House of Commons Hansard #38 of the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament's site.) The word of the day was medical.
The House proceeded to the consideration of Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), as reported (with amendments) from the committee.
Speaker's RulingCriminal CodeGovernment Orders
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès) Alexandra Mendes
There are three motions in amendment standing on the Notice Paper for the report stage of Bill C-7.
The Chair has received letters sent by the hon. member for Fundy Royal and the hon. member for St. Albert—Edmonton, arguing that Motions No. 2 and 3, though previously defeated in committee, should be selected at report stage as they are of such exceptional significance as to warrant further consideration, in accordance with the note to Standing Order 76.1(5).
Motion No. 2 seeks to maintain the provisions of paragraph 241.2(3)(g) of the Criminal Code to ensure that there are at least 10 clear days between the day on which the request was signed by or on behalf of the person and the day on which the medical assistance in dying is provided in cases where natural death has become reasonably foreseeable.
Motion No. 3 seeks to increase from 90 to 120 the minimum number of days required between the first assessment of a person who seeks medical assistance in dying and the day on which medical assistance in dying is provided, this in the circumstance where natural death is not reasonably foreseeable.
The Chair appreciates the argument put forward by the members as to why they consider these amendments dealing with procedural safeguards to be of such significance as to warrant further consideration at report stage. As with the original medical assistance in dying legislation four years ago, I recognize that this is an important issue with profound legal, moral and constitutional dimensions and that members have strongly held and varied points of view on these matters.
For these reasons, the Chair is prepared on this occasion to give members the benefit of the doubt and to select Motions 2 and 3, even though they were previously defeated in committee.
The remaining motion, Motion No. 1, was also examined and the Chair is satisfied that it meets the guidelines expressed in the note to Standing Order 76.1(5) regarding the selection of motions in amendment at report stage.
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Madam Chair, in light of the selection of the motions from my colleagues, I would like to withdraw my motion.
Speaker's RulingCriminal CodeGovernment Orders
The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès) Alexandra Mendes
Accordingly, Motion No. 1 will not be proceeded with.
Motions No. 2 and 3 will be grouped for debate and voted upon according to the voting pattern available at the table.
I will now put these motions to the House.
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
moved:
Motion No. 2
That Bill C-7, in Clause 1, be amended by deleting lines 25 to 31 on page 3.
Motion No. 3
That Bill C-7, in Clause 1, be amended by replacing line 8 on page 5 with the following:
“(i) ensure that there are at least 120 clear days between”.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak at report stage of Bill C-7 and, in particular, with respect to the two very modest amendments that we in the official opposition have put forward to the legislation, namely, to maintain a 10-day reflection period and to extend the reflection period of 90 days to 100 days where death is not reasonably foreseeable. Both of these amendments are supported by the evidence that was heard at the justice committee in what was otherwise a very rushed process. It need not have been this way and it should not have been this way.
One year ago, the Attorney General should have done what we on this side of the House called on the Attorney General to do, and that was to appeal the Truchon decision. That would have provided clarity in the law and it would have provided Parliament with time to appropriately respond legislatively if necessary, but the Attorney General did not do that. Instead, he rushed ahead with legislation purportedly aimed at responding to the Truchon decision, legislation, I might add, that was introduced with very little consultation.
The legislation went well beyond responding to the Truchon decision. The legislation fundamentally changes the medical assistance in dying regime that was passed in this Parliament a mere four and a half years ago and in so doing, the Attorney General and the government pre-empted a legislative review that was mandated by Bill C-14.
As a result, what we have is a rushed process to deal with a shoddy piece of legislation that recklessly puts vulnerable Canadians at risk. It is why virtually every disability rights organization in Canada opposes this bill. Indeed, 72 national disability rights organizations wrote to the Attorney General and pleaded with him to appeal the Truchon decision. Those pleas fell on deaf ears.
More than 1,000 physicians have penned a letter to the Attorney General opposing this bill. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities expressed concern about Canada's medical assistance in dying regime and questioned whether Canada in fact was living up to its international obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
I will quote Krista Carr, the executive vice-president of Inclusion Canada, an organization that represents the rights of persons with disabilities, who said this of Bill C-7, “Bill C-7 is our worst nightmare.”
