Debates of Sept. 30th, 2011

Senate Reform Act

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Madam Speaker, on every bill in the Senate, British Columbia and Alberta would be very underrepresented and in any democracy that I know of, to be underrepresented is bad news. Today it is a problem, but it is manageable because the Senate at the end of the day almost always gives the last word to the House.

British Columbia and Alberta are much better represented and we will work on some things that will make their representation even better in the House in the coming weeks, but not in the Senate. In the Senate it cannot be changed and the minister did not answer my question. He said that the distribution of senators by province cannot be changed other than by the Constitution. I agree with him. So that means that forever British Columbia and Alberta will be terribly underrepresented in one of the two elected chambers of this country. Is that really what he wants for his province?

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is curious that the minister is not taking the opportunity to ask my colleague some questions with respect to what I would regard as a very thoughtful speech and a detailed deconstruction of what is clearly a flawed bill.

We have seen some pretty awful situations in the United States recently with constitutional and political gridlock between two houses which are elected. As others have said, there is a conference mechanism wherein people of goodwill can in effect work out their differences.

It seems to me that one of the core points the hon. member raises in his speech is the institutionalization of gridlock between the two houses. As I think about what he has elucidated, I think he is right. I am curious as to how the hon. member sees that happening over time as each develops its own culture.

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is a big concern for me. Canada is a complex country to govern, and friends in the Conservative Party are realizing that more and more. It is a huge country, very decentralized. There is little that Ottawa can do alone without at least consulting the provinces. Also the aboriginal people have to have their say.

Why add an even more complex situation when the common institution of the country, the Parliament of Canada will, most of the time, like in the United States, be blocked by partisan differences between the two elected houses, the two elected chambers?

I think it is ill-advised to do so. We should at least have a long debate. I would urge the minister to ensure to have hearings. Many experts will come and explain to the minister how dangerous this bill is for Canada.

[Kellie Leitch, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development and to the Minister of Labour]

Madam Speaker, 70% of Canadians have said that they want some form of reform. I would just like to ask, does the member opposite really want a constitutional quagmire? That is what he is proposing.

Canadians want action. They elected a strong, stable, Conservative government to create reform. We are moving forward with that. Why does the member opposite want to put us in a constitutional quagmire?

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Madam Speaker, in fact, it is the bill that will create the quagmire. The hon. member must understand that.

Alberta and British Columbia will see that on every bill they will be so unfairly represented that they will request a constitutional change to be sure that they will have their fair share. It will be completely understandable.

As the member well knows, there will not be one politician in Quebec or Ontario who will be willing to change that. So we will have the quagmire that the member is speaking about, and it is what I do not want. I am sure she does not want it either. So the member should say no to this bill.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Madam Speaker, I had come with the intention of giving a fairly dry speech full of historical references. I am a comparative historian, so I was going to make all kinds of comparisons to other countries, but I have heard so many things today that just do not seem to bear with what I would consider to be the facts. So I thought I would, instead, turn my attention to responding to some of the, I am sure, sincerely meant but completely incorrect statements made by some of my colleagues today.

I want to start with the completely erroneous and baseless statement that this amendment would represent some kind of unconstitutional change to our Constitution. Let me start with that.

First, I should draw the attention of members to the fact that the bill contains two parts. Part of the bill is an ordinary piece of legislation that deals with the subject of how senators would be elected using the advisory election process. That process then causes individuals' names to be submitted to the Prime Minister. I will read that part of the bill, if I could. It is very brief. Part 1, clause 3 of the bill states:

If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially in accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory.

There is then a schedule that outlines what the rules would be for such an election to qualify the individual to be treated in that manner by the Prime Minister.

Part 2 of the bill is actually an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. My colleague from Saint-Laurent—Cartierville made a reference to unconstitutionality and he can correct me if I have misunderstood what he was asserting, but I believe he was referring to Part 2 of the legislation. On that basis, I will now turn to dealing with any objections to constitutionality that he may believe exist.

I should first correct something he said. He said that the changes to the Senate are governed by subsection 42(1), the amending formula, of the Constitution Act and that is only partly true. I have subsection 42(1) with me and it reads as follows:

An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1)--

Subsection 38(1) is the 7-50 formula.

Paragraph (b) of subsection 42(1) states, “the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators”. That is the paragraph he referred to. Paragraph (c) says, “the number of members by which a province is entitled to be represented in the Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators”. These two things require the 7-50 formula. Seven provinces with half the population must approve it or it cannot go forward. This is the kind of discussion that tends to lead to constitutional quagmires.

By contrast, section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is the amending formula. Our Constitution has five amending formulae for different parts of our Constitution. Section 44 says, “Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”. The question is: Does this proposed change fall under section 44 or is it not in fact under that section and, therefore, does it fall back under the 7-50 amending formula? The answer to that is it does, indeed, fall under section 44. This is established law.

