Debates of Sept. 18th, 2017

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1092

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

With regard to cooperation between the Canadian military and the United States (US) military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and to findings of the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident”: (a) when did Canada decide to no longer transfer persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military to members of the US military; (b) were there any omissions or exclusions from the scope of this decision at the receiving end, such as US intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or did the decision apply to transfers to any agent or actor acting on behalf of the US government; (c) at the transferring end, did this decision apply to all members of the Canadian military, including special forces and intelligence officials, and if not, to whom did it not apply; (d) for what reasons was this decision taken; (e) was this decision taken after legal advice had been received on whether it would be lawful to continue to transfer to the US and if so, was the government advised that it would be unlawful to continue the transfers; (f) what was the date of the last transfer before the decision came into effect; (g) did this decision apply to persons who would or could be characterized as Persons Under Control (PUC) by the US Army, units within the US Army, or the CIA, considering that this is a term that the Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, referred to as an “American Army Term”; (h) were there any instances of this decision not being implemented, and thus of persons being transferred to the US military or another US agency in situations in which members of the Canadian military themselves characterized a person as a PUC, considering that the same Canadian military Board of Inquiry report of May 4, 2010, observed that the term PUC was in “widespread use” within the Canadian military in Afghanistan; (i) is the government aware of any instances in which persons who were determined not to be “detainees” were transferred on the battlefield or elsewhere to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel, including the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, the National Directorate of Security, and any paramilitary or like organizations working for or alongside the foregoing, to then learn that the person was re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, or private US actors cooperating with the US Army or CIA; (j) is the government aware of any instances in which persons treated by Canada as “detainees” were transferred to ANSF personnel and then re-transferred by ANSF personnel to members of the US military, CIA, etc., especially before the 2007 Transfer Arrangement between Canada and Afghanistan took effect; (k) was this decision conveyed to the US government and if so, what reasons were provided and how did the US government respond; and (l) was this decision ever reversed or revised and if so, on what terms, when, and for what reasons?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1093

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as Persons Under Control (PUCs) or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) in relation to a statement by Donald P. Wright et al. in A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation--ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001-September 2005 (Combat Studies Institute, 2010), at p. 221: “Detainees in Coalition hands in Afghanistan were referred to as persons under control (PUCs) instead of EPWs or detainees,”, does this reference to “Coalition” apply to the Canadian military, including special forces in any part of the 2001-2005 period in question; (b) in relation to a claim by Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Penguin, 2009), at pp. 304-305: “In spring 2002, …CIA lawyers further twisted legal boundaries by establishing a new category of prisoner: Persons Under Control, or PUC. Anyone held as PUC was automatically denied access to the ICRC, and even his existence was denied...PUCs were flown around the world to different locations on private jets belonging to dummy companies owned by the CIA.”, is the government aware of whether this is an accurate statement of one use to which the category of “PUC” was put by the United States; (c) in relation to an observation in Center for Law and Military Operations (United States Army, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School), Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: Volume I - Major Combat Operations (11 September 2001--1 May 2003) (August 1, 2004) [Lessons Learned]: “[P]ersons detained were either classified as ‘persons under control’ (PUCs) or simply as ‘detainees.’… Persons captured on the battlefield were initially brought to the classified location to establish their identity and determine if they met the criteria for potential transfer to Guantanamo. During this phase, detained personnel were classified as ‘PUCs’.”, is the government aware of whether, during such windows of time, CIA agents or persons working for the CIA would sometimes take custody of PUCs from the US Army before they could be officially designated as “detainees” by the Army; (d) in relation to a claim in Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Task Force 500 and America’s Secret War Against Al-Qaeda (Back Bay Books, 2004), at pp. 250-251: “In June [2002]…our [US Army] command in Bagram …came up with a whole new prisoner category called “persons under U.S. control”, or PUCs. The whole idea was to create a sort of limbo status, a bureaucratic blank spot where prisoners could reside temporarily without entering any official database or numbering system.”: is the government aware of whether or not this US Army PUC category was created in concert with and used by the CIA as a way to secure custody of PUCs while they were still in a “bureaucratic blank spot”; (e) in relation to the observations in Lessons Learned that “the term ‘PUC’ did not develop until the [US] XVIIIth Airborne Corps arrived in Afghanistan” in 2002, did Canadian Forces, including special forces, ever conduct joint operations with the US’ XVIIIth Airbone Corps in which captives were taken; (f) is the government aware of whether the commanding officer of the US’ XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, was a direct source of, or conduit for, the notion of “PUC” and if so, whether Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill was working in concert or tandem with the CIA in introducing this term into the Afghanistan theatre; (g) after General Walter Natynczyk was seconded to command 35,000 US forces in Iraq during the US’ Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, did he bring any knowledge of the use of PUC practices or a PUC system from Iraq to the Canada-Afghanistan context when he became head of the Canadian Forces’ Land Force Doctrine and Training system in 2005 and when he was appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff in 2006, and if so, was such practices introduced in any way to this doctrine and training system; (h) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Canadian Lt. Gen. Michel Gauthier and US Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence Steve Cambone or any other officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (i) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and any officials in the US Department of Defense or in the Pentagon in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; (j) prior to August 2015 by which time the first Canadian Forces troops had arrived in Kandahar, were there meetings between any Canadian Forces officers apart from Generals Gauthier and Hillier in which they discussed, inter alia, Canada aligning or otherwise coordinating its policy and practices in Kandahar with those of the US, including in relation to detainees, as a condition of the US agreeing that Canada be assigned Kandahar; and (k) is the mini-biography of Mr. Gauthier on The Governance Network’s website correct in saying Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan” and if so, did this include authority over policy and decisions related to the transfer of captives to other states?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1094

