Mr. Chair, I am a young member, not in terms of my age but in terms of my years of service here, and I can say that one can be inspired or notice the work of members who have many years of service. I am as passionate as the member for Toronto Centre, but not about the same things. I do not share his passion for the Senate. Today, however, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of the principle of the bill we are discussing and would like to see it studied in committee.
What I am passionate about are matters of ethics and conflicts of interest. Thus, this bill is of great interest to me. When one sits on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, these are often the topics we have to examine. It is our responsibility to make changes or amendments to the code of ethics and to the conflict of interest code for members. And so I was careful to read this bill attentively, and it is my pleasure to debate this matter in this House.
Everyone agrees that it is desirable that various codes of behaviour be established for members of Parliament, senators and public office holders. In our opinion, the idea that these codes be administered by a single person so as to standardize procedures and decision-making is a sensible one. The Bloc notes however that the bill will do nothing to significantly address ethics and transparency in the Senate. We noticed that most of the shortcomings in the Senate behaviour code will remain the same. I will explain a bit later that the bill would only see to the appointment of one person to govern both codes, i.e. that of members and senators. However, the commissioner does not necessarily have the investigative rights and powers needed to administer and enforce the code governing the senators.
Consequently, if what the Conservative government wanted was to make the Senate more transparent and to improve its image, it is missing the mark. You might almost call it window dressing, since the bill is going to introduce fairly minor changes. If the government had really wanted to improve the Senate's image, it could have started by not imitating its Liberal counterparts and not highlighting its partisanship and anti-democratic stance by making several partisan appointments. An example comes to mind readily. It should not have appointed Michael Fortier to the Senate. Moreover, it did not oblige him to run in byelections in Quebec between 2006 and 2008. It was within the Conservative government's power to do all sorts of other things to contribute to improving the Senate's image. However, the government continued the Liberal tradition of using the Senate as a partisan tool.
Consequently, this bill is rather symbolic. I am not a fortune teller, but I think that the government is well aware that its bill will not be passed by the senators, who have already rejected this proposal three times, as hon. members need to remember. The Bloc Québécois wants to remind this House that abolishing the Senate is the best way to put an end to the lack of Senate accountability. It is that simple. The Senate is not an institution that should continue to exist. However, I do agree with the member for Toronto Centre that to abolish the Senate, the government would have to amend the Constitution and enter into rounds of negotiations, which is a bit more complicated.
Hon. members also need to remember that in 2002, under Jean Chrétien, and subsequently under Paul Martin, the Liberals tried to introduce a uniform ethics regime including a single officer who would administer codes of ethics for MPs and senators. That did not work for Jean Chrétien.
For his part, Mr. Martin had to introduce separate regimes so that his Bill C-34 would be passed.
In the Federal Accountability Act, which the Conservatives introduced in April 2006, the Conservative government also proposed to create a single position of conflict of interest and ethics commissioner to replace the separate ethics commissioner and Senate ethics officer positions.
The bill was passed in 2006. However, the Senate twice rejected the provisions giving the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner the mandate to apply the Senate code of ethics and insisted on keeping the Senate ethics officer position.
The House of Commons finally agreed to the changes proposed by the Senate so that the Federal Accountability Act would be passed in a timely manner.
We would not be wrong in saying that Bill C-30 is the government's fourth attempt to subject the Senate to a real ethics commissioner.
The measures proposed in Bill C-30, the Senate Ethics Act, would amend the Parliament of Canada Act in order to abolish the position of Senate ethics officer and give the mandate to a single person, the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner. The position would be an independent one with a mandate to apply standards of ethics to senators, MPs and public office holders. The incumbent would be charged therefore with administering two completely different codes.
Under the new structure, senators would remain subject to the existing rules, that is, the senators' conflict of interest code would continue to govern the conduct of senators.
In actual fact, there are few changes. I see no reason then why the senators are upset, apart from the fact that the codes of ethics will be administered by a single conflict of interest and ethics commissioner.
The bill also contains transitional provisions on the renewal of the mandate of the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner and on the transfer of parliamentary votes and employees of the office of the Senate ethics officer to the office of the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner. That makes sense. If the position is transferred, the budgets and employees have to be transferred too.
The bill provides that, unless the Senate passes a motion approving the appointment of the current ethics commissioner, a new commissioner will be selected six months after the legislation comes into force.
Finally, the governor in council will appoint a conflict of interest and ethics commissioner after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and the House of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and House of Commons.
The bill will come into force on a date set by order in council.
This bill, despite being somewhat overblown, is fairly simple to implement and makes sense from an administrative standpoint.
As I said, the Bloc supports the principle of the bill. I repeat that it is desirable to have the various codes of conduct administered by a single officer in order to standardize procedures and decision making. It will mean consistency and makes perfect sense.
The conflict of interest and ethics commissioner will administer the conflict of interest code for members of the House of Commons and the Conflict of Interest Act applicable to elected officials and public office holders. He will thus be responsible for 1,350 full-time public office holders and 1,940 part-time office holders appointed by order in council, and 308 MPs.
I do not think that the addition of 105 senators will result in the commissioner being too overburdened to enforce the code. Basically, I do not think this will impede him in his work or overburden him.
From an administrative standpoint, it seems more economical and efficient as well as easier to ensure consistency if a single officer is responsible for the three codes of conduct.
It is important, though, to understand that this bill does not do anything significant to improve the ethics and transparency of the Senate because most of the shortcomings in the senators’ code of conduct will remain just as they were. I repeat, for the benefit of those who are concerned, that the appointment of a single officer to administer the three codes will not do a thing to change the application of the code or the procedures for enforcing it.
I could give a few examples of the shortcomings in the senators’ code of conduct, shortcomings that undermine the authority of the Senate ethics officer. This will help explain the basic point I am making. The Senate ethics officer exercises his duties under the general direction of a committee consisting of five senators and cannot initiate an investigation on his own. If he wants to conduct an investigation, he has to ask the committee for permission.
It is astonishing to find out that the Senate ethics officer does not have the authority to carry out investigations, decide which ones to do, and determine whether or not he can conduct an investigation, in contrast to the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner, who has the power to initiate investigations because she is independent.
The connections are very close, therefore, between the Senate ethics officer and the committee of five senators, which is basically like a board of directors. I use this comparison to make it easier for the people watching us at home to understand. It is this committee of five senators that holds discussions and examines documents provided by the Senate ethics officer and then decides whether or not to authorize an investigation.
As I see it, the Senate ethics officer is not necessarily as independent as the commissioner in enforcing the senators’ code.
I see too in subsection 45(1) of the senators’ code that the investigation reports of the Senate ethics officer are not necessarily made public. The ethics officer must report first to the committee of senators, which then reports to the Senate. It is obvious that the senators always maintain some form of control over the work of the Senate ethics officer.
In closing, as another example, the senators' code of conduct can only be amended by the Senate. In our opinion, if the government wanted to improve the Senate's image, and I am repeating myself, it should have set the example by not highlighting its partisan and anti-democratic nature with a proliferation of partisan appointments.
In the interest of properly informing the public watching on television, I would to make another point.
Members will remember that on December 22, 2008, the Prime Minister appointed 18 senators, including a number of Conservative supporters such as Michel Rivard and Leo Housakos, well-known Conservative organizers; Irving Gerstein, former Conservative Fund Canada president; Michael L. MacDonald, vice-president of the Conservative Party of Canada; Stephen Green, former chief of staff for Reform Party of Canada leader Preston Manning; or Suzanne Duplessis, Fabian Manning, Yonah Martin and Percy Mockler, former members or—