Mr. Speaker, we are having a decent debate here, but I would like to have more. It is too bad we now have time allocation on it and will also not get much discussion on it at committee. However, with the time I do have, I want to touch on a key theme, which is accountability and how it applies to this act.
Of course national security is an important issue that we all take seriously, especially after recent events. However, over the past decades it has been something that all countries have taken seriously. We have had to balance national security and what keeps us safe versus accountability to ensure things do not go too far in terms of protecting privacy and the rights of citizens.
There are two kinds of accountability. With CSIS, there is the idea of accountability to the public and to the legislature. That is one general aspect. However, there is also our accountability to the Canadian public to ensure we are doing our due diligence when we are considering these laws. Therefore, the history of the previous reviews of national security are worth looking at, because they show us how past parliamentarians have shown respect for the public in considering these issues. Professor Reg Whitaker, who is a famous expert in this area, has done a lot of work reviewing this in the past, and I will borrow from some of his work today.
In the review of this, my colleagues may come across the 1969 MacKenzie report, which was really the first major review of Canadian security that we have done in this country. It was an extensive report. However, even the generation of the report was difficult, because the government could not decide how much to keep public and how much to keep private. The 1969 MacKenzie report did not come out with much of a recommendation. However, a few months later we had very serious incidents occur in the province of Quebec—the FLQ crisis and the murder of a cabinet minister. Some had viewed the actions by what was then the RCMP security forces as a huge overreaction, because not only were the separatists in Quebec investigated but it was if they threw a giant net over anybody who might be deemed suspicious. Therefore, people who were in union or left-wing organizations were under surveillance and in some cases detained, which led to a huge scandal.
I think that still sticks with many of us today, seeing as how an overreaction by a security force can not only endanger those who are involved but can cause huge national strife. Therefore, the McDonald commission reported on that in 1977. It was set up to review what had happened in Quebec and to also look at our national security service in general. It was from the McDonald commission that we had the suggestion of the creation of CSIS.
What is interesting about this report is that it came out in 1977 but it took a full three years for the government to respond. There was not a response until 1980 because these kinds of issues require serious attention and consideration: the setting up of an entirely new security body, determining which powers stayed with the RCMP and which went with the security service, deciding how this was all supposed to be administered and funded, and those types of things. It took a full three years before there was even a response to the report. It was another four years before CSIS was officially created in 1984.
This was a major undertaking but also showed the amount of consideration past parliamentarians have shown when it comes to issues of security. It stands in stark contrast to what is happening in the House today, where we have a limit on debate on this bill and these changes, and we will also have limits at committee. It is important to note that, if we are to make any changes to this body, much more consideration and time should be given for all aspects of society to come in and explain their points of view.
What I found astounding from the questions earlier was that the members on the other side were essentially saying that the committee is totally irrelevant. They are saying we have heard everything we had to hear and we do not have to worry about committee work at all because we have already heard it. They are saying there is nothing that could possibly be said that would be of interest or that could help.
I find that arrogant. I do not think there is any other word for it. When we are dealing with something that is so important that we have to get the balance right, hearing from more than eight people would seem to be a good idea.
I will give an example from the bill. CSIS would now be empowered, if there is a warrant granted, to break the laws of other countries when it is carrying out surveillance of people of whom it might be suspicious. We can think about how that may cause trouble. This is, of course, a clause that would be written into the act. If we think about it, a security intelligence officer might go to a Canadian judge and get a warrant for surveillance of somebody in another country; and that might be fine. This person may be of particular interest, but what is concerning to me is who that person is talking to.
For instance, let us say that CSIS is carrying out surveillance on an international businessperson who is from another country and flies to Washington, D.C. That businessperson then starts to talk to different members of American organizations, perhaps the government or other business interests in Washington, and all of a sudden, we have a warrant that has been issued to a CSIS officer who can then apply that warrant in the national capital of the United States. The officer could carry out surveillance not only on this businessperson who is under suspicion but also on whoever that businessperson is talking to.
We can see how we could run into considerable difficulty there. If this is allowed to go ahead and it is not changed through our very short committee considerations, we could see how it could cause difficulty, because the United States also has security forces and they might notice this. We then have international incidents that would, of course, cause us considerable difficulty.
It may also mean that other security forces may be less inclined to co-operate with us. This is the kind of thing we should be conscious of. It is one example of how extra consideration of these powers is warranted.
What we are seeing is a bit of a rush. We hear all kinds of rhetoric from the other side about the very serious events we had here and how they prompt this legislation; but this legislation was drafted before all of those events. This has been on the government's agenda for some time. Again, we should have had ample time to have full consideration of this, but there seems to be a great disrespect for this place and for others who may want to comment on this bill by again shutting down debate in the House and within committee.
I cannot tell members how much consideration to give the balance between accountability and efficiency or effectiveness of security services, in order to get it just right. Although we are supporting this to go to committee, I would urge the committee to take some time to make sure we have the proper witnesses, not just government witnesses who will back up what it wants to do. I know that the committee has some jurisdiction to this. It is not just told by the PMO exactly what to do. I urge the committee to have witnesses who will challenge this and bring up scenarios and situations that members perhaps have not spoken or thought about, so that we get this right and do not face some kind of international incident that causes embarrassment.