I just heard the member say “unanimity”, and he may well be right. I may be incorrect on that statement. The point is that it is very difficult to achieve that kind of change. Getting that change is also not really an option.
The fact is that the only option aside from leaving an appointed upper house, which simply reflects the partisan interests of either the government of the day or the government of recent memory, is a pretty undesirable alternative to any kind of reform whatsoever. I do not think that is the approach we ought to take.
The hon. member for Saint-Laurent—Cartierville said that the Senate has only blocked seven bills since 1945 and warned against the danger of it blocking bills. I would just ask this question. Surely no one will argue that the House of Commons and Senate together have not passed more than seven bad acts of Parliament since 1945? Surely there have been things that should have been stopped in the Senate.
Surely the point of having checks and balances, which is a principle in our government, a principle in the government of all those other federations, and indeed in any civilized government, is something we ought to be protecting and honouring. This means that certain decisions that I personally would like to see would be blocked by an elected Senate, and also some that I would like to see stopped.
In general, the search for a greater consensus, something that does not simply reflect the will of a mandate achieved at one instant in time on election day in a certain election, is a worthwhile endeavour.
On that basis alone, it is absolutely vital we have a Senate that can be effective, as our Senate currently and most emphatically is not.
I mentioned a bit about the Frankenstein's monster argument that was presented by the member for Hamilton Centre. After he made his comments in response to my question, he noted that the multi-member proportional system, which has multiple mandates, is one that is precedented, it exists elsewhere, unlike the idea that an upper house has multiple types of mandates.
In fact, that is actually not correct. The Swiss upper house has multiple types of mandates. The members sent from different cantons are elected by different methods. They are elected by Landsgemeinde, an assembly of all the citizens in some of the so-called mountain cantons in the eastern part of the country. They are elected by different systems elsewhere. That is the decision of the individual canton.
There is a system that exists, and has been in existence for many years, quite successfully with more than one kind of mandate. In fact, if one looks around, they can discover that there are many legislatures in many parts of the world where multiple mandates are used. I think one should be careful about these things. One does not want to overdo it.
I point out that in this case what is being proposed is simply a method for transitioning out of the status quo where some people were appointed after 2008, promising to serve a mixed mandate, others where appointed before that time, having made no such promise, and those coming in after the passage of this amendment to the Constitution would be under a third system.
In the long run, there would one type of mandate for everybody. We are simply going through a transition process, and not one that I think would be damaging.
I also want to deal with the suggestion made by the member for Hamilton Centre that this is in some respect undemocratic. The whole point of this is to be democratic. His argument was that a prime minister might not recommend the individual who won an election. Let us remember the relevant part of the act, which I read to everybody, and I will read it again:
If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially in accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory.
It is binding on the Prime Minister. In true theory it is not binding upon the Governor General.
I think the point the member was making, and he will be able to reiterate that point if I do not get it correct, was that a prime minister might simply ignore this advice. The fact is that there is no penalty in the bill for doing so. Therefore, I see his point.
I would point out that in the discussions that took place for the parallel piece of legislation on Senate reform proposed in the 39th Parliament, the opposite objection was made by a number of witnesses. They said that the problem was that we would be establishing a convention which would become too firmly rooted and that the Prime Minister would, regardless of what objections he might have, be forced to follow the advice by the enormous political pressure. The argument then went on that this convention would cause this to be a de facto power of appointment being given to the people and that would mean the Governor General would lose his independent ability to appoint the senators and therefore it would be unconstitutional.
I will not go into the absurdity of that argument, although it was absurd, but I will point out that the feeling was very much the opposite. Therefore, the member's fears might be allayed by reviewing some of the testimony from that committee.
I would also point out the fact that there is an historical example we can draw upon. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated that until the Meech Lake accord was enacted into law, and at which point the Senate would be elected using a new set of mandates, he would accept senators appointed by provincial governments.
Therefore, in 1989 the legislative assembly of Alberta held an election for the Senate and General Stan Waters won it. His name was then presented to the prime minister who was very resistant. He tried to wiggle out of making that appointment, but in the end the heat was too great and he appointed Senator Waters to the upper House, where he served very well. Unfortunately it was not very long because he passed away as a result of cancer a couple of years later.
There is a precedent which indicates that prime ministers will have a very tough time ignoring who and what people choose.
Our whole system is based upon constitutional conventions. Our entire Canadian political system and its British ancestor are based upon the idea of conventions. On paper, the Governor General has an independent power with regard to the appointment of senators. On paper, the Monarch has tremendous arbitrary powers. In practice, a person not even mentioned in the Constitution, the prime minister, has most of those powers and exercises them via the House of Commons. In practice, we have responsible government, something which is absolutely responsible to the House of Commons and is absolutely not written down anywhere in the Constitution.
These rules are absolutely binding. They are not legal rules; they are constitutional rules. Those who would dream of trying to ignore them would do so at the cost of their political career.
I suggest that much the same dynamic would be at work with regard to the Prime Minister following the letter of this law and making a recommendation to the Governor General as to the appointment of senators who come from that provincial list.
There is no question that prime ministers in the end would lose the power they have to appoint partisans or people of their choice and would be forced to follow the will of the people of the relevant province. That would be a very good thing.