Mr. Speaker, it was a privilege to serve with other members of Parliament on the committee studying Bill C-2, the accountability act. I think we did tremendous work on behalf of Canadians.
From the testimony we heard and from the work that was done, we had a thorough vetting of the issues related to accountability. We heard from a great number of witnesses and we worked in a way to move the bill forward. Members on all sides of the House sacrificed a great deal to see the bill through committee.
It is the number one priority of our government and it is something that was long overdue. Canadians were demanding more accountability from public office holders and from Parliament, more accountability in the way their tax dollars are spent and more transparency in the way we run our democratic process. This bill, at the end of the day, accomplishes all those things.
I want to speak to Motion No. 9, which is a serious motion and one I urge all members of the House to consider as it impacts on some very fundamental rights and issues relating even to members of Parliament.
Specifically, the changes brought in by adding two provisions, subclauses 41.4 and 41.5, to the new MP trust fund rules proposed for insertion into the Parliament of Canada Act raise serious legal policy issues regarding the independence of prosecutions from political interference, as well as serious Charter of Rights issues related to the ability to get a fair hearing. They also raise some concern with regard to the Constitution and the division of power. It is for those reasons that the government proposed reversing those amendments.
To be clear, I would urge all members of Parliament to consider this amendment very carefully. It is not a minor amendment like dotting an i or crossing a t.
The amendment in subclause 41.4 would require:
Any person...who has reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed under section 41.1 shall...notify the Committee of the House of Commons designated to consider such matters.
This is the clause that prohibits members of Parliament from accepting benefits or income from a trust established by reason of their positions as members of Parliament, and from circumventing this rule.
The committee may then issue an opinion on the matter. The committee would study the facts of the situation and then issue an opinion on the matter. The new paragraph 41.4(4) provides that, in any prosecution of that offence, if there is a criminal prosecution of the offence, the prosecution shall “provide the judge with a copy of the opinion of the Committee”, which would be a committee of this House. It is important to note the exact wording, “and the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.
Further, a similar process is proposed in the second amendment, subclause 41.5, for contraventions of subclause 41.3, and that authorizes the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders regarding the treatment of MPs' trusts, with the same requirement as I outlined before in paragraph 41.4(4), that “the judge shall consider”--the committee's--“opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.
Obviously it is pretty clear, even on the face of the wording, that these amendments raise serious legal policy and constitutional concerns.
First and foremost, the amendments are inconsistent and completely at odds with the fundamental principle underlying the new director of public prosecutions provisions contained in Bill C-2, the federal accountability act, namely, the need to ensure the independence of prosecutions from political interference. It is that perception of political interference, the whole idea that somehow politicians could influence a judicial outcome, that is the whole reason for the underpinnings of the move to the director of public prosecutions. It underlines a lot of what we have done in the federal accountability act.
Obviously I hope that all members of the House would agree with me that we should not have political interference in the judicial process. I think that is fairly basic. This amendment, as the bill currently stands, would provide for just such an interference.
Second, the amendments present a serious risk of violating the Canadian charter right to a fair trial of a member of Parliament charged with an offence. All of us as Canadians, and even those of us who are members of Parliament, are entitled to a fair trial under our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
By requiring a judge to consider a parliamentary committee's opinion on whether an MP has committed an offence, the amendments would preclude a judge from respecting the procedural safeguards mandated by the charter, for example, by requiring a criminal court to consider evidence that is otherwise inadmissible either as hearsay or as opinion evidence with respect to an MP's guilt or innocence and/or to consider prior incriminating testimony, including testimony that the committee may have compelled from the accused member of Parliament. To be clear, this has an impact on the charter rights of members of Parliament and would undermine the right under the charter to a fair trial if we allowed this to proceed as proposed.
Third and finally, the amendment appears to undermine the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held and has often stated that this is a fundamental constitutional principle. In the House, we all know that there is a separation among the executive, the judicial and the legislative branches. It is essential to having a thriving democracy and fairness in our system that those divisions be kept sound. It is a basic constitutional principle.
In passing this as it is, it would impinge on at least the perception of judicial impartiality and judicial independence, another fundamental principle that flows from our Constitution. It is for these reasons that I ask all members to consider deleting proposed sections 41.4 and 41.5 from clause 99.
To sum up, the independence of the judiciary, the right for a member of Parliament to get a fair trial under our charter of rights, and the division and the separation of powers among the judicial, executive and legislative branches of our government are all pretty basic fundamental values that we all hold dear. I ask all members to consider that when we consider Motion No. 9.
I urge that the motion be adopted because otherwise we risk putting members of Parliament in a very serious situation with regard to their rights and we also undermine the independence of the judiciary in this country.