Catherine Frazee, professor at Ryerson University, former chief commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and a leading advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities, said “our equality is, right now, on the line” with respect to Bill C-7. She noted that the careful balance between individual autonomy and equality carved out in Bill C-14 had been up-ended in Bill C-7.
Dr. Heidi Janz of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities said:
Bill C-7 would enshrine a legal form of ableism into Canadian law by making medical assistance in dying a legally sanctioned substitute for the provision of community-based supports to assist people with disabilities to live.
You must ensure that MAID does not weaponize systemic ableism in Canada.
In the face of those concerns right across the spectrum from physicians and experts to persons with disabilities and their advocates, we, on this side, thought it appropriate we proceed in a cautious and deliberate way, having regard for the complexity of the issue, the lack of consultation and the very short time frame before us to consider the radical changes brought forward by the government in Bill C-7.
Therefore, at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights we put forward reasonable amendments, including maintaining a 10-day reflection period, having regard for the fact that people do change their minds and having regard for the feedback that was provided.
We put forward an amendment to ensure there be two independent witnesses. When one executes a will, one needs two witnesses. One would expect that at the very least there would be a safeguard at least as robust as in the case of executing a will when we are talking about ending one's life, but no, the government removed that safeguard.
We put forward an amendment to extend the reflection period where death is not reasonably foreseeable from 90 days to 120 days, having regard for the fact it is often not even possible to access palliative care or other supports within 90 days. What good is a reflection period of 90 days if one does not have access to alternatives within such a time frame? That amendment was rejected by the government.
Consistent with what the Minister of Disability Inclusion said, and having regard for the horrific evidence we heard of Roger Foley, who was coerced into making a request for medical assistance in dying, which he recorded, this should always be patient-initiated so coercion is limited and to guard against that.
In closing, let me just say that what we have is a piece of legislation that does the opposite of what the Supreme Court called on Parliament to do in Carter, namely to provide for a carefully designed and monitored system of safeguards. This legislation eviscerates those safeguards, and on that basis, is unsupportable. It needs to be defeated out of hand.
Arif Virani LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Madam Speaker, I have a couple points of clarification. I thank the member opposite for his contributions.
The 90-day period that is entrenched in the legislation is an assessment period, not a reflection period. I believe the member misspoke. The notion that little consultation has been done on this bill is patently incorrect. We consulted 125 experts and 300,000 people submitted questionnaires.
The point has been made about the Truchon decision. What I would say, on this side of the House, is that the Truchon decision informed the response that is before Parliament right now. It talks about the autonomy of the individual.
What we know about the 10-day reflection period, part of the motion that is being debated right now, is that the 10-day reflection period for people who have made a considered decision only prolongs suffering. We know the evidence shows that people were depriving themselves of pain sedative medication just so they could hold on to provide that final consent.
Is prolonging that type of suffering what the member opposite wants to see in terms of the medical assistance in dying regime in Canada?
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Madam Speaker, with respect to the consultation period, the consultation that was undertaken by the government provided for an online survey that left out people who do not have access to the Internet, left out people with cognitive, mobility or other impairments, and left out people living in remote and northern communities. We heard evidence before the committee that the so-called consultations were an effort to arrive at a predetermined outcome. I would not stand in any way defending that shoddy process, which led to this shoddy piece of legislation.
With respect to the matter of the 10-day reflection period, I would note that Dr. Harvey Chochinov, who was chair of the expert panel on a legislative response to the Carter decision, noted that death wishes can be transient and, indeed, data before the Quebec court in Truchon indicated that 8% of persons who made a request for medical assistance in dying removed that request, underscoring the need for a reflection period.
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech.
He mentioned that he would have liked to see the government appeal Justice Baudouin's decision. Usually, when a decision is appealed, it is because an error of fact or law was made.
Can he tell me what errors of fact or law Justice Baudouin may have made in her decision?
