Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Pierrefonds—Dollard.
Throughout May and June of this year, 21 remote and isolated communities in northern Manitoba were significantly affected by the H1N1 virus. When and where did these cases start and spread? An investigation needs to be undertaken as to why aboriginal cases were not picked up, or if they were, why they were not reported and acted upon.
What federal officials went to northern Manitoba as Canadian scientists went to Mexico? Where was the compassion and the urgency to see first-hand the devastation, the lack of supplies and infrastructure, and most important, what was needed to perhaps slow down the spread of the virus and guarantee prompt treatment of very sick individuals?
Why was there a lack of federal action during the spring wave in aboriginal communities? Why were aggressive containment measures not attempted? The WHO has since said these measures can slow the spread.
What was done to ensure the administration of antiviral drugs such as Tamiflu in a timely manner? Antiviral drugs, when used for treatment, can make someone feel better or shorten the time a person is sick by one or two days. They can also prevent serious flu complications. Dr. Anand Kumar, an emergency doctor from Winnipeg, explained to our parliamentary health committee that some people had to wait seven or eight days for treatment and that this likely impacted patient outcome.
Aboriginal people account for only 4% of the Canadian population. Why were 17.5% of those who were hospitalized aboriginal, 15% who stayed in ICU aboriginal, and 12% of deaths aboriginal? As of October 7, why were 38% of confirmed H1N1 cases first nations or Métis persons living off-reserve? A real investigation is needed so that these sad and sobering statistics are not repeated.
Every effort should have been taken to protect the health of aboriginal Canadians, as we had historical hindsight wherein the native population of Okak, Labrador, was hard hit. Only 59 or 266 people survived.
There are underlying health issues today, breathing difficulties, diabetes, underlying socio-economic conditions such as four and five families living in a household, environmental issues, and lack of clean running water. As such, my colleague from the riding of St. Paul's and I travelled to aboriginal communities to see first-hand the state of pandemic preparedness and we wrote a letter to the minister asking for answers to our questions. My colleague asked that the health committee be called back in August, because the House had recessed June 18 and would not sit again until September 14.
One chief reported that, of 30 communities in northern Manitoba, two had a pandemic plan and none had been tested. Pandemic preparedness and response should not be a test in patience and humility for aboriginal peoples, and we recognize the government's action in bringing back Dr. Paul Gully.
Going forward in the second wave, we want to ensure that each community has an H1N1 plan that has been tested, with the necessary supplies, funding and human resources so that people receive treatment in a timely manner and suitable infection-control measures.
The summer provided an unprecedented opportunity, namely to remain vigilant and prepare for a possible second wave in order to reduce hospitalizations, deaths and socio-economic impacts. However, members of the parliamentary health committee learned that the government would stay the course regarding H1N1. Canadians did not need platitudes, but rather, planning, answers and action during the critical summer period.
While no one could have predicted what the fall might have brought, preparedness was our insurance policy. The more we prepared for a pandemic, the greater the probability that we would be able to mitigate impacts. During the summer, where was the Prime Minister, the health minister and the government in engaging decision-makers and citizenry regarding H1N1 influenza?
The summer was the time to inform the public about a potential second wave of H1N1 and the means by which individual citizens could lessen the impact on their families. The summer was also the time to encourage communities and ensure that vulnerable populations were prepared.
While underlying medical conditions such as autoimmune diseases and breathing challenges make individuals more at risk of complications or more likely to experience severe or lethal infections, how should information have been communicated to at-risk groups? This is key.
The summer was the time to plan for a possible gap between the onset of a pandemic, the second wave, and the time when vaccines might be ready.
Why did the government choose one vaccine manufacturer with one production line, particularly when influenza vaccine supply has a greater degree of unpredictability than the supply of any other vaccine? The United States contracted with five companies.
Why did the government order late and allow for a late delivery date? What was the contingency plan to ensure backup product and timely delivery of initial vaccine doses?
The government gambled on a possible November or December start date for a second wave of H1N1 and it estimated wrong. The second wave hit parts of Canada in October, as it did in the past, and before the vaccine was available.
The rollout began this past week, sadly, with confusion, frustration and lineups. Those vaccinated this past week will not be protected for 10 to 14 days. This week, there is a drop in vaccine doses.
How many Canadians have been vaccinated? What percentage of the population do they represent? What is the government's contingency plan for the gap period? That is the time between the second wave hitting and when people can get vaccinated.
Communication is vital in responding to any crisis, and clear, consistent messages are required. Our offices have been inundated by health care workers and the public who want real answers.
Perhaps the greatest confusion has surrounded vaccine for pregnant women. The World Health Organization advisory panel on vaccines recommended in June that non-adjuvanted vaccine be used for pregnant women if it were available. However, the Conservative government ordered adjuvanted vaccine in early August and later ordered non-adjuvanted vaccine. Why were pregnant women an afterthought?
When the WHO made its recommendation in June, there was no safety data for the adjuvanted vaccine in pregnant women, and expectant women fared poorly during past pandemics.
The government then recommended that pregnant women wait for the non-adjuvanted vaccine unless the cases of H1N1 were rising in their area. If the woman was over 20 weeks, she should take the adjuvanted vaccine.
To add to the confusion, the government then ordered 200,000 doses from Australia. We recognize that the position has now been made clear.
Regarding the adjuvanted and non-adjuvanted vaccines, we must ask: Who made the decision to halt the production of the adjuvanted vaccine? On what date was the decision made and the provinces and territories told? On what date did the minister know the delivery date would be delayed, and when did the minister inform the provinces and territories and the Canadian people?
Since the spring we have asked over 200 questions of the government regarding pandemic preparedness. We wanted to ensure that the government was prepared for a possible second wave. We are now in full response mode and we need bold action.
We need the $400 million from the 2006 budget redeployed to pandemic response. We need additional resources for the provinces and territories. We need clear, consistent messages for public health and Canadians.