Section 44 is the governing formula because of the fact that it is the replacement for another section that allowed the Parliament of Canada to make amendments exclusively in certain areas. There is widespread acceptance that section 44 is the replacement for the subsection 91(1) amending formula that was put in place for Canada in 1949.

That formula read that, “It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make laws” dealing with the following classes of subjects:

The amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada, except as regards matters coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured to the Legislature or the Government of a province, or to any class of persons with respect to schools or as regards the use of the English or the French language or as regards the requirements that there shall be a session of the Parliament...at [least] once [every] year, and that no House of Commons shall continue for more than five years from the [date] of the return of the Writs for choosing the House....

The subsection 91.1 formula was used in 1965 by the Pearson government and the Parliament at the time to change the Constitution, causing senators to no longer be elected for life, but rather to be elected until age 75.

There are the precedents for doing it this way.

I want to take a few moments to mention some other considerations here.

The practice of having a section 44 amendment, that is an amendment to the Constitution authorized under section 44 of the Constitution contained in a piece of legislation, a bill dealing with ordinary legislative matters in one part and then with an amendment to the Constitution in the other part of the same bill, is an established practice. It has done been a number of times. I would point, in particular, to the act passed in 1999 that created the territory of Nunavut. That act contained some ordinary legislation and also an amendment, an amendment that dealt with the Senate of Canada because it awarded a senator to the territory of Nunavut.

Therefore, the established practice of doing things in this manner, as authorized by this section of the Constitution, has existed for no small amount of time, it is well-precedented and there is considerable scholarship to back up the assertion that the subsection 91.1 amending formula is the parent of the section 44 amending formula.

I turn now to some other issues that were raised in the earlier debate.

I mentioned my frustration with the argument that we cannot engage in piecemeal reform, that we must engage only in a complete reform. I think this leads to a constitutional quagmire. The perfect becomes the enemy of the good and we achieve no change whatsoever. That is a very strong reason for opposing the arguments made by the hon. for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville.

I want to mention in particular that we do deal in this bill with some very significant points. We do not deal with the issue of regional fairness. That is quite true. We do deal with the election versus appointment issue. Members would be, in a formal sense, appointed by the Governor General, and the Governor General's powers are very carefully protected under the text of this bill. However, nonetheless, a de facto election takes place. On the term length of senators, they cannot be appointed at age 40 and serve for 35 years. That is also dealt with.

As for regional fairness, and this is always a vexed question, it is in the nature of upper houses to tend to not reflect representation by population or the principle of one person, one vote; one vote, one weight and therefore that presumably justifies some inequality. I think the inequality in our current upper house is excessive. On the other hand, to argue that therefore we must ensure that the upper house is powerless is to say that we must eviscerate one of the basic concepts of federalism because of the assumed belief that, as the member said, no politicians in Ontario or Quebec would support a change to correct that unfairness of representation. That would be a very wrong thing.

Remember, every long-standing federation in the world, every successful federation in the world, has an independent upper house, which is based, at least to some degree, on considerations other than representation by population. There are two senators per state in the United States. In Australia it was originally six per state, then eventually 12 per state. It of course have only six states. In the upper house in Switzerland, there are two per canton. There are some what they call half-cantons, such as Appenzell Innerrhoden and Appenzell Ausserrhoden, which get one senator each, but everybody else gets two. Germany has a somewhat different system but, again, it is not based on representation by population. There is some overrepresentation for the smaller länders.

The idea of having some kind of equality is there. We could work towards a more principled kind of equality. I really think there is sufficient good will. However, we should not halt any progress because we are searching for perfection on that point.

Let me deal with something else on the same subject. The idea that the upper house ought to be kept effectively illegitimate so it cannot second guess the lower house, leads logically toward the NDP position to abolish the upper house rather than to the position taken by the member for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville.

We have to be realistic about this. The upper house cannot be abolished without a 7/50 amendment, without 7 provinces with half the population agreeing to that amendment. The chances of getting that kind of success—

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Unanimity of provinces. It is unanimity.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

I just heard the member say “unanimity”, and he may well be right. I may be incorrect on that statement. The point is that it is very difficult to achieve that kind of change. Getting that change is also not really an option.

The fact is that the only option aside from leaving an appointed upper house, which simply reflects the partisan interests of either the government of the day or the government of recent memory, is a pretty undesirable alternative to any kind of reform whatsoever. I do not think that is the approach we ought to take.

The hon. member for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville said that the Senate has only blocked seven bills since 1945 and warned against the danger of it blocking bills. I would just ask this question. Surely no one will argue that the House of Commons and Senate together have not passed more than seven bad acts of Parliament since 1945? Surely there have been things that should have been stopped in the Senate.

Surely the point of having checks and balances, which is a principle in our government, a principle in the government of all those other federations, and indeed in any civilized government, is something we ought to be protecting and honouring. This means that certain decisions that I personally would like to see would be blocked by an elected Senate, and also some that I would like to see stopped.

