Mr. Speaker, it is a great honour to be here today. I want to point out that I received over 200 emails just last night supporting the position I am taking today. I have had over 1,500 responses encouraging me to support Motion No. 312. I find it interesting that many of them have come from young women. I think that is a rebuke to the opposition members, reminding them that there are young women in this country who believe in what is being proposed in today's motion.
I am pleased to address the matter of Motion No. 312. To do so, it is necessary to refer to subsection 223(1), Canada's 400-year-old definition of “human being”. It states:
A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not
(a) it has breathed;
(b) it has an independent circulation; or
(c) the navel string is severed.
Many Canadians have questioned the accuracy of this definition. They ask: What is the medical evidence? Does a child become a human being at some point before the moment of complete birth, or is it at the point fixed by subsection 223(1)? Do Canadians believe that a child transforms from a non-human into a human being at the moment of complete birth, as subsection 223(1) dictates? Motion No. 312 attempts to address these questions. The answers to the questions have implications for Canadians and Canada's justice system. Motion No. 312 calls on this country's leaders, parliamentarians, to look at the evidence and ask if that evidence verifies or contradicts subsection 223(1).
We need to recognize that a majority of Canadians believe that human life begins long before a person is born. We can understand that if the evidence establishes that a child does in fact become a human being before the moment of complete birth, then subsection 223(1) has some major problems and it is actually a law that dehumanizes and excludes a whole class of human beings from legal protection. That is why we need to pass Motion No. 312 in order to get the facts about this issue.
This is a very serious matter. If we presently have a law that decrees a certain human being is not a human being, is that an honest and acceptable law? Could such a law ever be considered just or legitimate? If Parliament finds itself in a situation where it allows one law that decrees the dehumanization and exclusion of an entire class of people, what are the safeguards that will prevent us from finding reasons to decree that others are not human beings as well?
This is just not a theoretical and academic question, because many of the letters and petitions that I have received in my office have referenced the past. They point out that several times legislatures and supreme courts have supported other laws, which, like subsection 223(1), have decreed the exclusion of a class of people from legal protection. They mention, for example, in the 1850s the United States Supreme Court issued a decree that African Americans would not be considered human persons under U.S. law. Instead, they would be excluded from recognition even though they were human beings.
Early in the 20th century, our Canadian Supreme Court ruled that women were not to be considered human persons for purposes of all Canadian laws. Instead, they would be dehumanized and excluded from recognition even though they were human beings. In Germany in the 1930s, laws were passed that dehumanized and excluded mentally challenged people from the protection of law even though they were human beings.
Such laws have been opposed more and more over the last 400 years. By the middle of the last century, Canadians and others around the world reached an international consensus, which is that laws that dehumanize people and exclude any human beings are condemned. Instead, the consensus is that every person has an inherent worth and dignity based on who they are as a human being. Governments and laws can never legitimately assign or withhold the value of any human being. Instead, they can only recognize the worth and dignity with which each human being is created.
Subsection 223(1) has been overlooked until now, but the question really is: Does it directly contradict these principles of universal human rights that so many Canadians have fought for and have died to defend? Do we have a consensus in Canada in favour of universal human rights, or are we willing to accept that our government or laws may dehumanize and exclude classes of people with false definitions of what it means to be human? I do not think Canadians have come to that point. They continue to believe strongly in the unique value of each human life from its beginning to its natural conclusion and they would expect that Parliament is able to discuss these issues.
That belief in the value of human life needs to be protected and encouraged. It is not enough that we properly define human life. It is just as important that we continue as a culture to reaffirm the uniqueness and inherent dignity of every human life. That is how we find good and just solutions to the many life issues that we will be facing as legislators and as a country. To change subsection 223(1) and then to say that we do not recognize human life as having value in itself would lead us down some very dangerous paths.
This is not an unreasonable concern. Our culture is in danger of changing its view of the value of human life, and we all know that. There are many illustrations that are readily apparent.
There is an active attempt within the medical community to convince parents that it is necessary to eliminate Down's syndrome children before they are born. Recently, two European academics proposed that newborn infants should not be treated as human persons since newborn infants are essentially no different than children are before birth. I am told they used the Down's syndrome argument for elimination prior to birth in order to justify their afterbirth proposal.
The member for Kitchener Centre has found evidence that in Canada 40 to 50 children every year are born alive but later die of injuries inflicted by what is referred to as a termination of pregnancy. These are injuries that take place before birth when subsection 223(1) has taken human rights protection away from them.
The late Justice Bertha Wilson, who was as much a feminist as any person in this room, agreed that our existing criteria of complete birth were wrong. She believed that the interests and rights of a child before birth should be recognized and protected from some point in the second trimester of the child's development. Justice Wilson quite reasonably suggested that Parliament resolve this by studying evidence from all the relevant disciplines. This is the suggestion which is embodied in Motion No. 312. Justice Wilson did not think that this suggestion contradicted her rejection of Canada's last abortion law. Will abortion become illegal if we study this as Justice Wilson suggested? Absolutely not.
Why would a 400-year-old definition of human being be frozen in time forever? Why would a 400-year-old definition of human being be forever exempt from all democratic review? Why would a 400-year-old definition of human being be severed from advances in our medical understanding?
Why would parliamentarians turn their backs on this important discussion just because we are faced with diverse views on an important topic of human rights? Why would we not search for consensus through informed dialogue?
I ask members in the House to accept Justice Wilson's suggestion for Parliament to inform itself. I ask members to stand up for the Canadian consensus and legacy that every human being has an inherent worth and dignity which all our laws must recognize. I ask members to approve the open-minded, evidence-based study, which is all that Motion No. 312 proposes.