Madam Speaker, I know that technology can always be a challenge, and we want to make sure that our interpreters are able to hear what we have to say so that it can be provided in both official languages.
Today I will be sharing my time with the member for Vaughan—Woodbridge.
I am very pleased to speak in support of Bill C-3, an act to amend the Judges Act and the Criminal Code. This is a critical piece of legislation that is necessary to ensure that judges understand the context in which offending occurs.
Bill C-3 would amend the Judges Act to require candidates seeking appointment to a provincial superior court to commit to participating in training related to sexual assault law and social context. Thanks to amendments made by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, candidates must also commit to participate in training on systemic racism and systemic discrimination. The bill would also require the Canadian Judicial Council to ensure that those knowledgeable in the field, potentially including sexual assault survivor organizations, are consulted in the development of this new training.
The bill would also assist in ensuring transparency in judicial decision-making by amending the Criminal Code's sexual assault provisions to include a requirement that judges provide reasons for their decisions, either in writing or in the record of the proceedings. This requirement complements existing legal requirements for reasons including specific obligations for judges to provide reasons in sexual history evidence and third-party records application hearings.
Allow me to explain why these amendments are so critical to a fair and effective response to sexual assault, which we know disproportionately impacts women and girls. Canada has come a long way in this regard. We have one of the most robust sexual assault legal frameworks in the world, but we must not forget the myths and stereotypes to which Canada's existing legal regime responds, nor the fact that those very same myths and stereotypes persist to this day. For example, pre-1983 sexual offending laws were repealed and replaced with “affirmative consent”, the model we have in place today.
The previous laws accepted as a fact, first, that a complainant who fails to resist is consenting and, second, that a complainant who consented to sexual activity with the accused before an alleged sexual assault likely also consented to any subsequent sexual activity. It is hard to believe that this was in place before 1983 until changes started to be made, like the changes that we are looking to make through this bill.
We now know that myths and stereotypes like these are false and distort the court's ability to seek the truth. We also know that these myths and stereotypes have a detrimental impact on victims, who are overwhelmingly women and girls, and that their impact is compounded when they intersect with other discriminatory stereotypes. In particular, they deter women and girls from coming forward to denounce their assailants, which means that those assailants cannot be held accountable.
Statutory rules of law and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence now clarify that myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims have no place in the courtroom, yet we continue to hear that such myths and stereotypes persist. Allow me to expand on examples I have just noted.
We have known for quite some time that a failure to resist is not the equivalent of consent. More than 20 years ago now, in its 1999 Ewanchuk decision, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that the accused's belief that “silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct constitutes consent is a mistake of law, and provides no defence”. That can be found at paragraph 51.
That rule is reflected in all of the Criminal Code's provisions that relate to consent, sections 273.1 and 273.2. Thanks to former Bill C-51's sexual assault amendments, which were enacted in 2018, this important principle has been further clarified. The provision that limits when an accused can raise the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent is now clearly limited to situations where there is some evidence that the complainant communicated consent affirmatively through words or conduct. That is found at paragraph 273.2(c).
More recently, in its 2019 Barton decision, the Supreme Court of Canada aptly renamed this defence as the “defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent”. I understand that many now refer to Canada's sexual assault framework as an “affirmative consent” model. This means that failing to resist is not relevant to the issue of whether the complainant consented or whether the accused believed the complainant consented. However, in 2014, the Alberta case of Wager, a trial court judge asked a sexual assault complainant why she did not squeeze her legs together if she did not want to engage in sexual activity she alleged was a sexual assault. This is unbelievable. It is unheard of that someone would make a comment like that and that we would hear it from a judge.
We have also known for quite some time that a complainant's prior sexual conduct is not relevant to the question of whether she consented to sexual activity that she alleges is a sexual assault. Originally enacted in 1983, the sexual history evidence provisions, sometimes called the “rape shield provisions”, were amended in 1992, almost 30 years ago, to ensure charter compliance. These provisions were upheld as constitutional in the Supreme Court of Canada's 2000 Darrach decision. They directly target two myths. The first of these is that a complainant who is sexually active is more likely to have consented to an alleged sexual assault. The second is that she is less worthy to be believed in respect of her claim that the sexual activity was non-consensual. These are sometimes called the “twin myths”.
The sexual history evidence provisions require an accused who wants to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct to bring an admissibility application to the court. The court then plays a gatekeeper function at the admissibility hearing to prevent the evidence from being admitted to infer one of the twin myths. Former Bill C-51 strengthened these provisions. Specifically, it clarified that communications for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature constitutes sexual history evidence, which is found in subsection 276(4).
In the Barton case, the trial court had to determine whether the sexual activity that caused the death of the victim, Ms. Gladue, was consensual. In this case, evidence of prior sexual activity with the accused was admitted without the judge holding a hearing on whether it was appropriate to admit this evidence as would usually happen. In addition, numerous statements about the complainant's status as a person who provides commercial sexual services were admitted, as were statements about her ethnicity. I want to be clear that both the Wager and the Barton trial court decisions were overturned on appeal because errors of law were made. It provides a measure of comfort to know that such errors are corrected on appeal. However, that fact may not offer much comfort to the victims in such cases, or in the case of Ms. Gladue, her loved ones. When the law is misapplied, appeals follow and perhaps even a new trial will be ordered. This can significantly lengthen the criminal justice process.
What can we do about this problem? How can we help our criminal justice system function fairly when addressing one of the most complex human interactions? We can support Bill C-3, which would assist in ensuring that judges have the education they need to understand sexual assault law, those most impacted by sexual offending and the social contexts in which sexual offending occurs.