In general, the search for a greater consensus, something that does not simply reflect the will of a mandate achieved at one instant in time on election day in a certain election, is a worthwhile endeavour.

On that basis alone, it is absolutely vital we have a Senate that can be effective, as our Senate currently and most emphatically is not.

I mentioned a bit about the Frankenstein's monster argument that was presented by the member for Hamilton Centre. After he made his comments in response to my question, he noted that the multi-member proportional system, which has multiple mandates, is one that is precedented, it exists elsewhere, unlike the idea that an upper house has multiple types of mandates.

In fact, that is actually not correct. The Swiss upper house has multiple types of mandates. The members sent from different cantons are elected by different methods. They are elected by Landsgemeinde, an assembly of all the citizens in some of the so-called mountain cantons in the eastern part of the country. They are elected by different systems elsewhere. That is the decision of the individual canton.

There is a system that exists, and has been in existence for many years, quite successfully with more than one kind of mandate. In fact, if one looks around, they can discover that there are many legislatures in many parts of the world where multiple mandates are used. I think one should be careful about these things. One does not want to overdo it.

I point out that in this case what is being proposed is simply a method for transitioning out of the status quo where some people were appointed after 2008, promising to serve a mixed mandate, others where appointed before that time, having made no such promise, and those coming in after the passage of this amendment to the Constitution would be under a third system.

In the long run, there would one type of mandate for everybody. We are simply going through a transition process, and not one that I think would be damaging.

I also want to deal with the suggestion made by the member for Hamilton Centre that this is in some respect undemocratic. The whole point of this is to be democratic. His argument was that a prime minister might not recommend the individual who won an election. Let us remember the relevant part of the act, which I read to everybody, and I will read it again:

If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially in accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory.

It is binding on the Prime Minister. In true theory it is not binding upon the Governor General.

I think the point the member was making, and he will be able to reiterate that point if I do not get it correct, was that a prime minister might simply ignore this advice. The fact is that there is no penalty in the bill for doing so. Therefore, I see his point.

I would point out that in the discussions that took place for the parallel piece of legislation on Senate reform proposed in the 39th Parliament, the opposite objection was made by a number of witnesses. They said that the problem was that we would be establishing a convention which would become too firmly rooted and that the Prime Minister would, regardless of what objections he might have, be forced to follow the advice by the enormous political pressure. The argument then went on that this convention would cause this to be a de facto power of appointment being given to the people and that would mean the Governor General would lose his independent ability to appoint the senators and therefore it would be unconstitutional.

I will not go into the absurdity of that argument, although it was absurd, but I will point out that the feeling was very much the opposite. Therefore, the member's fears might be allayed by reviewing some of the testimony from that committee.

I would also point out the fact that there is an historical example we can draw upon. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated that until the Meech Lake accord was enacted into law, and at which point the Senate would be elected using a new set of mandates, he would accept senators appointed by provincial governments.

Therefore, in 1989 the legislative assembly of Alberta held an election for the Senate and General Stan Waters won it. His name was then presented to the prime minister who was very resistant. He tried to wiggle out of making that appointment, but in the end the heat was too great and he appointed Senator Waters to the upper House, where he served very well. Unfortunately it was not very long because he passed away as a result of cancer a couple of years later.

There is a precedent which indicates that prime ministers will have a very tough time ignoring who and what people choose.

Our whole system is based upon constitutional conventions. Our entire Canadian political system and its British ancestor are based upon the idea of conventions. On paper, the Governor General has an independent power with regard to the appointment of senators. On paper, the Monarch has tremendous arbitrary powers. In practice, a person not even mentioned in the Constitution, the prime minister, has most of those powers and exercises them via the House of Commons. In practice, we have responsible government, something which is absolutely responsible to the House of Commons and is absolutely not written down anywhere in the Constitution.

These rules are absolutely binding. They are not legal rules; they are constitutional rules. Those who would dream of trying to ignore them would do so at the cost of their political career.

I suggest that much the same dynamic would be at work with regard to the Prime Minister following the letter of this law and making a recommendation to the Governor General as to the appointment of senators who come from that provincial list.

There is no question that prime ministers in the end would lose the power they have to appoint partisans or people of their choice and would be forced to follow the will of the people of the relevant province. That would be a very good thing.

[Anne Minh-Thu Quach, NDP, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Madam Speaker, I found the speech given by the hon. member across the floor rather incoherent, especially when it comes to giving powers to the provinces. The bill supposes that the provinces could, at their expense, hold elections to elect senators, but it very clearly states that the Prime Minister would not be obliged to accept those elections or that choice of senators. Where is the democracy in this bill?

Also, the member across the way added that it would be unconstitutional to give these powers to the provinces. What do the Conservatives ultimately want from this bill? Do they want to give powers to the provinces or not? Where is the democracy in that?

