With respect to depleted uranium (DU), military service, and Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) benefits and programs: (a) what are all potential sources of DU to which Canadian Forces (CF) members and veterans might have been exposed between 1990 and the present; (b) what are any operations between 1990 and the present that might have brought CF members and veterans into direct or close contact with DU, including, but not limited to, operations in which Canadian personnel seconded to other military forces were involved; (c) did any CF member or veteran serve between 1999 and 2003 in areas assessed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to be DU areas; (d) what, if any, DU munitions, vehicles made with DU, or ships carrying DU munitions, were used by CF between 1990 and the present; (e) what are all possible exposure routes for each source of DU identified in (a), (b), and (d); (f) what, if any, field measurements were taken around any DU source identified in (a), (b), and (d) and, if such measurements were taken, what was the level of contamination of the environment for each site, for each time sampled; (g) what, if any, studies were undertaken by the Department of National Defence (DND), or any other federal government department or crown corporation, from 1990 to the present, regarding DU environmental contamination linked to the military and what were the chief findings of each such report, including (i) whether it identified a need or made a recommendation to work with caution in DU contaminated areas, (ii) whether it identified a need or made a recommendation to do policy work regarding DU contaminated areas; (h) what follow-up took place concerning the chief recommendations of each report identified in (g), as well as concerning the issues identified in each of (g)(i) and (g)(ii); ¸
(i) what, if any, clean-up operations were undertaken in impact zones between 1990 and the present, and, if such operations were undertaken, why was each clean-up operation deemed necessary, and what national or international recommendations were followed in each clean-up; (j) which, if any, experts were consulted to determine any possible DU contamination between 1990 and the present, and, if experts were consulted, who were they, and in what field or fields did each expert work; (k) what, if any, specific training, equipment and guidance was given to CF members and veterans who were required to work in areas of DU contamination or to conduct any DU field assessments and clean-ups; (l) what, if any, specific radiation field measurement and health and safety equipment was provided to CF members and veterans, including equipment used to determine the presence of DU, and what specific training was provided concerning the use of any such equipment; (m) what, if any, training, equipment and guidance was given to CF members and veterans concerning the handling of both intact and damaged weapons previously used to fire DU munitions; (n) from 1990 to the present (i) what was the CF’s policy regarding transportation, use, exposure, risk mitigation, and testing of DU from 1990 to the present, (ii) how did or does the policy comply with all relevant guidelines and regulations for the protection of the environment and personnel, including, but not limited to, those established in the Canada Labour Code, by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and through the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System, (iii) were the guidelines and regulations identified in (ii) followed during CF operations abroad, (iv) how was the policy elaborated in (n)(i), enforced during CF activities both in Canada and abroad; (o) is there a protocol accepted by the government for urine testing for DU and what are its details, including, but not limited to, (i) who should be screened, (ii) following what exposures should screening occur, (iii) which laboratories were or are used for the screening, (iv) what criteria have been used to select the laboratory that conducts the screening and how can quality assurance in screening processes and results be ensured, (v) the maximum acceptable delay between DU exposure to initial screening, (vi) the screening method and how that method was chosen, (vii) the screening schedule, (viii) any follow-up mechanisms, (ix) how screening is documented, (x) when this protocol was accepted; (p) what, if any, screening procedure exists for potential DU exposure for CF members and veterans, including, but not limited to, (i) an exposure questionnaire, (ii) a 24-hour urine collection test, (iii) a detailed physical exam, (iv) clinical tests of organ systems function; (q) what, if any, DU follow-up program or similar program intended to screen and monitor health problems associated with DU exposure is available to CF members and veterans; (r) what, if any, CF members or veterans have been identified and tracked following potential exposure to DU through situations related to (a), (b) and (d), and what was involved in the tracking procedures, specifying whether the tracking included (i) urinary uranium determinations, (ii) clinical laboratory values, (iii) psychiatric and neuro-cognitive assessments, (iv) other forms of tracking;
(s) what, if any, summary statistics are now available for cases identified in (r); (t) what, if any, CF members or veterans have been identified and tracked following exposure to (i) vehicles hit with friendly fire, (ii) burning vehicles, (iii) fires involving DU munitions, (iv) the inspection or salvaging of damaged vehicles; (u) what, if any, information is given to CF members or veterans who might have been exposed to harmful DU conditions, and, specifically, how is this information relayed; (v) can CF members or veterans who might have been exposed to harmful DU conditions ask to be screened for DU exposure, if not, why not, and, if so, (i) what procedure do they follow, (ii) who does the testing, (iii) what is the cost of the testing; (w) what are the potential health effects from (i) external exposure to DU, for both low and high dosages, in both the short term and the long term, and (ii) internal exposure to DU, for both low and high dosages, in both the short term and the long term; (x) what, if any, CF members or veterans have applied for compensation associated with DU exposure during military service, specifying (i) the number of requests, (ii) whether compensation was awarded, (iii) whether compensation is pending, (iv) whether compensation is in appeal, (v) how many appeals have been made; (y) have any of DND’s medical or surgical members ever identified a possible link between a CF member’s service or a veteran’s service, exposure to DU, and particular health effects, and, if so, (i) how many times has such a possible link been made by DND’s medical or surgical members, (ii) what follow-up occurred as a result of any identified possible linkages; and (z) does the government have plans to convene a working group to review the latest research on hazardous materials exposure, including, but not limited to, exposure to DU, and possible health effects and, if so, (i) what is the planned scope of the review, (ii) who is to convene the working group, (iii) how are experts to be chosen, (iv) how are conflicts of interest to be avoided and declared, (vi) what is the timeline for the review and the review’s milestones?