Mr. Speaker, thank you for this opportunity to participate in this historic debate. I want to start by congratulating the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the former leader of the official opposition, all of whom have made significant contributions to getting this agreement to the place it is now, and indeed all colleagues, particularly colleagues who were part of the Canada-U.S. parliamentary group led by the hon. member for Malpeque. Indeed, all of us were down to Congress many times in many senators' and congressmen's offices to extol the virtues of an agreement. It really was a team Canada approach, and I think all members should see themselves in this agreement as we debate it and ultimately, I hope, ratify it.
I want to take a slightly different approach to this agreement and talk about its security benefits. It is trite but true that countries that trade together do not very often go against each other in war or any other form of conflict. If I may, I would like to take these few moments to talk about the security element that is generated by virtue of this agreement and other agreements.
We in Canada are extremely fortunate. Possibly the public and even members in the House do not realize how fortunate we are to have a European trade agreement. We also have a Pacific trade agreement and we are about to have a North American trade agreement. That is 1.4 billion customers we have access to in those markets in 41 countries. I dare say there is no other country in the world that can claim such privileged access to such a large pool of customers.
Of course, it is up to us to take advantage of not only the North American agreement but the European and Pacific agreements as well. There are 1.4 billion customers, and we should look at these customers not only as trading partners but also as allies. That gives us, without going into the business of NATO or anywhere else, 41 new allies. Those allies provide us with a level of security that we have not enjoyed for a long time.
I contrast that with, say, Russia. Who can Russia say is an ally? Maybe Belarus, Kazakhstan, Syria, or Iran. These are maybe not the A-list of allies that one would want. Then there is China. Who can say who is actually China's ally? Possibly it is North Korea. It may not be the most reliable ally that China has ever had.
We can contrast that with these three agreements taken collectively, whereby in effect we put together not just 41 trading partners but 41 allies. That is all to our collective security. The collateral benefit of this trade agreement is clearly security. In fact, the two are mutually reinforcing, because security creates trade and trade creates security. These trading alliances are huge assets to Canada.
Some would argue that trade comes first and security follows, and they point to the Auto Pact, to the first free trade agreement, to NAFTA 1.0 and now the Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade deal. I would like to suggest that actually security came before trade. I will go back 80 years, and I know as soon as I say that, someone starts to nod off, because not a lot of people appreciate history. However, I direct members' attention to a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in Ogdensburg, New York, where the two leaders negotiated a security arrangement for North America known as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
From that agreement, the entire security architecture of Canada and North America was revamped. In 1941, we were in the middle of World War II. At the time the prime minister and the president were meeting with each other, the Battle of Britain was taking place, and at that point there was no assurance that Britain would emerge from the battle as the victor. In that context and at that time, there was enormous resistance by the American public, particularly led by the ambassador to Great Britain, Joe Kennedy, to engaging in any European conflict, let alone another war, yet President Roosevelt realized that North America was a vulnerable space. It was vulnerable on the Pacific side and it was vulnerable on the Atlantic side.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King was in a very delicate position because he realized that while we were going to continue to be allies of Great Britain and continue the fight, the shifting of empires was pretty obvious. We were going to be taking ourselves out from the security blanket of the British Empire and placing ourselves in the security blanket of the emergent American empire. That has been our security reality for the last 60 or 70 years.
Out of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, a number of real decisions were made which continue to this day. Gander airport, for instance, was developed as a military airport. It existed prior to the war, but it was really enhanced over the course of the war. That was a result of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The Alaska Highway was a result of the Americans' concern that the Japanese might come in through the west coast of Canada and separate Alaska from the continental United States.
There were quite a number of other institutions and military-to-military arrangements that were made, the most significant of which is NORAD. NORAD is clearly our most significant military treaty, and it was a direct result of the negotiations between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt. Hence, we created a security environment, and that security environment, in turn, led to the Auto Pact. That, in turn, led to the first free trade agreement with the United States. That, in turn, led to the first NAFTA. That, in turn, leads to where we are today, because nations that have good security also have good trade, and those that have good trade generally have good security.
Prime Minister Mulroney used to say that job one of any prime minister is to manage the U.S. relationship. There is great truth in that statement. I want to just recognize that in very difficult circumstances, our Prime Minister has managed this relationship as well as it can be managed; hence, we are here today with an agreement that many members of this House will be able to sign onto in good conscience.
The other consequence of this agreement was that we have preferred nation status with respect to military procurement. In military procurement, we are treated as a domestic supplier. Similarly, we treat the Americans as domestic suppliers. That has relevance to the peripheral debate about aluminum and steel in particular. That is what was so silly about the section 232 tariffs. We are effectively making each other's military security more expensive. That is the difficulty with tariffs.
I congratulate the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. However, in my judgment, the next most important treaty to be renegotiated is the NORAD treaty, because, as I say, good security makes for good trade and good trade makes for good security.