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

With respect to the characterization of persons in the care, custody or control of the Canadian military as “PUCs” and “Persons Under Control”, or use of like categories, whether or not such terms were or are used officially or unofficially: (a) does the government accept the accuracy of the finding of a Canadian military Board of Inquiry (BOI) on the subject of the “14 June 2006 Afghan Detainee Incident” [BOI June 2006 Incident Report], in its report of May 4, 2010, (para 30, part II) that the term “PUC” was in “widespread use” amongst Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006; (b) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report observation (para 30, part II), stating that “[T]he B Coy MP [B Company Military Police officer] testified that he was directed during ROTO 1 [rotation/deployment 1] to always use the term “PUC” and to avoid the term “Detainee.””, who directed this Military Police (MP) to systematically use “PUC” and to avoid “detainee” and for what reasons was this MP so directed; (c) in relation to a BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding (para 30, part II), stating that “When made aware of the term the TFA Advisors (LEGAD and PM) endeavoured to remove it [“PUC”] from the tactical reporting lexicon, as it had no legal foundation in detainee policy.”, (i) when and how were the Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) Advisors “made aware of the term”, (ii) for what period did “PUC” appear in tactical reporting, (iii) did its use in tactical reporting end, and if it ended, when did it end and was this the result of the initiative of the TFA Advisors; (d) in relation to the same report finding as in (c), was any person in position of strategic command in the Canadian Forces, including Generals Rick Hillier, Walter Natynzyk, Michel Gauthier and David Fraser, at any time aware of the use of the term “PUC” and if so, what actions did one or more of them take in relation to its use; (e) does the government accept the BOI June 2006 Incident Report finding that persons characterized by Canadian soldiers and commanders during one or more periods in 2006 as “PUCs” were transferred to Afghan authorities without also being characterized as “detainees” with the result that there was no triggering of the record-keeping and reporting (including reporting to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) connected to official detainee policy and to the 2005 Transfer Arrangement with Afghanistan, and if so, what is the number of such PUCs transferred without record or reporting to the ICRC; (f) in relation to the observation in the BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 33, Part II), that, in relation to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published Canadian military reports from the field that 26 persons were “captured” on May 17, 2006, by Task Force ORION, those 26 were transferred to the Afghan National Police without ever being processed as detainees, were those persons treated as PUCs by TF ORION; (g) in relation to question (m) of Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session; filed by Craig Scott, MP) that asked the government to set out how 11 captured persons referenced at page 96 of a book by the commanding officer of Task Force ORION, Ian Hope-Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008)--were processed, were these 11 persons processed as “detainees” with attendant record-keeping and reporting or were they instead treated as “PUCs” and transferred to Afghan authorities on that basis, with no attendant record-keeping or reporting to the ICRC; (h) in view of the statement in a report by the Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries (DESI), in “Directorate of Special Examinations and Inquiries Investigation—Passage of Information, Final Report (14 June 2006 Afghanistan Detainee Incident)”, document number 7045-72-09/26, that it was “of very significant concern …that a number of TF ORION War Diary records for the period 13 May--17 June 2006 could not be located”, have some or all of those war diary records since been located; (i) if some or all of the war diaries referenced in (h) have been located, do they shed light on the use of “PUCs” or like designations as a way to avoid labelling a captive as a “detainee”; (j) in relation to point (o) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements?”--that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (k) in relation to point (p) in Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed?”