Mr. Speaker, excuse me. It is late in the season, and I get a little carried away when it comes to defending the House of Commons.
Anyway, I see that I have created quite a bit of excitement across the way. I would like to point out something else to them.
Speaking about this particular situation, another certain professor, Andrew Heard, had these points about prorogation itself and about how we must be careful that we do not abuse the system. He said:
There is little guidance to be had from historic precedent as no Prime Minister in Canada has asked for prorogation in the face of an almost certain defeat on a confidence vote. Prorogation is normally granted after many months of parliamentary business have elapsed....In 1988, Parliament was prorogued after only 11 sitting days....Prorogation came after only fourteen calendar days and twelve sitting days in the first session after the 1930 federal election. In both 1988 and 1930, however, the government had a solid majority in the House of Commons, and there was no question that prorogation would permit the government to avoid defeat.
Basically, what he is saying is that the precedents that some people cite, and what happened before and quickly thereafter, were not questions of government survival, because the majority was in place. That was not the case this time.
Now we find ourselves in a situation in which we could be abusing the system only for the sake of political survival. In this last particular situation, it was certainly perverse in the way it was used, because the government wanted to avoid one small particular issue: Afghan detainees.
I would caution everyone in the House not to use the methods within the House to defeat the purposes of the supremacy of Parliament. I remember that just a short time ago we brought in a motion to say that we did not agree with reforms to NAFO, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. There was a vote in the House that said that we did not agree with what they were doing in NAFO. We did not agree with the agreement that was struck in Europe, with many other countries, regarding the health of fish stocks off our coast, particularly the east coast.
The vote said that we did not agree with it, yet the very next day, the government ratified the agreement, defying the opinion of the House.
We might cite precedents showing when that has happened before. However, let us go back just a few more years and talk about 2006. I say this with the utmost respect. Let us talk about the document called “Stand Up for Canada”.
As a man who is 5 feet 4 inches tall, I certainly appreciate the respect I can get when I stand up in the House. When the government stands up and says that it will bring every international agreement within the confines of the House to debate and vote on, it tells us that the government must respect Parliament. At least, that was the intention.
The government did not even bring that agreement to the House. We had to bring this particular agreement to the House to debate. We voted. We did not like it. The next day, in defiance of that opinion, it was signed, or ratified, which is the term used.
Bradley Miller, assistant professor, University of Western Ontario, made a good point about prorogation. He said:
Prorogation is a regular event in the parliamentary cycle, but until this occasion had always come at the end of a legislative session—that is, when the government decided that its legislative agenda was complete. There is no Canadian precedent establishing that the Governor General has the power to refuse to grant prorogation in these circumstances....It is, however, arguable that the power to refuse dissolution ought to extend to the power to refuse prorogation....It is argued that one of the rationales for the power to refuse to grant a dissolution—to provide that check on the [government]....
That applies in this particular situation. I would say, according to his words, that the Governor General has to take a greater role in the future so that dissolution, or in this case, prorogation, is not abused by the levers of government, because that power is vested within the Crown. Therefore, we must seriously consider that.
Eric Adams is another highly esteemed professor. He said:
The specific power to prorogue Parliament is unmentioned in the Constitution, but it was well understood by the framers to fall within the prerogative of the Crown.
I just mentioned that idea.
Blackstone stated and explained:
A prorogation is the continuance of the parliament from one session to another, as an adjournment is the continuation of the session from day to day.
That is a good point, because we do not stand here and try to interrupt the daily session just because it is not going well. There are times when we are just not performing up to par. I use that term rather lightly, as the House can well understand.
We do not use that power to shut down for a particular day, so why should we shut this down for a particular session? They talked about the fact that we were holding up legislation, yet at the very same time, the government prorogued Parliament, killing 37 bills, the vast majority of which were promises it made in successive campaigns. The government thought that the execution was so silky smooth that it was actually going to work.
The grassroots then decided that they did not think so.
I agree that this committee should be struck. I agree that we should expedite the process by which we get to the bottom of prorogation and deal with it using the recommendations we bring.