Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to ask further about a question I asked during question period on October 26, 2010, regarding the procurement of Chinook helicopters and other helicopters, the Cyclones, by the Department of National Defence and in relation to the Auditor General's report of fall 2009.
There is a familiar story here. The Auditor General reported that in 2006, based on meetings and discussions with Boeing and the market analysis, National Defence formally concluded that Boeing's Chinook was the only existing western certified helicopter in production capable of meeting its needs. It convinced Treasury Board that it was buying an off-the-shelf product and got approval for it. As a result, a sole-source contract was agreed upon, an ACAN, advance contract award notice, approved by Public Works and Government Service Canada, to proceed to buy the Chinooks.
The reality was the government did not really know at the time it would use the Chinooks for. The Auditor General said that after the ACAN was posted, the government negotiated with Boeing, looked at a schedule to produce these aircraft and had to develop a detailed statement of work. In order to do that, it had to know precisely what type of missions the helicopter would support, what it wanted the helicopter to do and the technical specifications needed to achieve it.
The Auditor General said that the evidence on the file was that there were uncertainties both before and after the decision that the Chinooks were the only ones we needed, such as which type of operations would be supported, whether land, maritime or special operations, what mission systems would be needed, the minimum number of helicopters and whether the helicopter would be located on one or two operating bases.
The actual specifications were not decided upon until 2009. Does that sound familiar? We have a situation with the F-35s. The Department of National Defence has decided the only military jet to meet Canada's needs is the F-35. When was that decision made? It was made about a month or so after the Minister of National Defence said in the House that there would be a fair, open and transparent process of competitive bidding. In fact, probably a month or two after, finally the statement of operating requirements, which is basically the first step in a bidding process, was decided upon by the Department of National Defence. All of it was done in the wrong order.
The Auditor General, to go back to the Chinooks and the process, said that the manner in which the advance contract award notice was given did not comply with the applicable regulations and policies and in her opinion the process was not fair, open or transparent. All of this is required, including a whole series of challenges and reviews that must go on before spending of this nature is approved.
We see the same thing here. The Auditor General called the projects undertaken by the Department of National Defence high risk. It resulted in a doubling of the expected costs to $11 billion. We have the same kind of risks with the F-35s. We do not know how much it will cost. We do not have a fair, open and transparent process.