--that the government did not then answer in the affirmative, would the government now like to change its answer; (l) in relation to point (n) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session)--“at any period and if so, which periods, [were] there …one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal?”--why did the government not reveal the existence of “PUCs” as an informal category; (m) in relation to, inter alia, the government answers to points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), does the present government consider that the former government deliberately sought to mislead or even deceive the then Member of Parliament who submitted Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session); (n) inclusive of points (n), (o), and (p) of Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session), are there any answers to this question that the present government considers were incorrect or untruthful; (o) in relation to a September 19, 2016, letter from Mr. Craig Scott, former MP for Toronto–Danforth, to the current Prime Minister in which Mr. Scott presented reasons as to why he “believe[d] it to be likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st Parliament, first session) in order to avoid revealing” the existence of persons who were transferred to Afghanistan without being recorded or reported to the ICRC as “detainees”, has that letter resulted in any inquiries by or on behalf of the Prime Minister and if so, of what sort and with what result; (p) when on December 8, 2009, then Member of Parliament the Hon. Ujjal Dosanjh asked a question to former Chief of Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk in the latter’s appearance before the Standing Committee on National Defence in which Mr. Dosanjh quoted from a Globe and Mail article in which a Military Police officer’s field notes used the term “PUC”, did the government conduct any other investigation into why “PUC” had been used apart from the ordering of Board of Inquiry and Chief of Review Services investigations into aspects of the underlying incident and if so, what was the result; and (q) in relation to findings in BOI June 2006 Incident Report (para 12, Part II), stating that “Although BGen [David] Fraser did not become familiar with TSO [Theatre Standing Order] 321A until arriving in Kandahar…, its underlying principle of transferring detainees to ANSF was made clear to him before departing Canada. Direction provided to him verbally by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) [General Rick Hillier] emphasized that Afghan detainees were to be transferred to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as far forward in the field and as rapidly as possible; indeed, that their transfer from CF to ANSF custody was to be measured in terms of “minutes to hours.”, does the government consider that this constituted an instruction by General Hillier to circumvent the formal “detainee” system with a “PUC” practice?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1095

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

With regard to all operational contexts in which members of the Canadian military have been involved since September 11, 2001, up to the present and with respect to all military orders, directives, instructions, etc., whether binding or non-binding, interim, provisional, or final, related to persons in the care, custody, or control of members of the Canadian military and to all persons with whom members of the Canadian military come into contact but who are judged as being in the care, custody, or control of armed forces, security, and intelligence forces, and police forces of another state: (a) what were the numbers, titles and dates of all Canadian Forces Theatre Standing Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (b) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all Fragmentary Orders and the identity of the issuing official; (c) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of all International Security Assistance Force orders of a similar nature issued in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them; and (d) what were the numbers, titles, and dates of any orders of a similar nature issued by American, Iraqi, or other forces, including Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq, that apply in any way, directly or indirectly, to Canadian soldiers who come into contact with detainees while serving in Iraq and the name of the issuing official or entity which issued them?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1098

