Mr. Speaker, as the member of Parliament for the upper Ottawa Valley riding of Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, home to Garrison Petawawa, training ground of the warriors, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to Bill C-77, the legislation that, if passed, would amend provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. As a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence, I look forward to examining Bill C-77 in greater detail, and I will vote with my party to send this legislation to committee for further study.
It has been noted by our party's defence critic that Bill C-77 incorporates many of the legislative proposals made by the Conservative government in the 41st Parliament. This fact alone loan merits my support of the bill at second reading. There are changes between the legislation introduced by the Conservative government in the last Parliament and what we have before us today, and those changes will need to be carefully scrutinized.
As the member of Parliament for the riding that is home to Garrison Petawawa, Canada's largest army base, military justice is still a volatile topic. In addition to being the home of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, 2 CMBG, and the 4th Canadian Division Support Group, which is made up of 2 RCHA, 1 RCR and 3 RCR, RCDs and 2 Combat Engineer Regiment, as well as 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron and 450 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, Garrison Petawawa is also home to CSOR, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment.
CSOR, which was stood up during the Conservative watch of the defence of our nation, is the first new regiment to be stood up in over 50 years. I am proud of the role I played in supporting that decision and the subsequent decision to locate 450 Air Tactical Helicopter Squadron to be close by, to train with the troops its Chinook helicopters serve as strategic lift for. It made absolute sense to locate CSOR at Garrison Petawawa.
Petawawa is the home of the storied Canadian Airborne Regiment before it was disbanded during the decade of darkness that occurred prior to the election of a Conservative government. I mention that dark time in Canadian military history, the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, as there is a direct relationship between that sad event and the legislation we have before us today.
March 5, 1995 will be forever etched in the minds of many Canadian veterans and their supporters as a day of infamy. That is the date the Canadian Airborne Regiment was officially disbanded by David Collenette, the the minister of defence at the time in the Jean Chrétien government. Collenette acted against the advice of the Chief of the Defence Staff in ordering the regiment to be disbanded. The most unfortunate aspect of the few acts of a handful of Canadian soldiers is that the Canadian success story in Somalia has been overlooked by the media and remains largely unknown to the majority of Canadians.
In late 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was sent to Somalia to assist the United Nations peacekeeping mission in that country. Initially, the UN troops operated according to the relatively restrictive rules of engagement that directed most such operations. As the violence in Somalia escalated, however, the United States requested and received permission to modify its role. The Canadian Airborne Regiment received a change in orders. Canadian soldiers were ordered to be peace makers instead of being peacekeepers, two very different roles. The untold story is how the paratroopers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, tankers of the Royal Canadian Dragoons and combat engineers of 1 Combat Engineer Regiment, all based in Garrison Petawawa, very quickly subdued heavily armed gangs. Attacks on Canadian patrols early in the mission were suppressed with force and local warlords quickly realized that Canada's combat power was not just for show. Humanitarian agencies could then go about their business of distributing relief supplies, a task that was never the primary mission of Canada's troops.
Canada's soldiers then turned to rebuilding a local infrastructure of the police, hospitals, schools, etc. Poignant testimony of the effectiveness of the second reconstruction phase of the Canadian mission came from the father of the dead Somali at the centre of the controversy. He pleaded with Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, who was by then retired and on assignment as a journalist to Somalia, to intercede to keep the Canadian soldiers in his country. He told Mackenzie that, while he grieved for his son, the value of the peace makers to Somalia was enormous.
If Canadians are going to use this dark period in military history as a learning exercise, there are several things parliamentarians need to keep in mind when we study this legislation in detail.
A big difference between this legislation and the bill that was introduced by the previous Conservative government is special consideration for indigenous members that results in sentences that are less harsh versus other Canadian Armed Forces members. There is a legitimate concern that a two-tier system of military justice could undermine operational discipline, morale and anti-racism policies.
The following question needs be considered: If the legislative provisions in Bill C-77 had been in place during the Somalia affair, and had he been fit to stand trial, should Master Corporal Clayton Matchee, an aboriginal, been treated any differently, under the circumstances, than a non-aboriginal soldier? Would the Liberal government of the day have been so quick to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment and slash military spending in that circumstance?
The symbol for justice is a blindfolded figure holding a set of scales in balance. Will serving soldiers see a set of scales in balance or weighted in favour of someone based on government policies that tip the scale based on the political flavour of the day? Members of the Canadian Armed Forces should not be discriminated against based on race, gender, creed or culture.
I recognize that the Chief of Defence Staff stood up to deal with sexual misconduct and other forms of discrimination in the armed forces. However, as parliamentarians, we need to tread very carefully each time changes are made that would affect our women and men in uniform.
Consider this. For members of the Canadian Armed Forces, when they put on the uniform, they are soldiers first. That is an important distinction. In an operational setting, they need to rely on their fellow soldiers. Would Bill C-77 contribute to or diminish camaraderie among soldiers? Would Bill C-77 hurt operational efficiency? We need to keep asking these questions with real-life experiences in mind. Psychological experiments in troop cohesion will end up getting soldiers killed, the same way political expediency led to the loss of soldiers' lives in Afghanistan with the cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter contract by the Chrétien Liberal government.
One of the other take-aways from the Somalia affair was the report on the military justice system completed by former chief justice Brian Dickson in 1977. While it recognized that there was a breakdown in the chain of command, it also recognized that the chain of command, the flow of responsibility, must be at the heart of the military justice system. In the same way, a cabinet minister is expected to take responsibility for bad decisions by resigning, or, where there is a lack of judgment in not resigning, is fired by the Prime Minister.
The Somalia affair resulted in the end of a number of political careers, including several Liberal defence ministers. What is truly unfortunate about the Somalia affair is that with the political decision by the Liberal government of the day to shut down the civilian inquiry, the true cause of the breakdown in the chain of command never came to light. I quote from a 2017 media story:
The man who led an inquiry into the 1992 beating death of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian troops says he is frustrated that his commission's work was cut short before it could explore what role a controversial anti-malarial drug might have played in the violence.
Gilles Létourneau, a retired judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, says it may be too difficult now to examine whether mefloquine was a major factor in the so-called Somalia Affair because most of the soldiers who were deployed to the African country have left the military. But Mr. Létourneau told The Globe and Mail in a telephone interview on Wednesday it would be worthwhile to take a hard public look at the dangers posed by the drug, which is still being offered to Canadian Force members.
“Surely, run a survey of existing use of mefloquine within the Armed Forces and see whether the problems that were raised 20 years ago are still there,” Mr. Létourneau said.
“We ran out of time,” he said of the inquiry, which gathered evidence for two years before being cut off by the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien before the 1997 election. “There were so many issues to be covered, and this was one we had to leave aside in the hope that eventually medical progress would either sort out or solve these problems. But it hasn't been followed up, from what I can gather.”
Health Canada agreed in August, three years after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration came to the same conclusion, with an assessment that said mefloquine can cause permanent brain damage.