Mr. Speaker, more than a decade ago when I rose for the first time in this place as a newly minted MP, full of lofty ideals and untested enthusiasm, I verbally underscored my belief that all human life is sacred from the moment of conception to the moment of natural death.
Since that time I have been tested in nearly every conceivable manner. My perceptions and beliefs have been challenged and, in some instances, I have altered my positions in a manner that more accurately reflects evolving constituents' wishes and feedback or in a manner consistent with the ever-changing state of knowledge on a given subject.
That aside, my core beliefs or what I view to be absolute truths have stood the test of time and remain a constant factor in my voting record.
With the latter in mind, I am on my feet this evening but this time I will frame my remarks within the specific context of Bill C-291.
For many, Bill C-291 represents just another round in the age old abortion debate. It represents a nibbling away at the edges of the perceptions of the 1988 Supreme Court decision on the subject. I would reject any such notions and I challenge those people to lay solid evidence on the table here tonight defending that position, which I would believe to be rooted in specious logic.
First, to be absolutely clear, Bill C-291 is not a bill about abortion. It is a bill about protecting women from violence. To be precise, Bill C-291 is about protecting the choice of a woman to carry a fetus to full term. Surely we can agree that a woman has every right to make that determination.
Many Canadians do not understand that there are no protections in place for viable unborn children who, despite the mother's desire to carry to full term, are harmed or terminated at the hands of those seeking to perpetrate violent crimes. In some cases the said violence is committed in a manner specifically targeting the unborn child. This is astounding to me.
I for nearly 13 years have listened to some of my colleagues speak on the merits of a woman's right to choose but now I learn that some of those same people will not vote to protect the woman's choice if it involves the choice to keep her baby.
When the member of Parliament for Vegreville—Wainwright sought to defend this bill against irrational committee allegations that it was unconstitutional, he cited several instances to the committee where violent and criminal actions were perpetrated upon third party against prospective mothers who had chosen to carry to full term.
An example that has already been cited this evening is the one about Olivia Talbot of Edmonton who was 27 weeks pregnant with her son Lane Jr. In November 2005, Olivia was shot three times in the abdomen and twice in the head. Because we offer no legal protection for unborn children today, no charge could be laid in the death of baby Lane.
Another pregnant Edmonton woman, Liana White, was slain by her husband in the summer of 2005. Again no charges could be laid in her baby's death.
Many of my constituents and, indeed, many Canadians would be shocked to learn that when an attacker kills a woman's unborn child no charges are laid in the death of that child even when the attacker purposefully intended to kill the child.
To use the words of the member for Vegreville—Wainwright, his bill seeks to address this injustice by making it a separate offence to kill or injure a pre-born child during the commission of an offence against the child's mother. That offence would be the offence of which the person would have been found guilty had the injury or death occurred to the mother. In other words, the unborn child would be treated as if it were a human being and the existing legal protection already defined for human beings in the Criminal Code would apply.
The exact offence depends on what existing sections of the Criminal Code would apply under a specified set of circumstances. Just to be clear, Bill C-291 is not seeking to invent new offences. In the same vein I should point out that Bill C-291 actually excludes abortion. The provisions of the legislative proposal would apply only while a perpetrator is committing or attempting to commit an offence against the mother.
Again, Bill C-291 is not about limiting a choice but rather it is about instituting protections for women when they have decided that they wish to carry their child to term.
I also understand that some have objected to Bill C-291 because they have come to believe that the Supreme Court has determined that a fetus cannot be afforded the legal protections of a human being as defined by the Criminal Code. To that I would again say respectfully that notions to this effect would be inaccurate.
Currently, section 223(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada defines a human being as a child that has completely proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother. Furthermore, section 222(1) of Criminal Code of Canada defines a homicide as the act perpetrated by a person when directly or indirectly by any means causes the death of a human being. To me this seems simple enough.
Currently the Criminal Code of Canada does not consider a fetus to be a human being as defined by the code. This proposal would seek to extend certain legal protections to the fetus in instances when the mother was being victimized in a criminal manner. This would have no impact on other debates involving fetal rights, or the greater issue of abortion in general. It would simply seek to add certain protection to women who might fall victim to violent criminal activities.
Again, while generally speaking I support a pro-life stance on the issue, in this instance I support freedom of choice, that is to say, the freedom to choose to conceive and deliver a child without threat of violence being perpetrated against prospective mothers.
I would also like to take a moment to address this notion of Bill C-291's constitutionality. I happen to believe that the committee is mistaken with respect to the state of the court's notions on the subject. Again while I do not believe that Bill C-291 is unconstitutional and I do not outright accept that it is about abortion, for the purpose of responding to claims to the contrary, I would offer the following.
First, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that it is incumbent upon Parliament to establish parameters under which an abortion could be permitted. For example, in The Queen v. Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott in 1988, when the Supreme Court struck down the abortion law, it was done for procedural and administrative reasons only. The court clearly did not find a charter right to abortion, but rather articulated that it was up to Parliament to determine what level of protection to afford the unborn child. It said it had to be done in such a way as to balance the rights of the woman with the rights of the fetus. In that instance Chief Justice Dickson said:
I agree that protection of foetal interests by Parliament Is also a valid governmental objective. It follows that balancing these interests, with the lives and health of women a major factor, is clearly an important governmental objective.
Justice Beetz said:
I am of the view that the protection of the foetus is and, as the Court of Appeal observed, always has been, a valid objective in Canadian criminal law...I think s. 1 of the Charter authorizes reasonable limits to be put on a woman's right having regard to the state interest in the protection of the foetus.
These sentiments were echoed again in 1989 by the court in Jean-Guy Tremblay v. Chantale Daigle when the court stated:
The Court is not required to enter the philosophical and theological debates about whether or not a foetus is a person, but, rather, to answer the legal question of whether the Quebec legislature has accorded the foetus personhood....Decisions based upon broad social, political, moral and economic choices are more appropriately left to the legislature.
This was restated in 1997 in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.) In this case involving a glue-sniffing pregnant woman, the issue at hand was whether child protective services could force a pregnant woman into custody in order to protect the unborn child. As in the previous case cited, the Supreme Court said that according to the existing law, the unborn child had no rights and therefore the woman could not be forced into custody. The court stated:
The law of Canada does not recognize the unborn child as a legal person possessing rights.
The court went on to ask at what stage would a fetus acquire rights. The court said that such thorny moral and social issues were better dealt with by elected legislators than the courts.
What I am trying to say is that the Supreme Court has consistently called upon Parliament to step up to the plate and to provide the courts with guidelines with respect to fetal rights. I respectfully submit that Bill C-291 was a genuine attempt at just that.
In closing, I would unreservedly underscore my support for Bill C-291 and renew my objection to the logic that has deemed the legislation to be unvotable. I firmly believe that the process was politicized in a manner that ignored legal precedent and continuing requests from the Supreme Court on the subject. I would like to compliment the member for Vegreville—Wainwright for putting this legislation forward in the House.
Hopefully this debate will bring this matter to light in the future so that we can actually deal with the complexities of the issue rather than hide behind the politics of it.