Mr. Speaker, for the second matter, I would like to address the question of privilege raised by the hon. member for Perth—Wellington on March 22 with respect to an alleged violation of Section 49.8 of the Parliament of Canada Act.
My hon. colleague, in his statement, argued that the collective privilege of the House had been breached since it includes the right to regulate its internal affairs. In his argument, my counterpart across the way argued that the resignation from caucus of the hon. member for Whitby seemed to have been forced, insinuating that the member did not resign as much as was kicked out of caucus.
First, I would like to argue that the basis for the hon. member's question of privilege is flawed. The hon. member for Perth—Wellington stated, “I truly believe the hon. member for Whitby was, or was threatened to be, kicked out of the Liberal caucus....”
On the exact day that the member for Perth—Wellington rose on this question, a tweet from the hon. member for Whitby was tabled by the hon. member for Spadina—Fort York in a reply to this question of privilege. It stated, “Everything in this ridiculous point of order is false and you have no right to speak on my behalf.” With this tweet, the hon. member for Whitby confirmed that her resignation from caucus was indeed voluntary and not forced, as alleged by the member across the aisle.
Second, on the question of the process by which the Liberal caucus takes decisions and its respect of the Parliament of Canada Act, I would like to point out the criteria necessary to raise a question of privilege.
House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, states on page 145 that:
The matter of privilege to be raised in the House must have recently occurred and must call for the immediate action of the House.
In his initial submission, the member for Perth—Wellington mentions that the members of the Liberal caucus have allegedly been deprived of their rights since the first caucus meeting following the 2015 election. The member goes as far as quoting an interview of the Canadian Press, dated November 2015, to try to support his claim. If the question at hand has been known since November 2015, I would argue that the requirement of timeliness in raising the matter has been greatly disregarded.
Furthermore, I would like to remind the hon. member opposite of your decision dated May 29, 2017. In this ruling on the adequacy of consultations with regard to the appointment of a Commissioner for Official Languages, you stated at page 11,558 of Debates:
The fact that, in this instance, the requirement for consultation is embedded in statute, rather than a rule of the House, does little to change the role of the Speaker in this respect. In fact, it adds an additional element in terms of the role of the Speaker: that of interpreting laws. On that front, there is a rich body of jurisprudence to confirm that the Speaker cannot adjudicate on the legality of matters, which, of course, would include whether or not specific provisions of a statute, such as the need for consultations, have been respected.
This statement echoes a ruling made on December 7, 1989, by Speaker Fraser on the subject of statutory requirements which stated:
While it may be a question for the courts to decide upon as to whether or not the law has been respected in this instance, it does not constitute a contempt of the House.
In summary, therefore, the issue raised is neither a question of privilege nor a contempt. It is rather a question of law, and consequently I cannot offer my opinion as to the merits of the case either as argued by the hon. member for Victoria or as rebutted by the Minister of Justice.
Consequently, for all the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully submit that this is a question of debate and, as such, does not constitute a prima facie question of privilege.