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we want to give powers to Canadians, in their respective provinces. Regarding the issue of democracy, the prime minister is obliged to accept the decisions of the voters in the provinces. To quote the bill:

If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially in accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory.

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington for his very thoughtful and personal speech. It is a refreshing change from the kind of canned speeches read for the first time by so many of his colleagues in his party. He came with something personal and I hope it will stay this way. I hope that he will not one day come in repeating slogans as if he were unable to come up with his own personal view.

However, he made some comments that were in contradiction to what the minister and some of his colleagues have said. For example, he said that, yes, the bill would be unfair for some provinces. It is a fact and he does not say that it is not true. However, he thinks that there will have enough goodwill elsewhere in the country to address these issues une fois que le mal sera fait, once the wrong is done, and that this goodwill will come from other provinces.

In to order to justify the bill, the member is saying that we should not to worry, that we will have a constitutional negotiation after writ. Therefore, the constitutional nightmare his colleague spoke of before, he is hoping for it. That is what he said. I think that is a very dangerous contradiction within the Conservative Party and he will need to explain that to Canadians.

Do Canadians want a constitutional fix after the wrong the government would have made for the whole country, especially for British Columbia and Alberta?

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Madam Speaker, it would be truer to say that what I said was that it was not that the bill was unfair, but rather that it does not deal with one of the issues that confronts us today, and that is absolutely true.

I would be willing to do this sort of thing, but whether there is a national willingness is not for me to decide. Whether the nation says that it is satisfied with the way things are is not for me to decide.

I would point out the goal of the original Confederation deal on the subject of Senate representation. There was no illusion at the time that we were trying to achieve representation by population in the Upper House, quite the contrary. Nor was there the goal to achieve what the Americans had done, which was equal representation for each of the states. The goal was to achieve equal representation for each of the regions. At that time, we perceived Canada as consisting of three regions: Quebec, Ontario and the Maritime provinces. The west was contemplated but did not come in. When it did, a change was made to the Constitution to allow for equal representation for the western region. That regional principle of representation inequality, more or less, stays in place.

There is a separate issue one could point to. There are 24 senators for each region except for the Atlantic region, which is, population wise, less than half the size of the next region, and yet it has seven extra senators because Newfoundland entered in and was given extra senators.

These are things I genuinely do think can be dealt with by means of goodwill. I do not lose faith in the goodwill of all members, both people in the regions that are under-represented and understand that is not the end of the world, and those who are in the over-represented regions who have a sense that we might want to make corrections. However, I leave that to them. I should not be making decisions on their behalf.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for taking the time to listen to my remarks and include them in his responses. It is enjoyable debating with that parliamentarian at committee.

The member commented that the Prime Minister would consider that if it became a convention it would, therefore, have the effect of law. However, that takes time. My point is that the Prime Minister violated his own law in the same Parliament that he brought it into. Therefore, it is quite possible that we may never get enough time to have a convention.

He mentioned Sweden, which was an excellent answer. My response is that, again, it is a recognized model. It may be unique but it is a model. What we have in the Senate, by virtue of what is being proposed here, is not a model, it is a mishmash of things that were hangovers from before; new immediate short-term fixes. I mean, it is just a patchwork and that is why I used the Frankenstein example.

The member mentioned deliberately built multiple mandates. Again, when it is a deliberate mandate that is built-in, that is a lot different than saying that we need to leave this piece here because we have people appointed for that length of time and we need to put this piece in here to cover that. There is a huge difference.

I will come back to the point that was just made about the regions. The member said that we do not deal with regional fairness. That is quite true. The member prides himself in being intellectually honest and, for the most part,I believe he is, but could he please comment on, or however he wants to skate over this, how this bill would entrench the serious problems that are being referenced not only in Alberta and B.C. but also the eastern provinces and the northern part of our country?

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Madam Speaker, I also I enjoy debating with the member at committee. He is always a gentleman and very fair-minded. While we honour all colleagues, perhaps they are not all equally fair-minded in the proceedings of the House. I appreciate that from him and from the member for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville too.

I think the member was inadvertent in referencing Sweden. I was actually referring to Switzerland.

The more substantive issue he pointed out was he continued to say that we have a model here that is a mishmash. I would suggest another word. I would suggest the word “transition”. I want to point out that we would not be the first country to face this kind of problem.

When the senate was being set up in the United States following the 1787 constitutional convention, there was a basic problem. Its senate was to consist of members, all whom would have six-year terms, but some of whom would have their six-year term expire six years from then and others would have it expire only four years into the future within a de facto four-year term, and some of whom would have only a two-year term. This was a problem. Every state wanted to have one of the four-year and one of the six-year senators and every candidate for the senate wanted to be one of the four or six-year senators. No one wanted to be a two-year senator. This was a short-term political problem and it did not prevent it from functioning as a very august institution and to grow in depth with time.