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

In relation to Canada’s transfer of captives in Afghanistan to the authorities of other states, including the United States and Afghanistan, from 2001 onward: (a) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of senior officers in the Canadian Forces up to and including the Chief of Defence Staff for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and/or one or more international legal obligations; (b) if the answer in (a) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result; (c) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any Minister of the Crown including the Prime Minister for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and/or one or more international legal obligations; (d) if the answer in (c) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result; (e) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the public service for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and/or one or more international legal obligations; (f) if the answer in (e) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result; and (g) have there been any investigations by any federal agency, including but not limited to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service, of any member of the a minister’s political staff including any member of the Prime Minister’s Office for possible criminal conduct in violation of one or more Canadian statutes and/or one or more international legal obligations; (h) if the answer in (g) is affirmative, (i) between what dates, (ii) with respect to what conduct, (iii) with what result?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1100

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

With regard to the Government’s nomination of a new Clerk of the House of Commons, and its general commitment to “open, transparent and merit-based” selection processes: (a) what process was followed to select the nominee; (b) how many candidates applied for the position; (c) were any tests or assessments administered to the candidates; (d) how many candidates were interviewed; (e) who were the members of the selection board or interview panel; (f) were candidates’ professional and character references checked; (g) how many candidates were psychometrically tested; (h) what was the role of the Prime Minister in the selection process; (i) what was the role of the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Principal Secretary and Director of Appointments in the selection process; (j) what was the role of the Government House Leader in the selection process; (k) what was the role of the Chief of Staff to the Government House Leader in the selection process; (l) what was the role of the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard in the selection process; (m) what was the role of the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard in the selection process; (n) did any ministers or exempt staff, not named in parts (h) to (m), have a role in the selection process; (o) what was the role of the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Results and Delivery) in the selection process; (p) what role was provided or offered to the Speaker of the House of Commons, or any personal representative of him, in the selection process; (q) were executive search firms, consultants, or other contractors retained to support the selection process; (r) if the answer in (q) is affirmative, (i) who was retained, (ii) what services were provided, (iii) what was the value of the services provided; (s) when was the nominee notified he was the government’s choice, and who notified him; (t) were the opposition parties’ House leaders consulted on the choice of nominee, and if so, by whom and when; and (u) was the Speaker of the House of Commons consulted on the choice of nominee, and if so, by whom and when?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1101

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

With regard to the most recent Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) compliance test on small businesses with regard to active vs. passive income: (a) what date did the compliance test (i) begin, (ii) end; (b) how many small businesses were (i) assessed in this test, (ii) determined to owe a greater amount to the CRA than initially assessed, (iii) determined to owe a lesser amount than initially assessed; (c) how were these small businesses selected for assessment; (d) how many of the businesses assessed were (i) campgrounds, (ii) self-storage facilities, (iii) from other sectors, as broken down by the North American Industry Classification System; (e) what conclusions, if any, were reached about (i) the CRA’s interpretation of the rules regarding “active” and “passive” income of the small businesses involved, (ii) the application of the CRA’s interpretation of the rules regarding the eligibility of the small businesses involved to receive the small business tax deduction; (f) what other conclusions were reached; and (g) what standards were used to determine whether a small business (i) provided a sufficient number of services for its generated income to be considered active, (ii) engaged or hired a sufficient number of year-round full-time employees for its generated income to be considered active?

(Return tabled)

Question No. 1102

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

With regard to the government’s decision to permit the Hytera takeover of Norsat International Incorporated: (a) did the transaction undergo a complete national security review as defined by the Investment Canada Act; (b) if the answer in (a) is affirmative, what are the details, including (i) when did the national security review commence, (ii) when did the review conclude; and (c) when did the government approve the transaction?

(Return tabled)

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-21, An Act to amend the Customs Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Customs Act

[Alupa Clarke, Conservative, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to see you in the chair again, guiding our democratic exchanges in the House.

I began my speech before question period. Having used up six minutes, I now have four left. In the first part of my speech, I explored the notion of borders from various perspectives: security, trafficking, trade, and the need for some to commute between various countries, in our case Canada and the United States.

