Mr. Speaker, I have the pleasure, on behalf of the official opposition, of concluding the debate on this very important motion.
I would like the backbench members of the Conservative government to pay particular attention because this affects them as much as it affects opposition members.
The office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer is non-partisan and so does research for all parties, particularly in an extremely complex area in which we, as parliamentarians and members of Parliament, have very few resources.
We are well aware that backbench members on the government side are about as much in the dark as we are when it comes time to examine budgets, because all powers in relation to budgets are in the hands of the Department of Finance, which answers to the Minister of Finance. The Department of Finance does not answer to Parliament, it answers to the Minister of Finance, and so to cabinet.
That is why I would like to have the Conservative backbench members’ attention during my speech. These decisions affect them as much as they affect us. We want to have an office, like the office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, that can shed light and force the Department of Finance, the Minister of Finance and cabinet to be a little more accountable and transparent.
I would like to recall what the legislation says:
79.2 The mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer is to:
(a) provide independent analysis to the Senate and the House of Commons about the state of the nation’s finances, the estimates of the government and trends in the national economy.
This is a very important element, since we have recently witnessed several attempts by members of the Conservative government cabinet in particular to create confusion regarding the role and mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer.
His role is not, as some, including the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of Finance, have claimed, simply to examine the money spent by the federal government and by cabinet. His role is to examine the state of the national economy and provide independent analyses about matters relating to the economy and the budget that he considers to be of significant interest both to parliamentarians and to the Canadian public.
Another part of its mandate is, at the request of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, standing committees of the House of Commons, or the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, to provide analyses and reports on matters that come to their attention. At the request of any parliamentary committee, it must conduct studies that review government estimates. Lastly, at the request of any parliamentary committee or any member of the House, it must assess the financial cost of any proposed measure within the government's areas of jurisdiction.
Once again, an important role played by the Parliamentary Budget Officer or the PBO's office is analyzing the financial and budget implications of private members’ bills. Unfortunately, the PBO has been unable to achieve this objective because of the lack of resources allocated from the very outset; but I will return to this point later.
After having listened to many speeches in the House from the opposition and the government, what strikes me is the offhanded attitude of government MPs towards this issue.
It needs to be taken seriously. Canada is a G8 economy, but at the moment, I get the impression that we are operating like a banana republic. The hope has been that the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer can counterbalance analyses by the Department of Finance, but at the end of the day, it cannot because it has neither the resources, nor the independence or autonomy required to do so.
I would like to compare the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer to a successful example of how a budgetary and financial analysis tool ought to function; I am referring to the United States Congressional Budget Office. For the benefit of the House, I would like to review the details of how it came about.
The CBO was established in 1974, mainly to counter the growing powers being appropriated by Richard Nixon, the president at the time, who was able to seize powers by hiding information from members of Congress. A mechanism was needed to enable members of Congress, whether in the Senate or the House of Representatives, to obtain the information they needed before it could be concealed by the Office of the President.
The Congressional Budget Office was established at the time for a very specific purpose, one that very closely parallels what we are experiencing at the moment: the need to check the growing powers being assumed by the Office of the Prime Minister and cabinet at the expense of parliamentarians responsible for guaranteeing transparency and accountability.
I would like to compare the establishment of the CBO and of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer because there are many similarities between the two processes, and between the objectives that those establishing them had in mind.
I would like to quote from Robert Reischauer, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office, who was there when it was established—not as the director, but he was there. He described how Congress attempted to weaken the powers of the CBO when it was being established:
What the House wanted [when the CBO was created] was basically a manhole in which Congress would have a bill or something and it would lift up the manhole cover and put the bill down it, and 20 minutes later a piece of paper would be handed up, with the cost estimate, the answer, on it. No visibility, [just] some kind of mechanism down below the ground level doing this...non controversial [work], the way the sewer system [does].
So that really gives you an idea of the state of mind of the U.S. Congress, which did not want the Republican party, the party in power at the time, to declaw the office, which was responsible for providing independent, non-partisan financial analysis to which members of Congress did not have access.
However, Mr. Reischauer, like many of his colleagues, opposed the will of the CBO, somewhat as Kevin Page did, to defend the independence, autonomy and non-partisan nature of his office. A few days ago, however, the Minister of Finance said this on Global TV:
—the idea...was that the parliamentary budget officer would kind of work like the congressional budget officer in the United States to report to the elected people in the House of Commons about how the government was doing in its budgeting. Sort of being a sounding board, a testing board.
This clearly shows that the Minister of Finance has no knowledge about the role of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, nor has he given it careful thought. Either that or he really wants to try, five years after it was created, to make it as harmless as the members of the U.S. Congress wanted to make their office when it was established. However, the Conservatives, the Minister of Finance and the members of the former Reform Party have not always thought that way.
What was the original idea in creating the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, according to the Reform Party at the time and the Federal Accountability Act, which we supported in 2006? That idea was clearly stated.
I would like to thank Paul Wells, who managed to find this quotation from Monte Solberg, a prominent former Reform Party MP. In 2004, he expressed the party's desire for such an office as follows:
It would be an independent body that would answer to Parliament and would not be part of the government. It would not be a situation where the government could manipulate the figures to its own ends.
That is not what the government did. By placing the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer under the authority of the Library of Parliament from 2006 to 2008—which meant that the Parliamentary Budget Officer served at the pleasure of the Prime Minister, who could dismiss him if he wished—the Conservative government wilfully restricted the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s independence and autonomy.
The Conservatives thought that, by appointing Kevin Page to the position in 2008, with the constraints that were placed on him, they could guarantee themselves a good little lap dog, a poodle. However, instead of that—and to Mr. Page's credit—they got themselves a pit bull who chose to champion government accountability and transparency.
The office exists today. It is our parliamentary duty, on both the opposition and government sides, to provide it with all the tools, autonomy and independence it needs, along with more resources so that it can do its work properly for the benefit and efficiency of our work as parliamentarians.
There are currently nine to twelve employees who work in the office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, and some positions have yet to be filled. The office has a budget of less than $3 million. By comparison, the American CBO has about 250 employees and has a budget of nearly $50 million. The CPB in the Netherlands, which has a similar role, has 170 employees. The National Assembly Budget Office in South Korea has 135 employees. The office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer has nine to twelve employees to do the work.
Organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD, have spoken about and continue to speak about the need for an independent analysis office that answers to Parliament. In a recent OECD document published in 2007 and subsequently updated, the OECD identifies three principles for independent budgetary institutions, such as the office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. It is worth going over these details, because they are at the heart of the difference in interpretation of the role of the PBO that the NDP and the government members have been expressing today.
The first principle for this office is the guarantee of independence and long-term sustainability. The OECD stresses the importance of the office being non-partisan, something that is constantly being challenged by the Conservatives. In their minds, being non-partisan means agreeing with them. The Parliamentary Budget Officer has a very high level of technical expertise. This office performs miracles with what little means it has, but it lacks the resources to do its job properly. The appointment process for an officer is very important. There must be a process, and that is why we are calling for the creation of the position of Parliamentary Budget Officer. The Parliamentary Budget Officer would thereby be an officer of Parliament and not an employee appointed by the Prime Minister who could be fired at the Prime Minister's will. Sure, we could talk about the Library of Parliament committee, but this committee is not non-partisan. The government always has the majority on that committee.
There also needs to be long-term stable funding. I remind government members who oppose enhancing the means and the independence of the office that when the report on the costs generated by our involvement in Afghanistan was released by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, the government immediately threatened to reduce his budget from $2.8 million, down to $1.8 million. In fact, at the time, he was only able to preserve his budget and resources by making compromises on his degree of independence and autonomy. These conditions had been imposed on him by the Library of Parliament.
The second principle presented by the OECD, which is also a condition for having a functional office, is the ability to lead truly independent analyses. This includes having access to the information needed to conduct the studies. Let us not forget, and government members are well aware of that, that the Parliamentary Budget Officer must now turn to the courts to obtain the information that he needs to conduct the studies that could shed light on government spending, including the positions that are targeted and eliminated through government cutbacks.
As parliamentarians, we do not get that information from the government. It refuses to give us that information, and it refuses to give it to the Parliamentary Budget Officer who, if he were an officer of Parliament, would have the necessary authority to obtain it, without having to go to court.
Another aspect related to the ability to conduct truly independent analyses is the maintaining of cordial relations without compromising the independence of his office. We all know that, following all the analyses and reports released by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, several Conservative members have been openly hostile and certain cabinet members have shown a great deal of contempt toward him, which is totally unacceptable.
The third element, which is also a sensitive issue among our Conservative friends, is the fact that this issue has an impact on the public. To a large degree, it means there is a need to have an independent and open relationship with the media, in order to be able to get the information out.
If you recall, when the position was first created, the Parliamentary Librarian tried to muzzle Mr. Page by preventing him from giving the media the information that he had prepared for the benefit of the Canadian people and for use by parliamentarians.
A number of the reports prepared by the Parliamentary Budget Officer or his office spurred healthy debate in the House of Commons. These include the sustainability of pensions, the cost of fighting crime with more jail sentences, freezing or cutting expenditures, security costs at the G8 and G20 summits, forecasts on the eve of the 2008 financial and economic crisis and, finally, the cost of the F-35 fighter jets.
We should remember that many of these reports contradicted what the government said about many issues, including the F-35s. This has been mentioned a number of times today.
It just amazes me to hear them say that we do not need to give the Parliamentary Budget Officer more power because the departments and the ministers provide the information. We have proven over and over again that a number of the debates triggered by the PBO's reports and analyses have brought to light many issues, many weaknesses in the Conservative administration that eventually led to debate in the House. It would not have happened had the departments, ministers and cabinet members been allowed to decide whether to provided the information or not.
I will talk about another curious aspect of the debate on sustainability of pensions. The Parliamentary Budget Officer studied the impact of the aging population, a study that the Minister of Finance had promised with the 2007 budget and that was needed for long-term planning. The study was probably done, but the minister refuses to submit it to Parliament. The Parliamentary Budget Officer carried out his own study—which the minister rejected—but was unable to submit it to Parliament for a debate on this important issue. This report was prepared using public money and it is probably sitting on a shelf at the Department of Finance or in the minister's office.
It is important to note that Canada is lagging behind other OECD countries. As I said, Canada is a G8 country. We should act like a G8 country by ensuring a maximum level of democracy, transparency and accountability when it comes to assessing our public finances.
Earlier I mentioned the conditions imposed by the OECD to ensure a functional PBO office or other similar functions. I can substantiate that with comments made by Dr. Alice Rivlin who was the first CBO in the United States. She faced a similar struggle against the government powers of the day, who were also trying to limit the CBO's authority. In the 1970s, she established the three main principles underlying the work of a good watchdog, from an economic and budgetary perspective.
Here are the three elements. The first is independence, pure and simple. At present, no matter what our Conservative friends may say, our Parliamentary Budget Officer is not independent. He works for the Library of Parliament and reports to a committee—the Standing Joint Committee on the Library of Parliament—on which the Conservatives have a majority.
Secondly, the non-partisan nature of the position is important. The PBO can examine bills put forward by the NDP, the Liberals and the Conservatives, for he is non-partisan.
The third principle is empirical objectivity, which ensures the benefit of technical and financial resources to conduct proper economic studies based on empirical evidence and theories.
At present, the PBO cannot do this. That is why we are asking that this individual be made an officer of Parliament. This position will not be filled in time for his departure, so we are asking that Mr. Page be reappointed to the position. We are not the only ones asking for this.
In all the media, whether left, right or centre, I have heard pundits talking about the importance of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. There is a general consensus on this within Canadian society and among those who care about these things. The Conservatives do not share this consensus, but they are the only ones who do not want to give the Parliamentary Budget Officer greater powers, more independence and more resources.
In passing, I would like to quote Ian Lee, whom the government often calls on for committee studies. He said that it is very important that the PBO be transformed into an officer of Parliament.
To conclude, I would like to say that the issue is important to backbenchers. Should the NDP replace them in 2015, I can guarantee that if the Parliamentary Budget Officer is not an officer of Parliament, it will be the first request they make as the opposition.