As well, I should mention that when the U.S. senate in the early part of the 20th century, exactly 100 years ago, was in transition from being an appointed body to being an elected body, what happened was initially one state, the state of Oregon, started electing its senators. That practice gradually spread, first through the west and, within a few years, an amendment was passed to the constitution, I believe it was the 17th amendment, that called for all senators to be elected. But again, there was a transition that lasted about a decade. It did not cause, as far as I am aware, any catastrophic problems.

The member had one last question, which was the one he was most vexed about, but it has slipped my mind of what it was.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Regions.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you, regional representation. As I mentioned, if there is a national desire to have a discussion on that point,then that discussion would occur, but I do not think that should keep us from having a discussion on this point.

I will ask my Alberta and British Columbia colleagues this question. Would they prefer being represented by six unelected senators or six elected senators?

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak.

I recognize that it is a privilege to have the opportunity to address the House today. This is a privilege granted to me by the democratic principles of our country. Based on the supremacy of the rule of law, Canadian parliamentary institutions recognize this fact and often serve as an example throughout the world. Whether it be our Supreme Court, our Constitution or the House of Commons, the international news constantly reminds us that it would be very dangerous to take our democratic institutions for granted or to simply handle government business in a manner that is inconsistent with the most basic parliamentary rules.

This opportunity to speak about Bill C-7 is an opportunity to express my concern about the profound changes that this government wants to make to Canadian parliamentary institutions and, in particular, about the questionable manner in which it intends to go about doing so.

First, I would like to draw the House's attention to one thing, and that is the purely cosmetic nature of this bill. It is like a face lift that merely serves to superficially hide the signs of aging. This proposed Senate reform does not do much to hide the wrinkles. It is what I would call botched surgery. This bill does not address the real problems with the Senate.

First, this government is not above the laws, and certainly not above our Constitution. How does the Conservative government plan to justify the fact that it is blatantly thumbing its nose at the most basic rules of our state? In the preamble of the legislation, the government says it plans to use section 44, which, subject to sections 41 and 42, allows Parliament to make an ordinary law to change the way senators are appointed. This move would very clearly violate subsection 42(1) of our Constitution, which states:

An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1)...

The Constitution unequivocally states that the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting senators cannot be changed without the consent of seven provinces representing at least 50% of the population of Canada.

This provision is in the Constitution in black and white. How does the minister justify ignoring it? If the government wants to reform the Senate, it must do so in accordance with the rules that have been established.

The government is saying that the scope of section 44 covers everything else, including, it says, what it is trying to do with this bill. This argument does not hold water, given the name of the bill: Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits. That kind of language cannot go unnoticed. I urge the government to honour the procedure for amending the Constitution.

I would like to add something here. I took a look at the government's previous Senate reform bill, Bill C-20. It was very interesting. In the preamble, it states quite clearly that the reform based on consultative elections was to be a transition process that would lead to a more permanent constitutional reform of the Senate to provide for a means of direct election. This statement, which is quite significant, does not appear in Bill C-7. This is yet more proof of the superficial nature of this bill. This is all that the majority government plans to bring to Senate reform. It is amazing that this is being used for political games.

This government feels justified in using an undemocratic method to make an antiquated institution that is ill-suited to modern political realities more democratic. All I am seeing here is another attempt by this government to unilaterally move forward with institutional reform in the least collegial and transparent way possible. What is more, the government is saying that this is all there will be in the way of Senate reform. What a lost opportunity.

Flouting the process for amending the constitution would create a dangerous constitutional precedent. Is this the historic legacy this government wishes to leave? I would like to take this opportunity to say that the New Democratic Party will always defend the rule of law and stand up for healthy, friendly and constructive debate on the future of this country and the issues that directly affect Canadians. No government can avoid meeting this country's constitutional obligations. No government can do that.

I do not think it could be any clearer that the use of section 44 is a way to avoid debate and especially to avoid obtaining the consent of the provinces, which are also concerned about these changes. By proceeding in such a unilateral way, the bill sends an ambiguous and underhanded message to the provinces. Last I heard, they were an integral part of this country. Is this government afraid that this reform bill will not obtain the required consent? This kind of attitude tells me that the government is incapable of generating the support it needs to make these reforms. This bill, in its current form, is an excellent way of short-circuiting the provinces' opinions.

The provinces that had an upper chamber in their own legislature abolished it a long time ago. Furthermore, a number of provincial premiers have opposed this unilateral reform. It is blatantly obvious that the government is saying, “You do not agree with us? Oh well, too bad for you. Our mandate is too strong for us to worry about you. Here are the wonders of Canadian constitutional law, covered in Conservative sauce.” What a fabulous message to send to Canadian citizens. Does that really represent the actions of a responsible majority government that claims to work for all Canadians?

The role of the Senate has been controversial since the early days of Confederation. If I may, I remind the House that the Senate, as an institution, was meant to be a chamber of sober second thought, a chamber of wise people chosen to represent the territorial diversity of the country and act as a counterbalance to the decisions made in the House of Commons. Today, the makeup of cabinet reflects one of the requirements for regional representation, which was previously a responsibility of the Senate. The role of the Senate has increasingly weakened since it was created at the time of Confederation.

