Fortunately, I have the defence critic sitting next to me here. He is a fine defence critic and knows the bill inside out. He has been briefing members of our caucus with great skill and knowledge of the bill.
We have the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff who can intervene in any disciplinary process. I would like members, especially members of the NDP, to look at the parallel with the RCMP and the Commissioner of the RCMP. There is a complaints process within the RCMP in cases where an RCMP member has been found to have violated the code of conduct. However, the Commissioner of the RCMP does not have a right to get involved in that investigation.
The members opposite say it is very important that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff has that right because he can bring the operational context to bear in the investigative process. However, the same could be said for the Commissioner of the RCMP. The argument could be made that he or she should have the right to intervene because he or she could bring some operational context into the process. There is a contradiction here. In the case of the RCMP, the Commissioner cannot intervene. In the case of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, he or she can intervene. I do not quite understand why the distinction.
Let me read a quote regarding the danger of this right to intervene, which I am told is a new right that did not exist in preceding years. This is from testimony before the defence committee by Mr. Peter Tinsley, the former chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission. He said:
My very brief summary submission is that if Bill C-15 is passed into law in its present form, inclusive of the new subsection 18.5(3) authorizing the VCDS to interfere with police operations and investigations, it will be inconsistent with the principles of police independence as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada a[s] late as 1999 as underpinning the rule of law, as well as run counter to the norms of police-government relations, certainly in Canada, and I can tell you internationally in developed countries, which recognize the importance of police independence and prohibit police service boards or similar executive bodies from giving directions regarding specific police operations.
This is a very interesting quote. We like to compare ourselves to other countries, which is proper because we can learn from what is being done elsewhere, as other countries can learn from us.
I would mention that in other countries, they appear to have understood that the military justice system needs to change. We cannot just say that it has always been like that since time immemorial, and therefore it should remain like that. Maybe some people can say that, but that is not the Liberal perspective on things.
Justice Gilles Létourneau, in providing criticism of the summary trial system, which remains, as I said, largely unaddressed in Bill C-15, said the following:
This form of trial has been found to be unconstitutional in 1997 by the European Court of Human Rights because it did not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality set out in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a result of this decision and others, the British Parliament enacted legislation which now provides guarantees to an accused soldier. These provisions include the following:
(a) the accused may be represented by counsel; (b) the accused is entitled to an Appeal to the newly created Summary Appeal Court; (c) the Summary Appeal Court is presided by civilian judge, assisted by two military members who are officers or warrant officers; and (d) as a general rule, imprisonment or service detention cannot be imposed where the offender is not legally represented in that court or in a court martial.
In our system, not only does the accused have to stand through the whole process, and not only is there no transcription of the process, but the accused does not have the right to legal counsel. That sounds pretty retrograde to me. That just does not sound like modern Canada to me.
All of that having been said, I will say that there has been one improvement to the system that would be brought by Bill C-15. That would be, of course, security of tenure for military judges so that they feel that they can exercise their independence. As a result of Bill C-15, military judges would have security of tenure until they reached the retirement age of 60 or until they were removed for cause on the recommendation of an inquiry committee or if they resigned.
This bill would also allow for the appointment of part-time military judges, which I suppose sounds like a fairly good idea if the caseload is not high enough to have full-time judges or if full-time judges need some supplementary help. Why not use part-time military judges? I do not see a problem with that.
All in all, we cannot support this bill. We have been consistent in our voting throughout the process. We have not voted against it at second reading only to flip and vote for it at third reading even after all our amendments have been rejected.
I think consistency is important in this place. I am proud to say that we will continue with our previous line of argument, and we will continue to not support this bill.