Mr. Speaker, as the official opposition critic for international trade, I am pleased to stand to speak on behalf of the New Democratic Party on Bill C-41, an act to implement the free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea.
By way of background, Canada and South Korea first discussed the possibility of a trade agreement in 2004, and negotiations for a trade agreement officially launched in July 2005. In a testament both to the challenges that such agreements pose and to less than satisfactory diligence on the part of various governments, it took some nine years to bring this agreement to completion.
Notably, several trade agreements have been concluded by Korea and other partners over the past 10 years. A trade agreement between Korea and the EU entered into force in 2011, and a Korea-U.S. agreement became operative in 2012. As well, Korea and Australia recently concluded negotiations.
As I will expand upon later, these nations' agreements have played a critical role in shaping Canada's bargaining position. As major competitors with Canada, their advantage in securing preferential first entry to the Korean market has done substantial damage to Canadian exporters in a myriad of sectors.
The Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement was signed on March 11, 2014, and submitted to Parliament on June 12, 2014. Once in effect, the agreement will eliminate 98.2% of South Korea's tariff lines and 97.8% of Canada's tariffs. While many tariffs between our two countries are already quite low, there are a significant number of tariffs and other barriers to market that exist that will either be removed immediately upon this agreement's implementation or phased out over various periods of time.
The NDP uses three important criteria to assess trade agreements. First, is the proposed partner one that respects democracy, human rights, adequate environmental and labour standards, and Canadian values, and if there are challenges in these regards, is the partner on a positive trajectory toward these goals? Second, is the proposed partner's economy of significant and strategic value to Canada? Third, are the terms of the proposed agreement satisfactory?
New Democrats also evaluate trade agreements on a comprehensive basis to determine if they are of net benefit to Canada. In our estimation, we believe that the Korea trade agreement meets these tests.
I will deal with each in turn.
First, since emerging from authoritarian to civilian rule in 1987, South Korea has transitioned into a multi-party democracy with an active trade union movement, a diverse civil society, and freedom of expression. South Korea's so-called tiger economy has succeeded in rapidly industrializing the country and raising the welfare and incomes of the Korean people.
Today South Korea is a developed country, ranking 15th on the Human Development Index, the highest in East Asia. South Korea has developed social programs, sound rule of law, low levels of corruption, and high access to quality education, including having the highest level of post-secondary education participation in the OECD.
In recent years, South Korea has emerged as a global leader in environmental economics, investing billions in an ambitious green growth strategy aimed at improving energy efficiency while boosting renewables and green technology.
There is no doubt that South Korea is a democratic country that possesses admirable environmental and labour standards and shares important Canadian values, including respect for human rights.
Second, is the proposed partner's economy of significant and strategic value to Canada? South Korea is a G20 country with the 15th-largest GDP. It is the G20's eighth-largest importer. South Korea is Canada's seventh most important trading partner and our third largest in Asia, after the two larger economies of China and Japan.
In 2013, total bilateral trade between our two nations totalled nearly $11 billion. Canadian exports to South Korea totalled $3.4 billion, while Korean exports to Canada totalled $7.3 billion. In relative terms, Canada exports the same amount to South Korea as it exports to France and Germany. We import approximately the same amount as we do from the U.K.
South Korea is also a major part of the Asian global supply chain and is a gateway market for other Asian economies. As this is Canada's first trade agreement with an Asian country, it provides an important opportunity to gain advantages in the Pacific region and diversify Canada's export markets. Economic models predict that this deal is expected to increase Canadian exports to South Korea by 32% and expand our economy by $1.7 billion.
In addition, the Canadian and South Korean economies are largely complementary, meaning that most Canadian industries do not compete directly with Korean industries. As Korea has emerged as a world leader in renewable energy and green technology and needs energy and energy technology from Canada in return, we can increase our trade in these important sectors and, more importantly, build Canada's green technology sector.
Domestically, a trade agreement with Korea offers significant economic benefits to a broad cross-section of economic sectors in Canada that represent all regions of the country. In fact, this agreement is favoured by almost every industrial sector in Canada.
Sectors that support the Korea free trade agreement include manufacturing, heavy industry, aerospace and transportation, forestry and wood products, agriculture, beef and pork industries, agri-foods and food processing, energy and chemicals, fish and seafoods, financial services, and high technology.
In sum, South Korea is a large market that offers significant opportunities for Canadian business to gain a foothold in important Asian markets.
It is vital to note that Canadian exporters have lost some 30% of their market share in South Korea since 2012, when the EU and the U.S. implemented agreements and secured preferential access for their companies. These losses are estimated to total several hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and are mounting each year that U.S. and European competitors enjoy tariff advantages and increased market access to Korea.
The losses have been particularly heavy in the agri-food, seafood, and aerospace industries. These sectors sustain thousands of quality, family-supporting jobs with high rates of unionization. As an example, when Korea signed the FTAs with the United States and the European Union, Canadian aerospace exports to Korea dropped by 80%, from $180 million to roughly $35 million.