Above all, the Senate must be absolutely devoid of partisanship. I am in no way questioning the wisdom of the current senators. However, it is clear that the Senate has never consistently attained the other objectives laid out for it. Territorial representation, a concern at a time when it took several days to reach the federal capital, is no longer relevant and does not protect remote regions. The Senate rarely opposes the decisions made by the House of Commons. When it does, it hinders the proper functioning of the democratic process. The perception of voters is not that the Senate is a chamber of sober second thought, but that it is the chamber where bills that are too controversial remain in limbo. Finally, and this is the key point, Senate partisanship is legendary. That is the greatest complaint about the Senate. Far from correcting the situation, Bill C-7 will only makes things worse.

To get an idea of its partisan nature, we need only watch the news. My colleague from Winnipeg Centre recently gave an interview in which he criticized the involvement of a Conservative senator who was serving as the election campaign co-chair and leading spokesperson for the Manitoba Conservative Party. It is clearly unacceptable for a member of the Senate, who is paid by taxpayers, to use his time for that purpose. If he wishes to get involved in the Manitoba election campaign, he should never do so at the expense of Canadian taxpayers. This example highlights how the Senate, in its current form, is poisoned by partisanship.

Canadians expect the Senate to act as independently as possible. Can the minister clearly tell this chamber that reforming the way senators are selected—by adding an election process—will make the Senate less partisan? No, I do not think he can, unless the minister outright contradicts a Progressive Conservative senator who told the Hill Times last June that Bill C-7 could be a threat to the Canadian parliamentary system. He maintained that the proposed reforms could politicize the Senate even further instead of making it free of partisanship. He also stated that a senator is more effective when there is no partisanship.

What more is there to say? This bill would clearly exacerbate the partisanship that is already all too prominent in the Senate. How can this bill possibly be described as an improvement to the democratic legitimacy of the Senate? The proposed nature of the method of selecting senators would poison the Senate's mandate, which is supposed to be as independent as possible. If we look closely at the government's line of thinking, there would be a huge divide among senators appointed before October 14, 2008, and those appointed after. How will these new, elected senators with fixed terms serve alongside senators who were appointed without any fixed terms? How will Canadians perceive this dual reality?

On that topic, I have a few questions I would like to raise. Approximately 60% of the current senators were appointed before October 14, 2008. This means that they would be able to fulfill their senatorial duty and enjoy the generous privileges of their position until the age of 75. The coexistence of the former kind of senators with the new kind of senators would go on for several years, perhaps even decades. Consider the example of a senator who still has 35 years of service ahead of him. How would the legitimacy of the former kind of appointed senator compare to that of the new senators with a fresh mandate from the electorate? The legislative process and the reputation of the Senate would definitely be undermined. This simply does not fit in with the vision of an independent Senate whose mandate is to remain as impartial as possible.

The Hill Times tried to contact the 37 senators currently serving who were appointed by the Prime Minister after October 14, 2008, and they received very few responses.

Most of them declined commenting or simply did not respond. There is not even a semblance of unity on this bill from Conservative senators. If their own senators do not support it, it is the ultimate insult to present it to this House. How can this government claim that its Senate reforms are based on increasing its democratic legitimacy? This same government did not hesitate a single second to appoint three candidates from its own party who were defeated in the last election. That is an insult to the intelligence of Canadians who clearly expressed their free and democratic choice.

If this government truly had the intention of reforming the upper chamber, as it has been claiming for a long time now, it would have avoided this unacceptable and irresponsible behaviour. This is yet more evidence of a consistently applied double standard: one policy for friends of the Conservatives, another policy for other Canadians. That is the reality of this government's policy. I doubt that the public takes this lack of respect for their democratic choices lightly. There are strong mandates, and then there are brutal mandates.

There are some aspects of this bill that are worth special attention. Unless they are declared as independents, provincial candidates for the Senate will be free to associate themselves with a political party during their election campaign. If the minister is hoping to cut down on the politicization of the work of the upper chamber through this initiative, I think he has misunderstood the role of the Senate, which is to protect regional, provincial and minority interests, while acting as a chamber of sober second thought to examine legislation in greater detail.

It all comes down to the same thing. How can this government say that greater politicization of the Senate could help deliver this mandate? And how does it reconcile overstepping the opinions of the provinces on this, when the mandate of the Senate is partially entrusted to them in order to balance representation within Confederation? Political party affiliation has a major influence on the work of the Senate. Through this bill the minister is proposing to increase the number of partisan battles by renewing the contingent of senators from each province every nine years.

