Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleague and his party will consider the arguments I made with respect to advance consent and its other application as well. It is important to reflect on that. I know they have been very clear on the issue of advance consent in this case, but it is important to consider in the other context that it can be asserted as well.
With respect to the Senate amendments, the existing language in Bill C-51, as proposed when it was sent to the Senate, was, “For the purpose of subsection (1), no consent is obtained if...(a.1), the complainant is unconscious; (b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph (a.1).”
This clearly sets out the conditions in which a person is unable to consent. The proposed amendment from the Senate says, “For greater certainty, capacity to consent at the time of the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge cannot be inferred from evidence on capacity to consent at the time of another sexual activity.”
The question is whether that addition adds anything, given the certainty already established under the new section 2. We agree with the principle. It is just a question of the practical legal application. My judgment at present is that the existing language in Bill C-51 is sufficient.