Madam Speaker, I reiterate my appreciation to the hon. member across for his work on the bill. This is an area the government is very concerned with, and we appreciate his attention to the issue.
Most of my comments today will centre on the question I asked concerning redundancy, namely the mechanisms that are already in place and whether this bill is filling a gap or overlapping the existing mechanisms, and what the consequences would be. I will run through these, if I could.
The proposals to create a mechanism to stem funding from foreign bodies known to promote radicalization and extremism in Canada are at the centre of this bill. It would also authorize the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Minister of Public Safety, to recommend the listing of states that have engaged in religious persecution, torture, and the promotion of radicalization. Canadian religious, cultural, or educational institutions would then be prohibited from accepting money or other valuables from sources affiliated with those listed states. As I have stated, these measures are totally in line with the objectives of the government.
The bill also attempts to respond to recommendation 15 of the 2015 interim report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. That reference proposes that the government develop measures to prevent foreign funds from entering Canada, where such funds, donors, or recipients have been linked to radicalization.
My concern is that the stated aim of the bill seems, in some instances, to be inconsistent with its provisions. Only one of the three reasons to list a state has to do with promotion of radicalization. The other two do not. They have to do with subjecting individuals to human rights violations, either through religious persecution or torture and cruel punishments. Those violations are already covered under the new Magnitsky act, which allows Canada to impose broad asset freezes and financial prohibitions on individuals responsible for, or complicit in, gross violations of international human rights.
With respect to preventing funds from being used to support terrorist activities, we can say that the Government of Canada is committed to a strong and comprehensive regime. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act,, or the PCMLTFA, is a primary piece of legislation that establishes this framework. The act requires approximately 31,000 financial institutions and intermediaries to identify their clients, keep records, and have internal compliance programs in place. It creates a mandatory reporting system for suspicious financial transactions, large cross-border currency transfers, and certain proscribed transactions.
The legislation also established the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, or FINTRAC, which I was referring to earlier, Canada's main agency for monitoring money laundering and terrorist financing. FINTRAC is authorized by the existing legislation to collect and analyze financial transaction reports and disclose pertinent information to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. With the millions of financial transaction reports received every year, FINTRAC helps to establish links between individuals and groups in Canada and abroad suspected of financing and supporting terrorist activities. This intelligence assists police and national security agencies in their investigations of terrorist financing and threats to the security of Canada. It is also information that is used in assessing the level of risk posed by organizations that apply to be registered as charities.
There are a number of rules that govern how charities should operate, whether in Canada or abroad. The Canada Revenue Agency, as the federal regulator of charities, protects the charitable organization registration system from being abused by individuals or groups with links to terrorists. The charities directorate formally established the review and analysis division in 2003 to audit registered charities based on the potential risk of terrorist financing abuse. It works to prevent organizations with links to terrorism from being registered and to revoke the registration of those that are.
The Criminal Code's terrorist listing regime is another important tool in the fight against terrorism. The listing of entities counters terrorist financing and criminalizes certain support for listed entities. It is based on a principle similar to what we see in the bill before us today. When an entity is placed on the list, banks and financial institutions freeze its assets. The code makes it a criminal offence for Canadians at home and abroad to knowingly deal with the assets of a listed entity. Listings aim to help obstruct financial support for terrorist groups and supporters of terrorism. For example, Canadian charitable organizations that are maintaining connections to organizations already listed under the Criminal Code can be and are listed.
Furthermore, the list of entities helps to prevent registered charities in Canada from serving as a support network for terrorist organizations operating abroad. An organization can be denied charitable status or have its registration revoked when its resources provide any means of support for, or benefit to, an organization listed under the Criminal Code.
A further result of listing may be to deny its members, recruiters and facilitators entry to Canada.
The assessment process to identify potential entities to consider for listing is continuous and action can be taken when and if necessary. Under the code, Canada has the ability to apply appropriate criminal measures to deter terrorist activity in Canada. Once listed, an entity becomes defined as a terrorist group under the Criminal Code, which means various terrorism-related offences could potentially then be applied to the entity's supporters in Canada. These include offences related to terrorist financing, terrorist related-travel, recruitment and training.
When it comes to the prosecution of terrorism-related offences, however, it should be noted that the Criminal Code's definition of a "terrorist group" is not restricted to listed entities. Charges and prosecutions can even proceed if the group involved is not on the list. That is only one of several mechanisms we already use effectively.
When it comes to countering terrorism, the government understands that stemming the flow of dubious funding is only one part of the equation. That is why we have taken a recent major step further, through the effort to prevent radicalization to violence rather than only deal with it after the fact. That involves getting at the root causes and factors that contribute to terrorism by actively engaging with individuals and communities.
We know that our success in doing so relies on the support and participation from all levels of government and society, especially local communities and individual Canadians. The newly created Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, or the Canada Centre, is a source of advice, research and funding in that respect.
Thanks in no small part to $35 million in funding over five years provided through budget 2016, the centre is already making a real difference. It is working with youth, communities, academia, and stakeholders to help prevent radicalization to violence in Canada. It is based on the understanding that there is no single ideology or cause of radicalization to violence and that prevention must be an essential component of Canada's efforts to counter terrorism.
All of this goes hand in hand with new security legislation, or Bill C-59, which is heading to committee now. It is designed to update our national security framework to reflect current realities, while putting the rights and freedoms of Canadians at the core.
The Canadian government already takes all appropriate action to counter terrorist threats to our country, to our people, to our way of life, and to our global interests. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, the efforts of FINTRAC and our security agencies, the Criminal Code listings, and the new Canada Centre, in concert with our proposed overhaul of Canada's national security framework, are all parts of a well-functioning system. Every day, they are informing our work to combat terrorism and to keep Canadians safe.
As I mentioned at the top of my speech, Bill C-371 is a well-intentioned legislation. The concern I would have, and I raised it in my question for the member, is where it will fill in any gaps that might have been missed in the various mechanisms I have just articulated.
One of the things I would ask members to do is to consider the implications of that duplication and ensure the legislation is moving that forward.
I look forward to further conversations with the member. I very much appreciate him bringing forward the legislation and for his ongoing work and concern, which I very much share.