By introducing a non-renewable term, the reform also denies Canadians an opportunity to reward the work of an elected Senator. If the senator is doing good work, he or she will not be able to continue and the voters will not have a chance to show their appreciation through a re-election. If, on the other hand, the senator is doing mediocre work, voters will not be able to punish his or her incompetence and the senator will leave when the nine-year term is up. Either way, citizens are denied their say in the matter. One of the fundamental principles of democracy currently seriously lacking in the Senate is accountability and this reform is devoid of it as well. This principle is working quite well in the House of Commons and it forces us to give the best of ourselves.

Again, this government does not know what it wants. It is trying to achieve a number of objectives without any real focus. This bill would give us a partially elected Senate that, according to the government, is more democratic by virtue of repeated partisan elections for a non-renewable and non-punishable term. Where I come from, we call that hogwash.

These things cannot be reconciled with the mandate of the Senate, as I was saying earlier. Allow me again to read part of the preamble to Bill C-7, which states that “Parliament wishes to maintain the essential characteristics of the Senate within Canada’s parliamentary democracy as a chamber of independent, sober second thought”. I do not think partisanship will create a climate for independent, sober second thought within the Senate. Just look at the climate in this House to see what I mean by that.

The objective of the bill contradicts its actual effects. The government must decide whether it wants to respect the historical mandate of the Senate or whether it wants to make the Senate more democratically legitimate through partisan elections. Regardless, it is inconceivable that the government would introduce this bill to the Canadian public and insist that these two goals are compatible. Frankly, such vague legislation should not be introduced. But perhaps the government is sacrificing finesse for strength.

I was also distressed to notice that the bill, vaguely and without explanation, shifts the responsibility for holding elections to select Senate candidates. Under the bill, Senate candidates would be elected during provincial elections, on a date to be determined by the lieutenant governor, or during municipal elections. Dumping this responsibility seems like a disorganized and very imprecise way of improving the Senate's democratic legitimacy. The government could have taken the time to draft a clear, detailed and intelligible bill, but instead, Bill C-7 is terribly unclear and illogical. For example, when Canadians choose their candidates during an election, they will not even be certain that the one they choose will sit in the Senate. The final choice will remain in the hands of the Prime Minister since the bill imposes no obligation.

I mentioned that this reform seems to be purely cosmetic and here is the evidence. Parliamentary institutions deserve a little more respect and rigour. Unfortunately, when I look at this bill, the public's cynicism about politicians seems justified to me. Nothing now guarantees that this government will take its reform of the Senate any further.

In addition to this important point, we must also consider the costs of this reform. However, Bill C-7 does not make any mention of these costs. As further proof of how vague this legislation is, the bill does not clearly set out which level of government will have to assume the new costs. In these uncertain economic times, the government is adding new costs without having analyzed the proposed reforms to determine how useful they actually are.

Senate elections would thus become a federal, provincial, or municipal matter. Nothing is clear because the bill allows for all three scenarios. How will expenses be shared in these even more complex elections? Moreover, this new use of public money will contribute nothing to democracy. Canadians have long questioned the usefulness of the Senate. I doubt that the public will find the Senate more attractive if it becomes more expensive. In other words, we do not know “when?” or “how?”, and especially not “how much?”. Would it not be preferable to reform the Senate by passing bills that have more substance than grey areas? Is that asking too much of the government?

These are the indicators of a sloppy bill that takes too simplistic an approach to the parliamentary institutions of this country. I am disappointed if this is all that this government can add to the debate on Senate reform. The regions, provinces and minorities of Canada are again left hanging and will continue to be represented by an upper chamber that is completely disconnected from contemporary reality.

This bill, in addition to moving ahead in a manner that is, at a minimum, constitutionally suspect, only masks the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the Senate, without undertaking the mandatory and necessary consultation of the provinces of this country and, above all, without considering what mandate Canadians realistically want an upper chamber to have. The message to the provinces is as follows: this government does not need to consult you to proceed unilaterally with constitutional amendments. The message to Canadians is that this government is not listening to them. Its mandate is too strong for it to worry about them, especially when they indicate their preferences in a general election.

My colleagues are certainly aware of all the attempts made to reform the Senate since its inception. These attempts all have one thing in common: they failed. In the past 100 years, 13 attempts have failed and, today, given the lack of provincial interest and the absence of a consensus on the nature of the reform, there is every indication that this bill will be added to that historic list of failed attempts.

The reality is that the Senate is a problem that no one has been able to fix. So, as our party is suggesting, it is time to consider another option that has yet to be explored—abolishing the Senate. That is why are proposing that we consult people about this, to see if they believe that the upper chamber still has a place in our democratic institutions. We want to ask them if they feel this legacy from the 19th century still has a place in a 21st century democracy. The provinces that abolished their senates did not stop functioning. Countries like Denmark and New Zealand abolished their senates and continue to operate without any problem.

