Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to have an opportunity this evening to share my thoughts on Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code regarding medical assistance in dying.
This bill has generated a lot of debate. It is good to talk about this because it is extremely important. It is important because too many sick people are suffering, knowing they will never get well.
I worked with such people for a long time, and I can say that knowing them, learning about their struggles, and helping them through their ordeal fosters a much better understanding. It goes without saying that medical assistance in dying is a matter of societal choices, choices that must be carefully considered from all angles.
I strongly believe that the government did its homework before introducing Bill C-7, which is the outcome of a series of round tables with experts and stakeholders, as well as a number of public consultations. We had to go through this process after the Quebec Superior Court's decision in Truchon and Gladu, which found that limiting medical assistance in dying to persons whose death was reasonably foreseeable was unconstitutional.
Ms. Gladu and the late Mr. Truchon both suffered from incurable degenerative diseases but were not eligible for medical assistance in dying because their deaths were neither imminent nor reasonably foreseeable.
The government's Bill C-7 proposes significant changes. It broadens the eligibility criteria to include people whose natural death is not reasonably foreseeable, as was the case for Mr. Truchon and Ms. Gladu. It also adjusts certain safeguards, allowing patients to waive final consent, for example. These are significant changes.
Let us first consider the reasonably foreseeable death criterion. A number of MPs are concerned about removing this criterion because they believe it would make it too easy to access medical assistance in dying. There is also some concern that people with disabilities or mental illness will not be properly protected. Life is precious and has so much to offer. I believe in that, and the government believes in it, too.
Under the provisions of this bill, mental illness is not considered to be an illness, disease or disability. The bill also expressly excludes people seeking medical assistance in dying solely because of mental illness. The government knows that the best treatment for mental illness is effective therapy, so greater emphasis needs to be placed on enhancing preventive measures and support resources.
What exactly is a reasonably foreseeable death, anyway? It is an assessment of the amount of time between a person's current state of health and their death. It is not something that can be measured with a blood test or a thermometer. It requires a clinical judgment based on an exhaustive medical evaluation of the patient. The fact remains that it is a difficult and sometimes imprecise exercise, and that is why the amendment is necessary.
Expanding patients' right to request medical assistance in dying does not necessarily mean it will be administered. Requesting medical assistance in dying does not automatically mean it will be administered. Even if the legislation is changed by removing a criterion, the spirit in which it will be applied does not change.
Requests will be evaluated based on the other criteria in the legislation and the new safeguards that I will get to shortly.
The government's priority is to strike a balance between the autonomy of eligible persons, the protection of vulnerable persons from being induced to end their life, and the important public health issue of suicide.
We care about compassion and dignity for both the patients and the process. In fact, that is why, in the first version of the legislation, the government included safeguards that would support decision-making, reflect the finality of the act, provide robust procedural guarantees to prevent errors and abuse, and protect vulnerable people.
Nevertheless, experience has exposed some gaps, and that is why we are proposing that two of these measures be amended.
The first change is to eliminate the 10-day waiting period between the date the request is signed and the date on which medical assistance in dying is provided, for individuals whose death is reasonably foreseeable. This 10-day waiting period needlessly prolongs suffering. Patients who are worried about losing their cognitive abilities and no longer being able to provide final consent live in fear. They may even refuse to take their medication and sometimes choose to request medical assistance in dying earlier.
The patient's stress also extends to their loved ones, making those last moments more painful than they need to be. Being able to choose when to die allows patients to go with their head held high, bolstered by the presence of their loved ones. These patients show noticeable relief when they realize that no matter what happens, they will get medical assistance in dying, as requested.
Although reasonable foreseeable natural death is no longer an eligibility criterion, it will be used to help determine which safeguards will be applied to requests for medical assistance in dying.
For people whose death is not reasonably foreseeable, a period of at least 90 days will ensure that there is informed consent. The sources of suffering causing the patient to request medical assistance in dying must be verified. Furthermore, it must be verified that the decision is being made without any outside pressure or influence.
The assessment of the person's overall medical condition is even more rigorous. We may be withdrawing the criterion of reasonably foreseeable death, but that does not mean greater access to medical assistance in dying. The bill continues to ensure that there is proper protection for the process, our medical practitioners and, above all, our patients.
Having recently discussed the bill with palliative care specialists, I can confirm that the 10-day waiting period often negatively influences a patient's decision and that removing this provision will make their last moments more peaceful.
The second safeguard I want to discuss today is the waiver of final consent.
Under the current legislation, immediately before providing medical assistance in dying, the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must ensure that the person gives express consent to receive medical assistance in dying and give the person an opportunity to withdraw their request. The government's amendment means that final consent can be waived if certain conditions are met, such as the loss of cognitive ability and the signature of a written agreement stating that medical assistance in dying will be administered on a specified date. This measure helps to ease patients' anxiety so they can take their medication, suffer less and set a later date.
It is important to note that this is not the same thing as an advance request, meaning a request for medical assistance in dying on an unspecified future date under particular circumstances. That type of request could be included in a notarized health care directive. Currently, a person can state in their health care directive whether they would want to undergo aggressive treatment and what that term means to them, but they cannot request medical assistance in dying in advance.
That is a more complex subject because, in such cases, a legal representative is being asked to make a decision on behalf of someone else. This issue will be examined by a parliamentary committee. The committee will also discuss other issues, such as medical assistance in dying for minors.
All these changes to the reasonably foreseeable death criterion and adjustments to the safeguards reflect the government's desire to keep doing better, to create a more dignified, freer and more progressive society. I therefore encourage all members to vote in favour of this bill.
I would like to conclude with a quote from the late Jean Truchon: “I ask you to try to understand me and not to judge me”.