Elizabeth May on Questions Passed as Orders for Returns

With regard to the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act enacted as part of Bill C-22, with particular reference to the government's decision to increase the absolute liability amount and mandatory insurance coverage for nuclear operators to $1 billion: (a) has the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) asked Ontario Power Generation whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (b) has the DNR asked Bruce Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage required under the Act at $1 billion, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (c) has the DNR asked New Brunswick Power whether removing the cap on operator liability, while maintaining the level of absolute liability and mandatory insurance coverage, would increase its generation costs and, if so, what were the details of the response, including the estimated increased cost-per-kWh; (d) in the scenario in which the limit on reactor liability is removed while the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator remain at $1 billion, what is the DNR's estimate of the impacts that removing the cap on liability would have on provincial electricity rates, (i) what additional impacts would there be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $1.5 billion, all other things being equal, (ii) what would the additional impacts be if the mandatory insurance coverage and absolute liability of the operator were increased to $2 billion, all other things being equal; (e) does the government determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating whether it will be within the capacity of insurers to provide insurance at reasonable costs and, if so, (i) did the government use the same criterion for determining the absolute liability and insurance requirement for offshore operators, (ii) how does the government define “reasonable costs” for insurance, (iii) what is the limit in cost-per-kWh for what the DNR considers “reasonable costs” for insurance, (iv) did the government use the same definition of “reasonable costs” for insurance for the nuclear and oil industries; (f) what are the insurance costs-per-kWh for the $1 billion in insurance that is currently required for nuclear operators under C-22, (i) what would these insurance costs-per-kWh be for the insurance requirement of $1.5 billion, (ii) what would these insurance costs be for the insurance requirement of $2 billion; (g) does the DNR determine the amount of liability required of nuclear operators by estimating its commensurability with the consequences of controlled releases of radiation and, if so, (i) what studies has the DNR undertaken regarding the consequences of accidents involving controlled releases of radiation, (ii) what is the estimated likelihood of such accidents, (iii) how has the DNR determined that the current amount of liability for nuclear operators under C-22 is commensurate with the risk of such accidents; and (h) has the DNR commissioned any studies to estimate the implicit subsidy per kWh that would be created by imposing a cap on liability since the time it commissioned an empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (Heyes, Anthony, and Catherine Heyes. 2000. An Empirical Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada. Resource & Energy Economics 22 (1):91-101) and, if so, what were the results of any such study?