Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to take part today in the debate on the second reading of Bill C-35 to amend the Criminal Code to reverse the burden of proof in bail hearings for individuals arrested for having committed firearm-related offences.
Since arriving in this House, I have commented on several government bills pertaining to justice. With regard to this new proposal, I believe that it is essential to put Bill C-35 into context because this bill lacks a solid factual foundation to determine if it will be effective with respect to firearms-related offences.
At present, it is up to the crown to prove that the accused must not be released on bail because he or she represents a danger to society. In the Criminal Code, the burden of proof rests with the accused only in very specific cases.
I would like to provide the context for amendments suggested by Bill C-35. First of all, there is reverse onus at the bail hearing for certain firearms-related offences. The accused will have to prove that he should not be detained prior to his trial. The bill adds two factors that the judge must take into account in making a decision to release the accused or to place him in custody for the duration of criminal proceedings. These two factors are the use of a firearm and an offence that involves a minimum prison term of three years or more.
In this sense, the Conservative government's bill seeks to broaden the existing range of exceptions that reverse onus. As I mentioned earlier, the accused bears the burden of proof for certain, specified offences, such as breach of release conditions, involvement in organized crime, terrorism, trafficking, contraband or drug production.
If this bill passes, it will add to these cases, which we consider serious, another set of exceptions in which people accused of committing a crime with a firearm will have to prove to the judge that they can be released without fear for society. This is very difficult to prove, especially for someone accused of attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, sexual assault with a weapon, and so forth.
As I was saying, I have had a chance to study some of the government’s justice bills. Once again, Bill C-35 raises considerable concern because it is of the same ilk as some of the previous ones and falls back on the rhetoric of toughening up the law, instead of looking at crime prevention, in order to give the impression that the government is doing something.
This demagogic approach is apparent in the repeated government gestures in the area of justice. For example, they attack judicial discretion, make lists that fail to deal with the particular realities, and concentrate on repression when there is no scientific basis for it. Here once again, they are attacking the basic principles of our justice system. These gestures make me wonder, therefore, what they are doing and the reasons for this bill.
I would like to focus on two concerns that I think pose a threat to our current legal system. First—and this is something we have already seen in previous bills—Bill C-35 undermines judicial discretion in sentencing. In the British legal tradition, it is incumbent upon the Crown to show that a person cannot be released because of fears for public safety. I do not believe that putting the onus on the individual in the legal system is the right way to proceed or that it affords the opportunities to which everyone is entitled. We know very well that there are already exceptions in very serious cases, but they should not be made the rule.
At present, judges can impose any reasonable conditions they consider appropriate, such as curfews or a prohibition on the consumption of alcohol or drugs. They can attach other conditions as well, such as the need to appear before a law enforcement officer at certain times, remain within a certain geographical jurisdiction, and provide notification of any change of address or employment.
Secondly, there have not been as many studies of release on bail as of other facets of the criminal justice system. We might not have answers to even the simplest of questions, beginning with this one: how many people accused of committing a crime with a firearm are actually released on bail?
With regard to this glaring lack of relevant information, I wonder about a press release issued on November 23, 2006, in which the Prime Minister mentioned that more than 1,000 crimes had been committed with a firearm in Toronto alone. According to his police sources, 40% of these crimes were committed by someone who was on parole, bail, temporary absence or probation. Why does this government mix all the release categories together to justify Bill C-35, when its bill specifically targets people who are on bail? Does the government have any relevant statistics for this particular release category?
I would also like to mention the article in the November 24, 2006, issue of La Presse indicating that even the Montreal police could not say how many crimes involving firearms were committed by repeat offenders.
What is more, according to Tony Doob, a criminologist at the University of Toronto, the statistics in this area do not tell the whole story, because someone could be out on bail as a result of simple theft, a situation Bill C-35 would not address. People accused of offences involving firearms are already faced with something like reverse onus. The expert adds that the question is whether the bill will make it possible to imprison a dangerous person who would not otherwise have been incarcerated.
Speaking of relevant statistics, I will add that there are more people behind bars awaiting trial than people serving sentences. According to Statistics Canada, in 2004, there were 125,871 Canadians in prison awaiting trial, while 83,733 people behind bars were serving court-ordered sentences. I can therefore conclude that the main objective of the bill—to reverse onus in the case of release on bail for all people accused of crimes involving firearms—lacks judgment and clarity.
For all these reasons, I am opposed to Bill C-35, even though there are some exceptions.