Mr. Speaker, in my question of Friday, April 4, 2014, I noted that the decision to run trains with only one operator was made not by the minister but by the rail companies themselves, and their decision was merely rubber-stamped by the minister. Of course, we know the result: 47 dead in Lac-Mégantic and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.
My suggestion to the minister was that the system was broken and needed fixing. The answer I got was that a protective direction was issued. The system remains the same, but a new regulation is in place prohibiting railroads from doing what they did before Lac-Mégantic.
A closer examination of the system reveals other flaws, which leads us to believe that the railway safety system itself is in need of a fix. The system now is to avoid regulation and day-to-day inspections and instead allow each railroad to develop its own safety management system, which is then audited for compliance by Transport Canada.
The Auditor General, in a scathing report this year, noted that Transport Canada failed to conduct 74% of the planned audits of safety management systems. Whether that was due to budget cuts or staffing issues is unclear. What is clear is that the system is not working.
The CBC uncovered evidence that railroads are failing to report hundreds of derailments. They uncovered 1,800 over the last few years and another hundred this past year. No charges have been laid for this deception. A system that brags about how few derailments there are while hiding the truth from the public and the legislators is broken and needs fixing.
The Lac-Mégantic derailment involved railcars that were mislabelled as having contents less volatile than what was actually being transported. In fact, the labels were changed when the load crossed the border. No charges have been laid for this deception. The fact that a railroad can get away with that with impunity means the system is broken and needs fixing.
In 1989, DOT-111 railcars were involved in a collision and fire in Cherry Valley, Illinois. One of the conclusions of the investigation of that accident was that the DOT-111 cars were not safe for the transportation of dangerous goods. Twenty-five years later, the federal government has acted, in part. It removed 5,000 cars at the end of May, but the remainder, some 65,000 or so, will continue to be used for three years. A system that identifies a problem but takes 28 years to take action is clearly broken and needs to be fixed.
The Transportation Safety Board testified that DOT-111 cars are subject to rupture, leading to environmental spills and possible fires, at speeds as low as 20 miles an hour. However, the government will continue to allow these cars to be run at 50 miles an hour or 40 miles an hour in built-up areas for the next three years. How is it that cars that are subject to rupture and fire can still run at such high speed? Again, the system permits it. It is broken and needs to be fixed.
The Transportation Safety Board has reported on many derailments over the past few years. In cases stretching back at least 10 years, the TSB has recommended that Canada implement a form of electronic fail-safe, commonly called positive train control. The U.S. is moving forward with such a system. This government has ignored this recommendation each and every time. If there were recommendations involving aircraft safety, they would be implemented, but not for railways. A system in which the government can ignore safety recommendations of the duly appointed investigators is broken and needs to be fixed.
In conclusion, Canadians need to trust that federally regulated railroads are being run past their homes, schools, and daycares in a safe manner. Recent events and disclosures suggest that the public question their ability to trust the safety of the system.
The government is responsible. The government needs to act to fix the system and restore public trust.