Yes, I am critical of this bill, but the official opposition will not be content with simply criticizing in a stubborn and narrow-minded fashion. The opposition will do everything it can to propose well-thought-out and reasonable solutions for the good of Canadians. Our parliamentary institutions deserve more of our time and intellectual rigour. That is why I insist that when difficult issues such as Senate reform are brought before the House for debate, we should be discussing the option of abolishing the Senate and presenting that to the Canadian public as well. That is the spirit of what I consider to be constructive and respectful debate.

[Stéphane Dion, Liberal, Saint-Laurent—Cartierville, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for her very interesting speech. I would like to ask her about the solution recommended by her party, that is, to hold a nation-wide referendum on abolishing the Senate.

Would the question read, “Are you in favour of abolishing the Senate?”

This question is problematic. Perhaps the majority of Canadians simply want Senate reform. But if they are forced to choose between abolishing it or keeping it as is, they may vote to abolish it, even if that is not their first choice. Thus, it would be a complex question to ask in a referendum, because Senate reform could be done in many ways. It could be done badly, as we are seeing here today, or it could be done in a way that is much better for Canadians.

Therefore, in my opinion, it is not suitable for a referendum for that very reason. But there is another reason. Let us suppose that the majority of Canadians say “yes” to abolishing the Senate, but a few provinces say “no” and want to keep the Senate, including, for example, Prince Edward Island, which is guaranteed four senators in the Constitution. Does the member believe that the premiers of those provinces—Prince Edward Island or others—would be forced to say, against the majority vote of their respective provinces, that they will agree to abolish the Senate? For if all premiers do not give their consent, it cannot be abolished, since the provinces' decision must be unanimous. So does she not see that her plan for a referendum on this issue, which on the surface appears very tempting, raises many problems?

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for his question.

In terms of the referendum question in this context, my colleague is acutely aware that it is very difficult to ask a very clear question in a referendum. Everyone agrees on that.

I agree with him when he says that presenting just one question that asks whether the Senate should be maintained or abolished does not cover all the possible options. In a similar way, the government is simply presenting Parliament with a reform, saying that people agree on having a reform. In fact, all people are saying is that they do not agree with the status quo. It is intellectually dishonest because we do not know whether people truly agree with the reform or whether they simply no longer want the status quo. It is important to verify what people really want and get their approval.

In terms of unanimous agreement among the provinces, discussions will have to be held and a consensus reached. What is being proposed is not simply to abolish the Senate without consideration and keep this Parliament the way it is. We would like to seek different representation in Parliament that could compensate for the fact that the Senate would no longer be there to represent the regions.

We could seek the unanimous consent of the provinces to a proposal for real democratic reform of our parliamentary institutions.

[Royal Galipeau, Conservative, Ottawa—Orléans, ON]

Mr. Speaker, unless I am mistaken, I think it was the member for Ottawa—Orléans who was recognized, not the member for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville.

I would like to hear the hon. member's opinion on the two choices before her now: the status quo in the Senate—where there are senators who have potentially been appointed for 45 years—or a Senate with shorter terms.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, the problem is that they have tabled this bill, saying that it will be more democratic and will improve the situation. In reality, this bill will not fix the problems inherent in the Senate, such as partisanship and a lack of regional representation. It is not true that senators represent regions; it is simply partisan. This reform bill is being presented as an improvement to democracy and as an accountability measure, but I do not agree with that. I cannot accept the reform as it stands.

[Marc-André Morin, NDP, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Madam Speaker, we are trying to find some logic in this whole thing. We have heard from colleagues with constitutional backgrounds on both sides of the House, and yet we still cannot make any sense of it.

I am wondering if this move is not a way for the Conservative Party to prepare for a time when the tide starts to turn against them. By keeping the Senate and stacking it in their favour, they are ensuring that they will be able to pursue their agenda in the future and that Parliament would not be able to go back and change things. Does my colleague get the same impression?

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for his question. It would indeed be a dangerous precedent to allow such amendments that are so close to being constitutional. This is an extremely sensitive issue. Making these amendments without any consultation would set a very dangerous precedent of completely unilateral constitutional amendments.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to congratulate the NDP member for Louis-Saint-Laurent for her very detailed and interesting speech. However, I must say that I was very disappointed when she proposed a constitutional dialogue on abolishing the Senate rather than a consultation with the provinces to see how we could improve the Senate. Abolishing the Senate is a major debate.

Does the hon. member think that this would be an effective use of our time during this period of economic uncertainty in our country and the world? Is it a priority for the Canadian public, the provinces and the members of the House to start a constitutional debate at this time?

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to sincerely thank the hon. member for her question. In fact, it is the government that introduced this bill on Senate reform in the House. I do not know if it is a top priority to reform the Senate or reopen the Constitution, but it was the government that introduced the bill before us today.

Personally, I believe that it is not worth reforming the Senate in this manner without having consulted the provinces and the public. When we talk about some form of abolition, we are not talking about simply abolishing the Senate. We will have to really reform our parliamentary institutions so that they are more representative of everyone in Canada. It would be possible to seek a consensus and see what the public thinks.