Mr. Speaker, I would like to discuss four issues, that is, four specific problems raised by the Canada-China foreign investment promotion and protection agreement. I probably will not have enough time to address all four problems, but I should have enough time to discuss the three main ones.
I have already talked about the fact that the agreement uses different language in articles about most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment, meaning that current Canadian investors in China, which is a very small number, will be protected. However, future investors will not be protected, which poses a serious problem.
The second point I want to discuss was also raised by my hon. colleague from Vancouver Kingsway, the official opposition critic for international trade. It has to do with the fact that both countries can keep all existing measures that do not conform with trade liberalization. This measure can help them locally. For instance, in China, provisions currently exist, and China will have the right to keep them after the agreement is signed, that is, after it is ratified.
These provisions require Canadian businesses to hire local workers or to have a certain number of local administrators, for example. There has been a lot of liberalization in Canada over the past 30 years, and we have eliminated all the measures that were not consistent with the spirit of freer trade. If each country can retain measures that are not consistent, we are giving an unfair advantage to our Chinese trading partner. That is what explains the lack of reciprocity I referred to earlier in my speech.
The third thing I want to talk about is the mechanisms for resolving conflicts between investors and the state. We have a lot of concerns about such provisions, which are in this agreement and in the previous ones. Unlike the existing agreements or the existing provisions between investors and the state, what is in this proposed agreement with China goes much further. It would allow either of the countries to go ahead with conflict resolution before an administrative tribunal that is not a judicial tribunal. These are not people chosen by the state, but private arbitrators who could, at the request of one of the countries, deal with these issues behind closed doors if one of the countries deemed it was not of public concern. They do not have to justify why it is not of public concern; they simply have to say so.
These three specific reasons—the different treatment of current and future investors, the maintenance of non-conforming measures and a different mechanism for settling disputes between investors and the state—make us wonder where the comments that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of Canadian Heritage made in question period are coming from. They are telling us that the sole reason for the agreement is to protect investors, and that the agreement gives Canadian investors in China the same rights as Chinese investors in Canada.
Yet, there are enormous differences in how the two are treated, partly because of the non-conforming measures, which are much more prevalent in China than they are here. Chinese investors in Canada benefit from the same protection as Canadians who are currently investing in China. In 2011, Canadian investors had about $5 billion worth of investments in China. These investments will be protected. In 2012, Chinese investors had $22 billion worth of investments in Canada—that is five times more. These investments will be protected.
We can therefore already see the imbalance. The fact that the agreement will not protect investors with regard to national treatment and the establishment or acquisition of various investments means that new markets will not be opened to Canada, as the Conservatives have promised. The Conservatives think that the opposition should vote in favour of this agreement because of these markets.
I am trying to understand the logic behind that argument. This agreement has been on the negotiating table for about 30 years or more. However, a solution has still not been found.
The softwood lumber agreement was signed quickly after the Conservative government came to power in 2006. This agreement was very bad for Canada, but producers accepted it because they were absolutely desperate.
At that time, the Conservative government wanted to win a quick victory. Right now, they want to achieve a victory, even if it harms Canada's interests and those of future investors in China. That is why we cannot support this agreement. We therefore support the motion moved by my colleague.