanted to be pulled out of NAFTA. When I was hearing the free trade discussions coming from the NDP in respect of softwood lumber, I thought those members had shifted their position from the one pressed by their candidate in my riding. That certainly is the topic of another discussion.

In respect of my friend's concerns about extending the agreement, I think what we are seeing here is not an extension but a response to a perceived threat. We have always seen the threat as coming from the air. Now what we are saying is that the threat does not come simply from the air; it can also come from the maritime areas. What we need to do is ensure that the--

[An hon. member]

Watch out for the Maritimes.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

We are very concerned about the protection of our maritime coast as well, because that is indeed where the threat can first be felt.

There are no guarantees in respect of where the next threat will materialize, but the agreement is clear that this does not extend to ballistic missiles. On that, the agreement is clear. My colleagues in the NDP should take some comfort in that.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Mr. Speaker, I have a technical question and a comment. Could the minister explain the amending formula and the least number of people who could be involved in an amendment?

As well, of course, a maritime threat is not new. It has been here since the beginning of our nation.

My comment is for the technocrats working with the agreement. On September 11, as the member has mentioned a number of times, I was actually in a congressman's office in Washington, away from my riding. In my riding in Yukon there was a very chaotic situation in which American fighter jets brought into my riding a Korean jetliner that was thought to be hijacked. There was a lot of chaos in town. I think the communications were not as good as they might have been. In fact, it took months for the local citizens to understand the situation.

So I would encourage the people who work on the agreement at the base level to make sure that local citizens of whatever country is involved in an incident are made quite aware of that incident and know what is going on. I think that will then give them more confidence in the agreement.