Madam Speaker, I certainly have never said, or certainly did not mean to imply, that every individual who may have a disability is vulnerable, and certainly would not be vulnerable in the same sense. There could be different degrees of vulnerability that could affect us all.
However, what I am trying to do with these amendments is to simply protect autonomy, ensure that everybody has the information they need about the alternatives. Some people may have that information already, but some people may not. That is why we need these safeguards.
If I have time, I want to briefly go back to comment to the previous questions because I did not get to answer the second part of it.
The member argued that an imminent requirement might not be constitutional. I will just say this. The Quebec bill has a requirement of imminence, and the Supreme Court, in its extension, said that the new provisions they were putting in place with respect to the extension do not apply to Quebec because Quebec already has a law in place. I think that would strongly suggest that in the view of the court, the Quebec model, which has a requirement for imminence, is constitutional. It would allow us to follow that model.
What I am suggesting in this amendment is to simply to a greater extent align the federal legislation with the Quebec legislation, which we already have a sense is constitutional.
However, I think there are some other points that could be made in defence of that; namely, that the court said in its decision that it would show a substantial degree of deference toward Parliament.