Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to thank my colleague from Vancouver Island North for becoming involved in the democratic process and for making the effort to introduce a bill. However, I do not share her opinion, and I will explain why.
The Government of Canada carefully examined Bill C-295 and determined that we cannot support this bill, which amends the Canada Labour Code to prohibit the use of replacement workers in sectors under federal jurisdiction.
The Government of Canada reached this conclusion after taking a careful look at the bill and in light of two very basic principles. First, does the proposed legislation maintain the fragile balance needed in labour-management relations, which are so vital to Canada's economic and social performance? Second, is there evidence to support the idea that such a law would benefit workers? The answer to these two questions is no.
Labour-management relations have repercussions on both management and unions, and any law that concerns those relations must take both parties' aspirations into account. I would just like to mention that the repercussions of labour-management relations go far beyond the two parties' concerns. I will explain.
Labour-management relations affect Canada's economic and social performance. They affect production, employment, salary gains, profits, individual incomes, productivity and competitiveness, to name just a few of the main aspects of an economic and social system. A government must keep this broader picture in mind when making appropriate laws in the area of labour-management relations. There is a basic principle that should always be taken into account. This principle calls for a balance between the aspirations of unions and those of management and requires that the greater national interest always be kept in mind.
The second principle—the principle of evidence—is equally important. Before a law is amended, there should be clear evidence that the change will be beneficial. What is important here is balance. The current system is in line with the two principles I have described.
The Canada Labour Code was amended in 1999, barely seven years ago, in an attempt to modernize our legislation and improve collective bargaining. During consultations, balance was achieved, and it was approved by unions and employers alike.
In fact, both sides presented legitimate arguments regarding the issue to be considered and, in a fair and transparent manner, the government took the time to examine all arguments before enacting the legislation, which, still to this day, respects the interests of both parties as well as national interests.
The provisions regarding replacement workers in the Canada Labour Code that were enacted in 1999 are balanced, work well, and do not need to be amended. The current provisions reflect the approach agreed upon by stakeholders within the unions following extensive consultation when Part I of the Canada Labour Code was amended in 1999. The current provisions take into account not only the interests of those two sides, but also national interests.
Bear in mind that this legislation regulates the federal private sector, which includes all the main industries of the infrastructure that ensures the proper functioning of our economy, such as air, rail, sea and ground transportation, to name a few. For those who may not be familiar with the details of the current system, allow me to explain how the existing legislation brings a balanced approach to the issue of replacement workers.
Current provisions do not impose a general prohibition on replacement workers, but they do ban the use of replacement workers if the intent is to undermine a union's representational capacity.
The employees in a union or an employee association, if they feel wronged, can file a complaint with the Canada Industrial Relations Board if they believe the employer is indeed using an unfair labour practice.
The Canada Industrial Relations Board has the mandate and expertise to resolve such problems, which they review quite quickly.
What are the problems with this bill? Allow me to explain how the situation would change if this bill were enacted. If passed, this bill would disrupt the balance of the interests, a disruption that would hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of the collective bargaining process.
The main economic leverage of the unions during the collective bargaining process is their right to strike. The employer's countervailing power is not the right to a lockout; it is the right to try for a short period to continue to operate its business with a certain limited capacity during a work stoppage until the problems are resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Such is the true test of the economic force that stems from the results of the appropriate collective bargaining for the economic situation of the day.
A total ban on the use of replacement workers would paralyze the economic right of employers to operate in a slow economy and could lead them, unfortunately, to structure their business so as to reduce their dependence on permanent employees for fear of being vulnerable.
This would be inconsistent with the workers' interests and would undermine the fragile balance currently contained in our labour legislation.
The other principle is that of evidence. As I mentioned earlier, there is absolutely no evidence that the proposed change in the bill would help workers.
Allow me to address some essential variables that are clearly important for the workers.
First, there is no evidence that legislation on replacement workers reduces the number of work stoppages. In fact, Quebec continues to have many more work stoppages than Ontario, which does not ban the use of replacement workers. For example, in 2005, Quebec had twice as many work stoppages as Ontario and four times as many as in the federal sector.
Second, there is no evidence that legislation on replacement workers means work stoppages are shorter. For example, the average duration of work stoppages in Quebec was 47 days compared to 38 in Ontario, between 2003 and 2005.
Third, there is no proof that legislation governing replacement workers would reduce the average duration of work stoppages. For example, despite Quebec legislation to that effect, the average work stoppage in that province rose from an average length of 37 days, for the 1975-1977 period, to an average of 47 days for the 2003-2005 period.
Fourth, there is no proof that legislation governing replacement workers reduces the number of days of work lost. For example, Quebec lost 1.5 times the number of working days lost in Ontario, on a comparable basis, during the same period of 2003 to 2005.
Finally, there is no proof that replacement worker legislation has any effect on salaries. For example, Ontario does not have such legislation and British Columbia does; in both provinces, wage settlements in 2005 were marginally lower than in Quebec.
Thus, there is no evidence indicating that prohibiting the use of replacement workers has any of the alleged benefits for workers. First, there are no fewer work stoppages; second, work stoppages that do occur are not any shorter; and third, it has no visible effect on the number of days lost or the amount of salary increases.
To conclude, I would like to reaffirm that principles should dictate our strategic response: the principles of national interests and evidence that justifies the amendment being sought. In both cases, there is no justification for amending the law.
Today, union relations in the federal private sector are the best they have ever been. Last year, over 95% of conflicts governed by the Canada Labour Code were resolved without work stoppages.
Most federally-regulated employers do not hire replacement workers. In many cases, managers or other employees excluded from negotiations are reassigned in order to maintain operations.
Consequently, the Government of Canada cannot support this bill as it does not respect the two major principles for legislative reform: it is not based on evidence and it has no benefit to the national economy.