Mr. Speaker, the Liberals politicized the heck out of the CF-18 file. That is about as low as it gets.
First, during the election campaign, they made promises that they could not keep. They promised to hold an open and transparent process to replace the current fleet of CF-18s, but they excluded the F-35. They were off to a great start.
The Liberals had their minds made up from the very beginning. They wanted to give a big contract to their friends at Boeing. That was clear, straightforward, and transparent. They wanted to give them a nice gift of $7 billion. They planned to bleed the Canadian Armed Forces to grease their friends' palms. That is a great Liberal tradition.
Even though the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force said, on April 14, 2016, that we had the resources we needed to live up to our obligations under NATO and NORAD, the Liberals decided to change the number of aircraft that the Royal Canadian Air Force would need at any given time. They were already beginning to tinker with the numbers. That is exhibit A.
The minister fabricated the capability gap. We know the minister likes playing architect. In this case, the minister was the architect of the air force capability gap. As it turns out, creating that gap involved a lot of meetings with Boeing. Since coming to power, the Liberals have had so much contact with Boeing that things are verging on the incestuous. It just so happens that the government's stance has shifted since the first of those meetings. I have a list of the meetings here. Let us call it exhibit B. There have been at least 14 known meetings with Boeing lobbyists, who met with political staff, ministers, and parliamentary secretaries over the past year.
After every meeting, the minister's position changed. The architect came up with his plan on the fly, apparently. This is a Liberal fabrication, pure and simple. One little sticking point interfered with developing the plan: Lieutenant-General Hood and the chief of the defence staff, General Vance, both told a parliamentary committee that they had sufficient resources to fulfill all of their commitments. Let us call that exhibit C.
This story simply does not hold water. If there really were a lack of resources, would the solution proposed by the government to acquire a fleet of 18 Super Hornets really be an effective solution, when we know that two-thirds of the American fleet is grounded? Indeed, two-thirds of the Super Hornet fleet in the United States is grounded. They are out of service. Parts are missing and there are problems with the oxygen system. It is a complete mess.
Problems with the Super Hornet are well known, and I have here a report, which is my exhibit D, that I found on the DND website. It is a public website. This 2014 report from the national defence research branch shows that having two fleets of aircraft was the worst idea in the world. Make no mistake; the CF-18s in our current fleet are not the same aircraft as the Super Hornets, even though they have the number 18 in their description.
The report contains all kinds of technical information that confirms that there was no capability gap, and that investments to upgrade the aircraft were going well and that they were operational. Most importantly, the report recommends not having a mixed fleet.
Here is my exhibit E. It is a letter signed by 13 former commanders of the Royal Canadian Air Force that was sent to the Prime Minister and that says exactly the same thing, specifically, that above all, we should not purchase an interim fleet or have a mixed fleet. Therefore—