Mr. Speaker, we live in an era of change and uncertainty. Infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.
New infectious diseases, such as HIV-AIDS and SARS, are emerging. Old infectious diseases, such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis, are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat.
Although most deaths from infectious disease occur in developing countries, no region of the world is risk-free. It is, therefore, in the best interests of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious disease.
Bioterrorism also remains a very real threat. As mentioned, in October 2000, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to American news media offices and two senators. The letters killed five people and infected over twenty others. Broad public health measures were implemented to treat the thousands who were potentially exposed and decontamination of government buildings and postal offices took years. The total cost to the United States was more than $1 billion.
Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. In 2003, SARS spread to 30 countries across 5 continents and killed almost 800 people, 44 of them in Toronto.
We must protect Canadian health and we must protect global health. The more we increase biosafety measures, the greater the probability that we will be able to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious disease, even if they are launched deliberately by human agents.
The World Health Organization urges countries to promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and to encourage the development of biological safety training.
Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely and in a timely manner. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infections.
There are new reports of infections resulting from transport related exposures, excluding the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States. However, there have been reports of the transmission of acute respiratory infections associated with air travel as a result of direct person-to-person contact.
Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among provinces.
In the laboratory, containment of microbiological agents and toxins is critical to preventing outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases. Over the last 70 years, research to combat infectious disease has resulted in over 5,000 associated infections in the laboratory and almost 200 deaths. Infamously, in 1978 a smallpox laboratory accident caused one death and led to the suicide of the laboratory director. More recently, in 2008 the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research the highly contagious foot and mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.
It is, therefore, imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infections, micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.
Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft or unauthorized access of biological material, and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.
New research shows that infectious diseases are now emerging at an exceptional rate, with humans accumulating new pathogens at a rate of one per year. This means that agencies and governments will need to work harder than ever before to keep abreast of the increasing threat.
It is, therefore, imperative that we take every opportunity to protect people and the environment from infectious disease, as emerging infectious disease has the potential to eliminate opportunities for infectious disease eradication or elimination.
In 1969, smallpox remained a devastating disease, killing 1.6 million people that year. Eradication of the disease was achieved because of a worldwide effort that was supported by the necessary political will, human and technical resources and a safe vaccine.
In 1979, the year that smallpox was declared eradicated, HIV was rapidly spreading across Africa and the world. If the global smallpox eradication campaign had been postponed, the world might not have been able to eradicate smallpox as easily as it did in 1980. Biosafety must be paramount, whether in the air, across the land or in the lab.
After six years of planning, I led an expedition to the Arctic to search for the cause of the 1918 Spanish influenza, history's deadliest disease. My research team would safely exhume six bodies with the hope of identifying the influenza virus to make a better antiviral or a flu vaccine.
Opening the graves was akin to opening Pandora's Box as there was the chance of re-releasing history's deadliest disease. Our safety protocols, planned over two years, were approved by a blue ribbon panel hosted by the National Institute for Health and the government of Norway. We did our utmost to provide a safe working environment on the frozen tundra.
After receiving all the necessary permits for transportation, my research team shipped tissue samples, packed in containers to prevent mechanical and temperature damage, from the High Arctic to our most secure laboratory, a biosafety level four laboratory in Britain.
For six years I lived and breathed biosafety, lived with the risk of finding live virus and took every precaution to undertake our work safely and ethically. No formal permission process existed for exhuming bodies. However, we asked permission from the families, the governor of Svalbard, et cetera. We also developed our own biosafety protocols related to exhumation and sampling decontamination.
Strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We need strong laboratory regulations and an improved means of communicating and reporting to protect the lab workers and the surrounding community from accidental exposure to infectious agents. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention.
We have had multiple wake-up calls. This new bill is a step in the right direction. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety.