Mr. Speaker, I am sure the Attorney General will want to add something to this, but I would like to respond initially to some of the claims made by the hon. member.
First, a matter like this of course has to be raised at the earliest opportunity, and this is old news. The member claims he is raising it at the earliest opportunity. In fact, he is relying on allegations made by one Edgar Schmidt in a court docket that was filed December 14, 2012. We are talking about matters that are already a quarter of a year old. He has not raised them at the earliest possible opportunity. They could have been raised when the House resumed in January. They could have been raised throughout February. He is only now raising them, well into March, so he does not pass that test at all. In fact, there are literally dozens of entries in the court docket that have occurred in the intervening period of time. There were dozens of additional instances. He has not raised any of this in the House. What is before you, Mr. Speaker, certainly is out of order on that basis alone.
Additionally, I would note that the member is asking you to deal with a matter of law. It is well established under the proceedings of the House that you have no jurisdiction over questions of law and matters of law; those are for the courts. You have jurisdiction over matters that relate to the procedures and rules of the House of Commons, Standing Orders and practices, not questions of law. On that alone, it is also not appropriate to deal with it.
The third point he touched on is that of the sub judice convention. This is before the courts right now. The questions are being resolved in the courts under our practices and rules. We cannot relitigate them in a parallel fashion in the House when they are before the courts. The sub judice convention prevails, and that is what should be done with them.
I have to say that I take very strong personal exception to the intent of this question of privilege that has been brought. The Attorney General is an experienced barrister and solicitor of very high standing. He is subject to oaths, as a solicitor, to exercise his professional obligation, and he is subject to similar oaths as the Attorney General and Minister of Justice of this country. The suggestion is that he has not been exercising his professional obligation in that regard. This is a scurrilous, scandalous and defamatory allegation on the part of the hon. member, and it is inappropriate when we have an individual as esteemed and professional as the Attorney General whose obligation it is to exercise his own professional judgment.
The essence of his argument is that because, according to the hon. member, he is not agreeing with somebody else's professional judgment, somehow his judgment is to have no value. Actually, it is quite the opposite. As the Attorney General, and a barrister and solicitor, it is his obligation and duty to apply his own professional judgment as to the law. To suggest otherwise, in my view, would be an abandonment of his oaths and obligations. I am very saddened and disappointed that we have heard this point of order raised by the opposition today. It is below him.
I expect the Minister of Justice will want to say more on this matter. I put it that there are several bases on which it can be easily dismissed. It simply does not raise a question of privilege, and I expect we will hear more from the Minister of Justice.