Mr. Chair, I would like to get back to the air force capability gap and put things into perspective for the minister.
Back in 2016, on April 14, Lieutenant-General Hood said, “We have just recently established that the end of the F-18s' useful life will be in 2025.” Right after that, he said, “I'm confident that if a decision were taken, certainly in the next five years, we'll be in a comfortable position changing that aircraft.”
It just so happens that on April 18 and 21 and May 3 and 10, Boeing lobbyists met with officials from National Defence, the Prime Minister's Office, and Public Services and Procurement Canada. Then, on May 16, the minister mentioned the capability gap for the first time. He said:
Talking about previous governments, we are facing capability gaps. We should have had a fighter replacement by now, rather than trying to extend....
Curiously, a few days later, a 2014 report by Defence Research and Development Canada disappeared from the National Defence website. The report contained very important information about things such as the importance of not running a mixed fleet and having two different kinds of planes. A Super Hornet may have the number 18 on it, but it is not at all the same kind of plane as a CF-18. It is a totally different machine. The report covered life expectancy and the need for new jets. It stated that 65 jets would get us to 2025 just fine, and that a mixed fleet was a very bad idea.
On May 24, Boeing lobbyists were again making the rounds in Ottawa. On May 26, at CANSEC, the minister confirmed that our CF-18 fleet needed replacing right away. He was talking about the whole fleet, not just a few jets. He added that failure to replace it exposed us to a future capability gap.
The meetings continued. On July 6, the minister made a few little changes. The Liberals said they were going to drop the 2010 requirements for fighter jets. They made a few changes here and there.
There were other meetings after that, this time with elected officials. MPs met with lobbyists from Boeing on July 17, September 21, October 7, and October 18. Two ministers, two deputy ministers, and two parliamentary secretaries met with lobbyists from Boeing.
Then, on November 21, we received the response from the Department of National Defence confirming what General Hood had said on April 14. The general's response was confirmed. We received an official response in writing.
On November 22, the minister announced that the government was going to begin negotiating with Boeing for a sole-source purchase of 18 Super Hornets, while launching an open and fair competition that would last five years, when we know that, in other countries, it takes one year when you have the information to conclude a competition.
On November 28, General Hood appeared again before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and said that the air force's policy on the number of fighter jets had been changed and that he was not consulted. He was not even a member of the committee that did the evaluation.
On this issue, I would like to know if the minister can tell us once and for all who told him that there was a capability gap.