Mr. Speaker, I want to pick up on the question of advance consent, because it has come up a number of times today.
What we heard from the special committee, at least from those who are involved in health care or represent those who are involved in health care, is that it is very difficult to have an advance directive about a very hypothetical situation in which a people do not actually know how they will experience what they will be going through. With an advance consent provision, one may end up with a situation where someone, who at the present time does not want to die, still has their life taken because of something they wrote down earlier, and they may be experiencing those events differently from how they expected.
I want to ask the member specifically with regard to sexual consent. We have a very clear understanding that a person cannot consent in advance. There has to be contemporaneous consent in the context of sexual consent. Therefore, why would we have a different and lower standard for someone consenting to die than for someone consenting to engage in sexual relations?