Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill S-3, an act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions).
Today I will focus my remarks regarding Bill S-3 on these provisions and how they compare with the provisions found in the anti-terrorism legislation of other major democratic countries. I will do so in order to show that the provisions in this bill are either similar to or in some cases narrower than those of other countries.
Let us first turn to the proposed investigative hearing procedure. Other democratic countries have similar procedures.
The United States has a grand jury procedure. A federal grand jury can compel the cooperation of persons who may have information relevant to the matters it is investigating. It can subpoena any person to testify under oath. If the individual fails to appear or refuses to answer, or fails to produce evidence or documents in his or her possession, he or she may be held in contempt absent a valid claim of privilege. If a witness or the custodian of a document asserts a valid privilege, he or she may be provided with use and derivative use immunity and then be required to comply with the subpoena to testify or produce evidence.
Investigative hearing provisions roughly equivalent to those proposed in this bill are also found in Australia and South Africa. The United Kingdom goes even further.
In 2001, the U.K. amended its Terrorism Act 2000 to create a crime of withholding information relating to a terrorism act. Specifically, a person commits a crime who fails to disclose information to the police which he or she knows or believes might be of material assistance in preventing an act of terrorism or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of someone for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of a terrorist act. Punishment for this crime is up to five years' imprisonment.
Also, the U.K., through the Terrorism Act 2006, applied to terrorism investigations the disclosure notice procedure that was created by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. Under that legislation, an investigating authority such as the director of public prosecutions, can have a disclosure notice issued to a person. The notice could require the person to answer questions relevant to the investigation, provide information or produce documents.
Let me now turn to the recognizance with conditions provision. First, the arrest without warrant power found in this provision would be, as before, very limited in scope, for example, where pressing exigent circumstances make it impractical for a peace officer to go before a judge and have the judge compel a person to attend before him or her. Where the person is arrested without warrant, the peace officer would have to bring that person before a judge within 24 hours or, if not feasible, as soon as possible thereafter.
If the judge decided to adjourn the hearing and detain the person until then, the adjournment would be for no more than 48 hours. Thus, under the recognizance with conditions power, the maximum period of time for which a person could be detained until the hearing takes place would generally be for no more than 72 hours.
However, the United Kingdom has a much broader arrest without warrant and detention power. Under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the police may arrest without warrant a person whom he or she reasonably suspects is a terrorist. The maximum period of time that a person can be held in detention without charge under this power was extended from seven days in 2000 to 14 days in 2003 and was increased again to 28 days in 2006. In January 2008, the United Kingdom government introduced a new counterterrorism bill which, if passed, would extend this period of detention, in extraordinary cases, for up to 42 days.
The U.K.'s Terrorism Act 2000 also contains other police powers not found in our Criminal Code, such as the power of a senior police officer to designate a cordoned area where considered “expedient for the purposes of a terrorist investigation”. This allows the police to, for example, order a person to leave the area or not enter the area, and failure to obey the order is an offence. The police may also be authorized to search premises in the area.
There is another power that allows a senior police officer to authorize a uniformed constable to stop and search a vehicle or pedestrian in an area set out in the authorization where the officer “considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism”.
As well, in 2005, the U.K. put in place a system of control orders which may be imposed on a person, citizen or non-citizen alike, to prevent terrorist attacks. There are two kinds of control orders that may be imposed, those that do not derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights and those which do derogate from the convention. The latter would, arguably, apply in cases of house arrest.
Some of those non-derogating control orders that had imposed lengthy, daily curfew periods were successfully challenged in the lower courts and these decisions were appealed to the House of Lords.
In the fall of 2007, the House of Lords ruled that a number of control orders that had imposed an 18 hour curfew violated the right to liberty under the European Convention on Human Rights, rendering these orders null. However, it upheld control orders that imposed 12 or 14 hour curfews.
Australia has also enacted legislation that creates a system of control orders and preventive arrests of terrorist suspects. The Australian federal police may apply for an order for preventive detention for up to 48 hours of a terrorist suspect where there has been a terrorist act or where a terrorist act is imminent. Additionally, Australian states and territories have enacted legislation allowing preventive detention for up to 14 days.
To summarize, Bill S-3 proposes a maximum period of detention of generally 72 hours in relation to the recognizance with conditions power. In contrast, a suspected terrorist in the United Kingdom may currently be detained without charge for up to 28 days. In Australia, states and territories allow for preventive detention for up to 14 days.
It is obvious that in contrast to the United Kingdom and Australia, the power to detain persons in Canada to prevent terrorist activity is far more narrow in scope. The investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions were drafted with due regard for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They help to protect Canadians from the scourge of terrorism in a manner consistent with human rights. As the comparison with other democratic countries show, they have been crafted with restraint.
We must also not forget that these powers can serve to respond to our international obligations to prevent and suppress terrorism. In this regard, it should be noted that United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 states in part that state parties are to “take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts”.
These provisions are necessary to prevent the commission of terrorist acts and therefore they respond to the international obligation set out in resolution 1373.
For these reasons, I will be supporting this bill and I urge all hon. members in the chamber to do likewise.