Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that the Bloc members will surprise anyone today when they say that they cannot support the Throne Speech presented this week. Several of my colleagues have referred to the five Bloc conditions. We were the first political party to establish what we were and were not willing to accept. That did not happen overnight. There were discussions in caucus. Our members are very involved in their ridings. When we meet with our citizens, we listen to their concerns, points of view, fears, what they like and what they don't like.
The five conditions established at the outset by the Bloc Québécois are rooted in the Quebec experience. They reflect what Quebeckers think. In our opinion, only one of these items may perhaps be acceptable, supply management in the agriculture sector. The government has said that it would continue to offer solid support in that area. As for the rest, it is a far cry from what the Bloc asked for.
Our planet is dying, but our Conservative colleagues say that the Kyoto goals and targets cannot be met. I understand; there has been no movement for years. We said we would sign the Kyoto protocol and that we would meet the targets; but now, 80 days or 3 months from the deadline, we are saying that we cannot do it. That is obvious; but did we try to meet the targets? Not only did we fail to reach the targets but we did so intentionally.
The Prime Minister attends international conferences where he associates with the greatest environmental delinquents on the planet, the United States, Australia and others. There he says that we will not meet the Kyoto targets and that we will do something else. The voters are not stupid. They understand very well that this position in Canada protects economic interests, particularly the oil interests in western Canada. This is done at the expense of the environment and is not in keeping with the intentions of citizens elsewhere in Canada. The government will certainly pay the price.
This is also the case for the forestry industry, which is experiencing a major crisis. The government is not lifting a finger to help. All manner of measures could be implemented, such as the reform of employment insurance or the re-establishment of assistance programs for older workers. The government could not care less and continues to defend major corporations, mainly the oil companies.
There is also the matter of federal spending power. This government has always said that it would stop interfering in areas under provincial jurisdiction. That is not what we are hearing today. It will be business as usual for old programs, and the government says that it wants to monitor new programs. It is still interfering. Federal spending power has not changed. We cannot accept that.
The last point I want to discuss in greater detail relates to my own area of expertise: Afghanistan. I think we should review the Bloc Québécois' track record of responsible action since Canada first went into Afghanistan.
I would like to go back to October 2001, when the Bloc Québécois said that the mission appeared to strike a balance between defence and development. We were told all about development, about how little girls would be able to go back to school, about how clinics, wells and irrigation systems would be built. We agreed to the mission because it was sanctioned by the UN and because NATO supported it on the basis of article five, which states that that an armed attack against one member of the alliance shall be considered an attack against them all. We agreed with this, so we agreed to deploying troops in Afghanistan.
Then, in February 2002, ground troops were sent in and things got more complicated. Initially, there were no ground troops involved. We sent boats and planes in on reconnaissance missions. We were less involved. Sending in ground troops meant more money spent and more soldiers' lives lost. That was when we started setting some limits.
In November, a major decision was made to leave Kabul, the capital—which Canada and its allies had managed to stabilize—and go to Kandahar. That was when we realized that there would be a very high price to pay. Still, we supported the troops, but we also started asking questions about detainees and speaking out against anti-personnel landmines and so on. We agreed to sending our troops to Kandahar in November 2005. However, as things went on, we realized that the mission was becoming unbalanced; it was leaning heavily toward combat and away from reconstruction and diplomacy.
At that point, we began to set limits. The Bloc Québécois introduced a motion on May 16, 2007 echoing what the Conservatives had said when they were in opposition. For example, how long would the mission last? Could the government tell us? What was the state of the personnel and materiel? We wanted to know the relationship between combat operations and humanitarian activities, reconstruction and diplomacy. What assessment criteria would be used to develop an exit strategy? Could we have those assessment criteria?
The day after this motion was introduced at the Standing Committee on National Defence, the government introduced its own motion to extend the mission to 2009 and asked us to sign a blank cheque. There had been barely a day of debate, and the government had not yet answered our questions. There was no answer to any of the questions I just mentioned. Nevertheless, we were told to close our eyes and jump from a tiny platform without knowing where we would land.
Given the circumstances, the Bloc Québécois said no to extending the mission. It is important to remember this. Where are we at today? The mission is still completely unbalanced. When I went to Kandahar, I attended briefing sessions where I asked how many Canadian soldiers were in Kandahar. I was told there were 2,500. I asked how many people were working for Foreign Affairs, engaging in diplomacy and holding talks with the state governors, the Afghan provinces and the municipal authorities in the villages. I was told there were six people.
CIDA is doing the development work, digging wells and building clinics and schools. And how many people does this agency have to evaluate projects? Six as well. At that point we had really had it and our patience was at an end, because for months we had been asking this government to reverse this trend.
Now, what have we learned from the throne speech? We have learned that not only does the government not want to end combat operations in 2009, it wants to extend them. The government also uses the Afghanistan mission to justify its recent purchase of more than $20 billion in military equipment and indicates that more spending is planned.
We believe it is unacceptable to invest billions of dollars of taxpayers' money in military equipment in order to extend the conflict. We are going in the completely wrong direction, and I am not the only one who thinks so. When I went to Kandahar, I met the top general, General Richards, who told me—and the delegation—that we could not achieve our goal through military force alone. Just like the Americans and Mr. Bush, this government is more interested in a militarization of the conflict, and we know that that gets us nowhere.
The Bloc Québécois is not very happy with the throne speech, in particular the military aspect of the mission in Afghanistan. When I see this government in action, I see that it has completely departed from the foreign policy Canada has developed over the past 50 years, during which Canada has had a good reputation. If we had to go to war, we went. If Canada wanted to go to war, it went.
Canada has participated in two world wars and the Korean War, but in those days it was known as a great mediator. This is no longer the case. Now, it is all about the military. The Canadian dove has decided to perch alongside the American hawk. This is terrible and will have tragic consequences. This battle cannot be won by military force alone. The government did not understand, it did not meet our condition on Afghanistan, and that is why we will vote against the Speech from the Throne this evening, next week and at the final vote.