Yuen Pau Woo, former president and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and, in my estimation, Canada's leading expert on Asia-Pacific issues, said that Canada is:
....an outlier compared to most of our industrialized country competitors, certainly in the G-7 and the OECD, and that puts us at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries that do have trade agreements with Asian partners. The best example of this competitive disadvantage is in the case of Korea, where we have been negotiating—as you all know—coming to nine years now. In the meantime, we have been overtaken by the United States and more recently, by Australia. Both of those countries now have margins of preference, particularly in the cultural sector, that put our exporters at a disadvantage.
Canadian exporters need a level playing field to compete in Asia and to protect the jobs they provide here in Canada. In the view of New Democrats, this agreement is essential to do so.
This agreement offers the opportunity for Canadian producers and exporters to increase trade with a modern democratic country with a high-income complementary economy. It will allow Canadian producers in a wide variety of sectors to more effectively access an Asian gateway economy that plays a pivotal role in global supply chains and offers entry opportunities not only to Korea but to other Asian economies.
It will level the playing field for Canadian exporters, who can compete with the best in the world when given the opportunity to do so on equal terms. It will permit Canada to deepen our Asian presence and diversify our trade patterns beyond the North American and European markets. There is no doubt that Korea is both a significant and a strategic economic partner for Canada.
Third, are the terms of the proposed deal satisfactory?
This is not the precise agreement that New Democrats would have negotiated. This deal includes investor state dispute settlement, a provision that allows corporations to launch legal challenges to government measures that they believe violate the terms of the agreement. They are permitted to file their suits not in domestic courts but in international trade tribunals that lack certain fundamental attributes of judicial independence and the rule of law.
This is something the New Democrats would not include in any trade agreement we negotiate. We believe such provisions carry excessive risk and are unnecessary when dealing with nations with independent and well-functioning judiciaries, which both Canada and South Korea possess.
There are also legitimate and well-founded concerns about the possible impact of this agreement on the Canadian auto sector. Knowledgeable industry actors, such as Ford Motor Company and Unifor, which represents most auto workers in Canada, have both expressed the view that this agreement will reduce domestic auto production and sales, and that South Korea adopts policies that serve to impair access to its domestic market.
In our estimation, however, when viewed on a comprehensive basis, this agreement is of net benefit to Canada. It benefits the vast majority of Canadian export sectors, and we believe that its weaknesses can be dealt with by effective Canadian government policies.
An examination of a few key sectors bears this out. This agreement is not only good for Canadian agriculture and the agrifood industry, it is essential. The agrifood sector represents 8% of the Canadian economy and is said to sustain one in eight jobs, or over two million jobs.
As stated, Canada has suffered significant losses in market share for Canadian agricultural exports to Korea following implementation of the Korea-U.S. deal in 2012. For example, Canadian beef exports to South Korea shrank from $96 million in 2011 to $8 million in 2013. Canadian pork exporters went from first to fourth in the Korean market. Australia, a major competitor of Canada in many agricultural products, is poised to bring their own agreement with Korea into force. As well, January 1, 2015, will see the next reduction in tariffs for U.S. and EU products, further exacerbating the harm to Canadian sectors.
The Korea FTA will progressively eliminate 86.8% of agricultural tariff lines and allow Canadian exporters to compete on a level playing field and recapture these markets. There are also impressive opportunities for Canadian grains, pulses and oils.
In aerospace, the agreement will gradually eliminate 100% of industrial tariffs. As such, there is general support for the Korea FTA among manufacturing sectors in Canada, notably Bombardier and other Aerospace Industries Association members.
According to Jim Quick, the president of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, South Korea is an important market due to its proximity to other major economies, including Japan, China and Malaysia. He said in the next 20 years, airlines in the Asia-Pacific region would account for 37% of global aircraft demand, or 12,000 planes worth $1.9 trillion. At the same time, half of the world’s air traffic would be driven by travel to, from, and within the Pacific region.
Similar opportunities lie in light rail and transit infrastructure. Global Canadian champions like Bombardier see important opportunities in South Korea to position themselves to tap this growth.
Canadian seafood producers on both coasts stand to benefit from the Korea agreement. Pacific seafood and fish product exporters are being out-competed in Korea by their Alaskan competitors due to the fully implemented Korea-U.S. agreement.
Current seafood and fish product tariffs in Korea for Canadian exporters are up to 47%, and most of these tariffs lines will be eliminated. Lobster farmers see growth opportunities in the Korean market on the Atlantic coast.
Canada's forestry and wood products industry, including newsprint, wood pulp, wood panels and other value-added products, contribute over $20 billion to Canada's GDP and employs over 230,000 Canadians, many of them in high-skilled and unionized jobs. Canadian exporters to Korea are disadvantaged by tariff lines on Canadian wood products, which reach 10%. The Korea agreement will provide growth opportunities for value-added wood products. This will help develop good jobs in the vital Canadian value-added economy.
With respect to energy and green technology, New Democrats see sustainable technologies and renewable energy as key industries of the future. They are estimated to be a $3 trillion sector and we believe that Canada must position itself for this economic opportunity and environmental imperative. As stated, Korea is an emergent global leader in this area and encouraging sustainable trade and technology transfer is one of the most compelling parts of this agreement.