As a certain philosopher whose name escapes me once said, borders guarantee a country's sovereignty. It can then be said that they guarantee our Canadian democracy, because in order to be enforced, rights must rest upon institutional foundations, foundations that can only be guaranteed within the borders of a sovereign state that has institutions such as the House of Commons, for instance.

The purpose of Bill C-21, which the Minister of Public Safetyintroduced on June 15, 2016, in this House, is to amend the Customs Act. Let me remind my colleagues that the whole content of this bill comes from the beyond the border action plan, introduced by prime minister Stephen Harper in 2011. The general aim of that plan was to address any emerging threats to the Canada-U.S. border, to promote trade, which makes for continuous economic growth and job creation, to have an integrated cross-border law enforcement, and to establish critical infrastructure for cybersecurity, a need that keeps growing over the years as new technologies become more important in our daily lives and our institutions.

In my view, this bill was put forward in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Americans wanted to address the concerns of their fellow citizens about security in North America, which is quite natural. In fact, the goal is still the same. As good partners, we not only wanted to address the concerns of Canadians regarding their security, but we also wanted to be good economic, military, and social partners with the United States. We still want that today. Therefore, we began discussions about border security in good faith and with an open mind.

That being said, it was imperative for us, Canadians, to ensure the continuity of trade flow. That is what is difficult to maintain with this type of bill. As my colleague from Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, our critic on this file, mentioned, this bill is intended to finally respond to the threat of terrorism. However, how can we achieve this while ensuring the continued free flow of goods?

We believe the government has accepted the main points we presented in 2011, which is quite interesting. However, this government still has many questions to answer about this bill. Will there be new infrastructure costs related to carrying out the inspection of outgoing people or goods? What measures have been put in place by this government to protect privacy and ensure that the collection of any new entry and exit data is carried out in a secure manner? How will this bill affect those people who enter Canada at unofficial entry points, as we saw this summer in Manitoba and Quebec? Finally, how is this issue reflected in our trade negotiations with the United States at this time, and will all Canadians benefit from these changes?

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the contribution of the member for Beauport—Limoilou to this debate.

I am concerned about the new information-sharing initiative, although, to be sure, this is not our first time sharing information. The digital age is increasingly permeating not only the federal government and every level of government in Canada, but foreign governments as well. This is an ongoing and growing trend. This bill represents one more step in a direction we have been heading in for some time, towards sharing more and more information.

Does my colleague consider privacy rights important? Does he think that allowing Canadians to retain some privacy is as vital as security? In this case, we are talking about information on travel. This means the government can see where a person has been, what day they left and what day they came back, and, no doubt, what countries they visited.

Is my colleague concerned about privacy at all, or does he think that security is paramount and outweighs Canadians' right to privacy?

[Alupa Clarke, Conservative, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Madam Speaker, at the end of my speech, among other things I asked what careful steps the government intended to take in order to protect the privacy of Canadians.

Clearly, that is one of my concerns. This bill may deal with sensitive matters, but it is absolutely essential. The Americans want to strengthen border security, but we would like trade to remain unimpeded. That said, with regards to the issue raised by the member for Sherbrooke of the privacy of people going abroad, the Canadian government can already access their information today. Peoples' passports get stamped when they visit other countries. This bill will make it so that information is available automatically and will also give us useful tools to deal with certain issues that may not be raised today, EI for instance.

Imagine someone that is drawing EI benefits and should be actively looking for work but instead is travelling in some tropical paradise, or in the United States. This legislation would let the authorities know automatically, and the information could then be relayed to the appropriate department. It would also allow us to interrogate the individual in order to better understand the specifics of the case and why they would be looking for work outside the country.

The member asks an excellent question. I do believe that we should make sure that the government specifies how it intends to protect privacy in the digital age.

[Marilyn Gladu, Conservative, Sarnia—Lambton, ON]

I thank the member for his speech, Madam Speaker.

There is a borer in my riding and I am worried about cannabis. People who have consumed cannabis cannot enter the United States.

