Mr. Speaker, in preparing for, responding to and recovering from the H1N1 pandemic, Parliament's focus must be the health and welfare of all Canadians. Specifically, our goals must be to reduce the rate of hospitalizations, illness and death as well as to reduce economic and social impacts. Therefore, our discussions must remain on the winding down of the second wave as well as preparing for a possible third wave.
We are here to address the question regarding the overrepresentation of aboriginal people and the morbidity and mortality statistics for the spring wave of H1N1, namely, the fact that 18% of those hospitalized due to H1N1 were aboriginal, 15% of those requiring stays in ICUs were aboriginal, and 12% of deaths were among aboriginal people, despite the fact that aboriginal people account for only 4% of the Canadian population.
Before I begin a discussion of the first wave and what could have been done differently, I want to recognize the intervention of the opposition parties that resulted in Dr. Paul Gully, former director general of the Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, being appointed as a special adviser for aboriginal communities H1N1 response. I also gratefully acknowledge that aboriginal peoples have not been overrepresented in the second wave, the tremendous work of chiefs and their communities and their co-operation with health officials.
Despite the improvements, an investigation still needs to be undertaken into the sad and sobering statistics. As late as the summer, one chief reported that of 30 communities in northern Manitoba, only 2 had a pandemic plan and none had been tested.
The first question must therefore be this. Why were some aboriginal communities unprepared for a possible pandemic when WHO and Canada had been preparing for several years for H5N1? Where was the support from Canadian health officials to ensure that each aboriginal community had a pandemic influenza plan that had been tested, with the necessary supplies, funding and human resources so people could receive treatment in a timely manner and have suitable infection control measures?
My colleague from St. Paul's and I travelled to aboriginal communities in the summer to see first hand the state of pandemic preparedness. We heard the challenges and the lack of support from health officials. We heard comments such as, “There was no help. We figured we had to do it on our own” and “We are starting a plan. Can you order supplies?”
My colleague asked that the health committee be called back in August because the House had recessed on June 18 and would not sit again until September 14. We wanted to ensure preparedness should there be a second wave of pandemic influenza. Pandemic preparedness is an insurance policy. The more communities prepare for a pandemic, the greater the probability that they will be able to mitigate impacts.
Every effort should have been taken to protect the health of aboriginal Canadians. Did the government simply hope that a pandemic would not strike? Hope is not a strategy and is particularly untenable in aboriginal communities, where history reveals that these communities are particularly hard hit in past pandemics. Underlying environmental, health, overcrowding, poverty and water challenges today make aboriginal communities particularly vulnerable.
In 1918, for example, the Spanish influenza killed close to one-third of the Inuit population and forced some communities out of existence. At Okak, the disease killed 204 of 263 residents. At Hebron, it killed 86 of 100 residents. Pandemic preparedness and response should not have been a test in patience and humility for aboriginal peoples.