Madam Speaker, it is indeed an honour for me to rise and speak today in support of Bill C-576, promoted and sponsored by my friend, the hon. member for Red Deer. I join in the comments of the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona in congratulating the hon. member for his hard work on the bill and the likelihood that the bill will become law in a timely manner.
The bill has but one provision. It is a short bill, but it is an important bill. That provision would make the crime of personating a peace officer a mandatory aggravating factor in sentencing if the offence was committed for the purpose of facilitating any other offence.
Let me begin with the offence itself and a word about the terminology. The offence uses the term “personation”. This term was used when the offence was first enacted in 1913 and continues to be used today in the modern version of the Criminal Code.
In everyday speech, however, we often the use the “impersonation” rather than “personation” to refer to the act of pretending to be someone we are not. Members of this House should be assured that the two terms are synonymous. I will use the term “personate” because that is the language of the law and it is also the language of the bill before us.
Section 130 of the Criminal Code makes it a crime to personate a peace officer or a public officer. There are two ways that this offence might be committed. First, a person can falsely represent themselves as a peace officer or a public officer. This particular criminal offence requires a mental state associated with the acts and would therefore require proof that the person intentionally misrepresented themselves as someone if they did in fact not hold such an office. In short, the offence would require some evidence a person deliberately tried to deceive another person about their status as a peace officer or a public officer as the case might be.
The second way that this offence can be made is when a person who is not a peace officer or a public officer “uses a badge or article of uniform or equipment in a manner that is likely to cause persons to believe that he is a peace officer or a public officer”
Although worded differently, this second form of the offence is similar to the first form of the offence because both are based on a person falsely representing themselves as a peace officer or a public officer.
For example, a person falsely representing themselves as a peace officer would likely use a badge or other article of a peace officer's uniform or equipment. Likewise and similarly a person using a badge or other article of a peace officer's uniform or equipment that could lead others to believe that they are in fact a police officer is most likely deliberately misrepresenting themselves.
In both cases, some outward display of peace officer equipment would likely be present as would some evidence that the person's conduct demonstrated an intention to deceive others in regard to their true identity or status.
There is one additional aspect of offence which bears some consideration. The offence prohibits the personation of a peace officer as well as public officers. These are different terms, as I am sure members are aware. A peace officer is defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code and includes holders of particular offices, most importantly police officers and corrections officers. The public officer is also defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code and includes customs officers and officers in the Canadian Forces.
It should be noted that the aggravating factor proposed in Bill C-576 would cover situations where a peace officer is impersonated but not a public officer. The narrow application of the proposed aggravating factor makes sense from my point of view and from this analysis.
One can immediately see the purpose of the offence once its elements are understood. Public trust in various important government office holders and the institutions to which they belong is absolutely critical to the proper maintenance of society generally and key government functions such as income tax and customs collections, for example.
Any instance of a public officer or peace officer personation risks diminishing the public's ability to trust in these offices and institutions and risks undermining valid public functions. That is why deception in relation to one of these offices is prohibited no matter what the purpose of the deception.
For example, the proposed offence in Bill C-576 would cover personation of a peace officer to obtain information from someone or to gain easy access and entry into an establishment.
Thankfully, peace officer or public officer personation does not occur very often. Every year there are typically between 120 and 160 charges laid under section 130 of the Criminal Code of Canada. This is a very low number when compared to other sections. The conviction rate ranges between 30% and 50% of those individuals charged.
However, the use of deception with respect to peace officers is especially troubling. Public trust in the police is essential for the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. The integrity of the uniform and the public trust in the office must be protected in their own rights. That is the genesis and the reason behind the bill that we are debating here this evening.
Canadians trust our police officers and our instinct is to be polite and responsive and to accept the authority of someone who appears to be a police officer. A police personator can approach, interact with and assert physical authority over others relatively easily by exploiting the trust Canadians have in peace officers. The reality is that members of the public would likely acquiesce to the authority of someone they believed to be a police officer.
Deference to police officers is certainly something that I was taught at an early age by my parents, and I would submit that deference to police officers is an essential element of the rule of law. Can anyone imagine a situation in which society does not trust police officers and people ignore the red and blue flashing lights when a police officer is trying to pull them over? It would lead to chaos and anarchy. As a result, police personation can be used, sadly, as a tool to facilitate the commission of serious offences that otherwise might be more difficult, if not impossible, to carry out when individuals who are not peace officers pretend that they are.
In the rare instance where police personation is used to facilitate the commission of a serious crime, such as kidnapping, sexual assault, theft or unlawful entry into a dwelling, it represents an extremely disturbing exploitation of the public trust in police and an even more disturbing violation of the victim's rights and interests. Members will know that this government and this member consistently and continually attempt to promote the rights of victims, and I would submit to this House that this bill certainly is in keeping with that motivation.
It is this situation that Bill C-576 seeks to address. The bill clearly identifies the situation of the false and deceptive use of the trappings of a police officer in order to facilitate the commission of another offence as one that must serve as an aggravating factor in the sentence imposed on the offender.
It is important to recall that, in determining an appropriate sentence, the court must always take into account all relevant, aggravating and mitigating factors. Members who are familiar with sentencing law will know that paragraph 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code describes a number of aggravating factors that apply to all offences. These include evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to his or her victim. In addition to the factors specifically listed, the sentencing court always retains the discretion to determine if additional circumstances revealed by the evidence are aggravating or mitigating factors that should be considered before the sentence is pronounced.
I would submit that police personation for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another offence is unquestionably a factor the court would consider to increase the sentence for the personation offence. A court would invariably treat the use of deception for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a serious crime against the victim, such as abduction, an aggravating factor for the more serious abduction offence. In essence, both offences work to aggravate each other and the total sentence imposed for all the offences in such circumstances should reflect the full range of harm caused by the perpetrator and suffered by the victim in these extremely disturbing cases.
The court can already consider relevant factors as aggravating by virtue of its inherent discretion in sentencing, as I just mentioned, pursuant to section 718, but Bill C-576 would clearly identify this particular situation as one that must lead to a more significant sentence than if it were not present. The bill would expressly force the judge to apply his or her mind to personation and how it accommodated the commission of another offence. I hope all members will join me in supporting the bill.