I am worried that if the government shares the information with the United States, in the going back and forth, the next thing is we would be sharing more information about people. If officials would share the information even when they make things a ticketed offence, then people will not be able to go to the U.S. Is my colleague concerned about that?

[Alupa Clarke, Conservative, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Madam Speaker, that is indeed a great concern. This morning, the hon. member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles asked the minister that same question, but he did not answer. In fact, he said that cannabis cannot be brought across the border, but we knew that already.

What the member was saying is that customs officers at the U.S. border can assume that half of all those crossing the border may have consumed cannabis in Canada, if it is legal. That is if this ever comes to pass because many promises have been broken so far. How are U.S. customs officers going to deal with this situation? Is this going to prevent some of our businesspeople from doing business in the United States? There are all sorts of questions and concerns.

This gives me the chance to say today that there are some international treaties having to do with cannabis that the Prime Minister should have already abolished. He has yet to do so. He is behind on all these files and is pushing the provinces forward without any clarification. As such, the government has to act as quickly as possible and explain what is going on.

[Brian Masse, NDP, Windsor West, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak again on Bill C-21.

One of the interesting aspects about the debate on this bill is around the consequences for trade with our American partner. The reality with our relationship with the United States is that we have hundreds of thousands of Canadians who traverse into the United States and then back into Canada per day. Anything we do with Canada-U.S. travel and trade will have a significant impact with regard to not only the individual crossing, but also the metrics of the infrastructure that is actually under that duress.

What I mean specifically, and through that I will reference my riding, but there are many others across the country, is the way that people are processed in and outside the border, whether it be in the customs line, the lineup for the infrastructure, or the return. In that context of exchange, there are several variables that can take place for individuals.

A passport is one of the documents that can be used for entry and exit. It is required by the western hemisphere travel initiative of the United States. By the way, when the U.S. implemented that, many members of Congress did not even know that was added as a rider, attached legislation, which is similar to what we do with our budget bills, now that we throw the kitchen sink in with everything. It did not get the proper review.

I was part of a group of Canadians, and many parties were involved, pushing for the delay of implementation, which we received because this affects our travel and trade.

What Canadians are being asked to do is to give up more of their privacy. This is important. On borders like mine, travelling to and from the United States is a regular practice. The information that is used therein has become more important for issues related to protection of people's banking accounts; online social and professional discussions or contributions through Facebook, Twitter and so forth; and then, lastly, the aspect related to video and other types of things that could be done and are related to fraud.

During the summer, as part of general discussion, I have been working a lot on the issue of inclusion of fraud and so forth. One of the notable things in the information that is going to be dispelled is the surname, the first name, the middle name, date of birth, citizenship or nationality, and sex of the individual. That is what is collected right now for people entering Canada.

The new information, collected when people exit, is the date, time, place of departure, travel document used at the time of departure, with the travel document number. I mentioned earlier that could be passports or other types of identification, the enhanced driver's licence and other things that are used, the NEXUS card and so forth. There is any unique passenger reference assigned to them by a carrier, including border or non-border designations, or in the case of a carrier crew member, it would be their designation as such.

The information would be gathered by CBSA at every border crossing, including land, sea, and air. The bill would also have some additional reporting of goods that cross the border, and specific needs of reporting related to that.

What I think is important is that it changes a number of things. I know right now in my crossing area, there is a high degree of concern about the digital world we have moved to, and the use of that information, but also the reliance on that information.

Right now, we have problems, often associated with the U.S. system or the Canadian system not following through on the collection of the data, and then the system breaking down. What has happened in the past is that the booths would be closed and there would be lineups which affect our trade and tourism. Seconds do matter when we are talking about tens of thousands of trucks. Every second does matter. It will back up into our economy. It will affect our competitiveness.

Now when the systems go down, the lineups then start to lengthen. When we look at what tools the CBSA has been provided, I get worried. There is a very well-schooled and trained workforce in our CBSA members. Our men and women who serve are very capable.

