Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his work on the committee.
On the question of Motion No. 1, I will bring to the House's attention exactly what this amendment does. It deals with the provisions around parliamentary secretaries and ministers of the Crown voting on matters in which they have a direct commercial or financial interest. The member has asked why we believe this should continue to be in the law. There are a couple of reasons, but the most obvious is that if a member of cabinet or a parliamentary secretary has a financial interest in a particular sector or industry, they should not be able to use their position in the House of Commons to further that interest.
We did hear some interesting and persuasive testimony to the contrary from the House legal clerk. He believed that it infringed upon members of Parliament and their parliamentary privileges. We, however, take a different point of view.
As initially proposed by the government, subclause 6(2) would have expressly prohibited a minister or a parliamentary secretary from debating or voting on a question “that would place him or her in a conflict of interest”. This provision is an essential element of the conflict of interest regime that we are attempting to codify in the accountability act. It is based in part on a similar provision found in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons, itself forming part of the Standing Orders of the House.
These provisions already exist in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and therefore we believe they should be codified directly into statutory law. That is what the accountability act sought to do in the first place. It was to take what were rules of the House and make them statutory law, codified in law so that they could be enforced more.
Absent such a provision, it would be open for a minister or a parliamentary secretary to vote even where to do so would be a conflict of interest and even where the conflict of interest and Ethics Commissioner had ordered him or her to refrain from voting. In other words, an individual could come into the House against the explicit instructions of the Ethics Commissioner and vote on an issue in which he or she had a direct financial interest.
In addition, absent such a ban, a minister or parliamentary secretary who did vote on a question that would put him or her in a conflict would not be subject to complaint, as no breach of the act would be made. In other words, they could stand in the House and vote on something that related directly to their personal financial interest and no member of the House would be in a position to file a complaint with the Ethics Commissioner because there would be no statutory prohibition on doing such.
That is the reason why we have introduced this amendment, Motion No. 1. We stand by it. We believe it is the right thing to do. We encourage all members of the House to support it.