Mr. Chair, as for what we are looking at from risk, we have to remember that it has two components: it has likelihood and it has consequence.
With the situation in November when the reactor was shut down and kept down when the two pumps were not connected, the risk of that was in the event of an external event. There is a number of events, such as earthquakes, floods, fires, tornadoes, et cetera. The reactor would not necessarily have a qualified emergency power system that would then be available to continue to provide electrical power to the main heavy water pumps at the NRU reactor.
The NRU reactor requires the main heavy water pumps to be operating at all times to provide cooling to the reactor. Cooling is essential, the pumps are essential, and an emergency power system is essential. I said that the safety case being proposed by AECL for one pump operation has not been fully completed. That is why we want to see its further justifications to support the safety case to ensure that it is robust, so that the safety that would be claimed is indeed that.
If an accident occurred, the emergency power system was not available and the pumps were not able to function, there would be nuclear fuel failures, which could then lead to releases of radioactive material to the atmosphere, which would then impact people and the environment.