The problem, quite frankly, goes back to their lack of respect and support for the materials and equipment on the border. That is one of the things that raises my question. We can have a lot of great ideas, but if we do not provide the right tools and appropriate measures, then that does not make a difference. It can complicate and make things worse. I know, through a number of different reports, that the computer systems, equipment, and processing are issues for the men and women who serve the border. I would also argue that there is a malaise in the government to do the necessary things to make sure the working conditions and employment are done properly through contracts and ensuring we have stability.

There are several things that act as disrupters in this entire process. We could have all the good intentions we want, but the reality is whether we have the capabilities to do that. Right now, our men and women are again serving without a contract. It is three years plus about five months since their last contract. If this Liberal government cannot even get a contract with its workers in place—it cannot even pay its workers for sure—what type of competency do we have that it is going to protect people's private information and the accumulation of more data, just because the U.S. says so? That is one thing that stuck out to me right away in terms of the vulnerabilities of this.

I mentioned the impact on my riding, with delayed times and backups related to the proper processing breakdowns. Now, past the breakdown, as we get data breaches and loss of information, as well as the incapabilities on top of all that, there is no guarantee that what we are doing is actually going to prove anything. The government has not done the necessary work that it should be doing right now.

I spoke in the House of Commons this afternoon at question period about a new border crossing that has been approved by the Prime Minister and cabinet without any consultation whatsoever with the community on what the specifics were going to be. It was nothing. They let a private American billionaire, whom Canadians will have to pay their taxes and tolls to, break the news about what their future is going to be under the Liberals' regime of making a crossing into the United States for jobs, improvement of connections to their families, or whatever it might be. They let a private American billionaire, who was incarcerated for not following through with construction properly on the American government side, do this. They are giving a billionaire in the United States a brand new bridge, plus an expansion of 35%. There was nothing in communication. What confidence do we have in the necessary communication and protection of private information that is going to be dispelled through this bill?

I will come back to this point, in time. However, the timing of this is the real curiosity. This bill and this discussion go back to the previous regime, as well the Obama regime, with regard to Canada-U.S. information being shared back and forth. There were a lot of agreements over the years between our two countries that were ratcheted up. I mentioned the western hemisphere travel initiative as the original one, which has the requirement of a passport. It is no mystery that it was, as I mentioned earlier, an addition to a congressional and federal bill that many members did not even know about. If we look at the history, it was delayed subsequently for Canada. Other countries had to go first because there was no planning. It was actually a response to something and not the creation of something, hence it did not have the proper infrastructure or capacities.

It is interesting that as we are in these negotiations with the United States over NAFTA, one of the things that is going to be required is a re-evaluation of jobs and other types of things that we share on both sides of the border in terms of qualifications. Before, when NAFTA was signed, we did not have the Internet, and we did not have a lot of the jobs that are out there. Whether it be for the computer science industry or accounting, there were a series of different things that were not included.

All of these things will have to be worked out even if we get an agreement, but we will sign another privacy agreement, or implement one in legislation, with the United States before we even know what we will do in terms of a trading relationship with that country and the future of another relationship.

It would seem that the eagerness to do this and the timing of it is off. It would make sense that Canadians who travel, who number thousands per day going back and forth, would want to know what information was being shared. The United States is going to collect that data.

As noted in the discussion earlier, the Liberals just gave a billionaire, an American citizen, a brand new border crossing, with a 35% increase in capacity, for nothing. The Liberals gave it up. They have to move a fire station. That is what Canada received. This is billions of dollars. The operation totals about $200,000 per day, and Canada gets a fire station moved.

However, the operations work with the American body and CBSA and so forth on a regular basis. When we have to give up more private information, we have to ensure it is rock solid. Not only do the operations in my area involve the CBSA and the Department of Homeland Security, but they can involve private American business. This is critical.

The U.S. Patriot Act allows that information to be accessed and used. It is interesting to note the way it works. The company that has the information taken from it is not allowed to tell the people affected by it.

I have fought for years in this place, and we were successful, to keep Canada's census data in Canada. This will be debated at the table during the discussions on NAFTA. A previous government outsourced data collection and the census to Lockheed Martin.

[An hon. member]

As the Liberals do.