There are positive and negative aspects of this agreement in terms of the Canadian auto sector, and opinions on it are mixed. General Motors, Chrysler, Toyota and Honda all have automotive production facilities in Canada and support this agreement. Ford and Unifor are also significant stakeholders in Canada, but they do not. The Korea FTA will gradually eliminate Canada's 6.1% tariff on auto product imports from Korea over a three-year period. In turn, South Korea's 8% auto tariff will be eliminated immediately upon the Korea agreement's implementation.
Other positives include rules of origin provisions that recognize Canadian-U.S. integrated products without volume limits and an accelerated dispute mechanism that allows for monitoring of non-tariff barriers. This will permit disputes related to motor vehicle trade to be resolved in a timeline that is as fast or faster than the Korea-U.S. deal, and it could be used to obtain remedies to unfair trade barriers to Canadian auto exports into Korea. In addition, transitional safeguards exist in case of a surge in imports.
At the same time, there are legitimate concerns about the deal's impact on the Canadian auto sector. These concerns have validity, as more Korean imports will affect domestic auto sales to some degree, and South Korea has been cited for implementing non-tariff barriers that restrict access to its market.
It is also a fair criticism that this agreement does not go as far as the Korea-U.S. deal does in protecting domestic auto producers. Under that deal, U.S. tariffs are phased out over a longer period, five years, and there is a snap-back provision that permits the U.S. to impose duties if certain import and export numbers are exceeded. The Conservatives were unable to obtain these protections in this agreement.
What is without doubt is that the current 6% Canadian tariff on Korean-made automobiles is insufficient to meaningfully keep products out. Among other things, lower Korean labour costs and vertical integration savings substantial exceed the tariff. More compelling, Korean automakers service the Canadian market from U.S. plants, with more opening in Mexico within two years, and their products enter Canada tariff-free due to NAFTA in any event. Accordingly, between 40% and 50% of Korean auto products already enter the Canadian market tariff-free from the U.S., so the status quo is clearly insufficient to assist Canadian production.
It is clear that the Canadian auto industry faces a very competitive global environment. It is equally apparent that this requires more support form the federal government. In 2013, Canada failed to attract any of the $17.6 billion in auto investments that were made around the world, not a penny. Competing countries like China, Brazil and our North American trading partners are upping their games, subsidizing up to 60% of the capital investments required to establish auto plants.
New Democrats believe that more needs to be done to support auto manufacturing in Canada, to promote growth in the sector and to encourage the competitiveness of North American brands around the world.
Therefore, a New Democrat government would pursue strategies to strengthen the Canadian auto sector. These would include policies that would encourage Korean automakers to locate production facilities in Canada; assist Canadian automakers to better access Korean and other Asian markets; closely monitor non-tariff barriers and act quickly and effectively to resolve disputes; place substantial resources into trade offices and lead frequent trade missions to Korea; and work with industry and labour to create an effective auto innovation fund.
Both CETA and the China FIPA have provoked widespread public concern in Canada and New Democrat share those concerns.
Importantly, the Korea agreement differs substantially from those two agreements. Unlike the China FIPA, the terms of the Korea agreement are reciprocal. Unlike CETA, the Korea agreement does not apply to provincial, territorial or municipal procurement or Crown corporations, where most Canadian procurement is located. Unlike CETA, the Korea agreement does not apply or negatively affect supply-managed agricultural products. Unlike CETA, the Korea agreement does not contain any negative intellectual property provisions, for example, pharmaceutical patents or copyright.
Notably, intellectual property expert, Professor Michael Geist has pronounced positively on the IP terms of the Korea agreement, calling it an example of a good agreement in this important area. While the Korea FTA does have an ISDS provision, it contains transparency guarantees and is fully cancellable on six months' notice. This is contrasted with the China FIPA, which binds Canada to ISDS for 31 years, and CETA, which appears to do so for 20 years.
Unlike the Conservatives and Liberals, a New Democrat government would involve a full spectrum of Canadian stakeholders, including industry and labour leaders in monitoring and implementing this deal. Unlike those two parties, the New Democrats would work diligently to eliminate non-tariff barriers and scrutinize the use of the investor state provisions very closely. Unlike those two parties, a New Democrat government would not hesitate to renegotiate or terminate this deal if meaningful market access is not achieved or the ISDS provisions are abused.
Overarching all, New Democrats want to deepen Canada's trade linkages with the Asia-Pacific region, something we recognize as essential to maintaining Canadian prosperity in the 21st century. We support breaking down harmful trade barriers, but believe government should provide the support Canadian industry needs to remain competitive in a more open world economy. We agree with such diverse voices as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Labour Congress that the government needs to do more than sign trade agreements. It must promote Canadian exports, develop sound Canadian industrial strategies, invest resources in trade commission services, and participate meaningfully in regional and international bodies of all types.
The Korea trade agreement presents a vital opportunity to diversify Canada's economy and promote good quality job creation in Canada. We cannot let this opportunity pass.
While certain terms of the agreement are not what an NDP government would have negotiated, on balance we believe that the benefits of the Canada-Korea trade agreement are significant for Canadians. We will be supporting the legislation accordingly.