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Madam Speaker, I would note that Madam Justice Baudouin, in rendering her decision and finding that the reasonably foreseeable criteria contravened section 7 and section 15 of the charter, based her analysis on only one objective of Bill C-14, namely to protect vulnerable persons from being induced in a moment of weakness to ending their lives.
The justice ignored other objectives of law, including the sanctity of life, dignity of the elderly and disabled, and suicide prevention. On that basis alone, the decision should have been appealed.
Elizabeth May Green Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC
Madam Speaker, I will disagree that this legislation is shoddy. I think this piece of legislation is well crafted. There were some amendments that my hon. colleague from Nanaimo—Ladysmith would have liked to see pass in committee, which I supported, which would have done more to reassure the disability community. One of the amendments did go through.
It is similar to what my friend from the Bloc just said. It does not strike me that making the case that this matter should have been appealed deals with the immediate need that the first version of this bill did not meet the Carter decision requirements. I said it at that time in the House that we did not do what needed to be done to meet the Carter decision from the Supreme Court of Canada.
Does my colleague think it would have made any difference to appeal Truchon, only to have it reconfirmed when it got to the Supreme Court of Canada?
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Madam Speaker, let me just say that I believe, at the very least, it would have provided time for Parliament to respond legislatively, something that we have not had sufficient time to do, and it would have better provided clarity of the law.
Arif Virani LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the discussion on Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code regarding medical assistance in dying.
I have the privilege of being a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. The committee heard from quite a few eminent witnesses during its examination of the bill. Their testimony before the committee gave rise to a number of reasoned amendments that were the subject of a lively debate among committee members.
I would like to take this opportunity to give members of the House an overview of the committee's work on Bill C-7 because I believe it could help inform upcoming discussions on this important legislative measure.
Before I do that, I want to emphasize to members of this place the looming court-imposed deadline to pass this legislation by December 18. It is important that we move expeditiously on this piece of legislation to ensure we do not prolong the suffering of Canadians or create an uneven law in respect of medical assistance in dying across the country.
The most important change put forward by Bill C-7 is its repeal of the reasonable foreseeability of natural death criterion in response to the decision in Truchon. The committee heard from several disability organizations and individuals living with disabilities who shared powerful testimony about autonomy, what it means to make a truly informed and voluntary choice, and the inherent dangers they perceive in shifting Canada's MAID regime away from an end-of-life one toward one that, in their words, made disability a justification to end life.
I want to discuss some of the amendments that were not adopted. This is an important piece of legislation and a very challenging issue, and we faced some difficult questions at committee. The majority of the members at committee ultimately felt confident that the current eligibility criteria in the MAID provisions adequately protect Canadians. There is a requirement that for people to be eligible for medical assistance in dying, their suffering must either be due to illness, disease or disability, or an advanced state of decline in capability. Suffering that would be solely due to factors like a lack of supports or the experience of inequality would not make a person eligible for MAID.
Of course, people can experience intolerable suffering for different reasons, and that brings me to the eligibility criteria that will apply in all cases and how they protect people.
Individuals are eligible for medical assistance in dying only if they make a voluntary request that is not coerced and give informed consent. We are confident that these criteria, combined with the judgment of practitioners who assesses eligibility for medical assistance in dying, will address those concerns.
The committee also studied the two-track system proposed in Bill C-7, paying special attention to the fact that reasonably foreseeable natural death will no longer be one of the eligibility criteria, but the factor that determines which set of safeguards applies in a given case.
The committee examined the possibility of defining this criterion as meaning a person would have 12 months or less to live. The phrase “reasonably foreseeable natural death” requires a connection to death that is temporal but remains flexible. To some members and witnesses, that flexibility sacrifices certainty, which can make the job of practitioners more difficult. This concern is what prompted the suggestion that we define it as requiring a prognosis of 12 months.
The majority of the committee members chose not to adopt that amendment, as we believe practitioners are able to continue to make determinations on the basis of the flexible criterion they have been using to date. That evaluation is determined on a case-by-case basis. The reasonably foreseeable natural death criterion does not have an arbitrary 12-month outer limit, so this proposed amendment would have narrowed its meaning.
The committee also discussed possible amendments to maintain the 10-day reflection period for people whose death is reasonably foreseeable, which is what we are talking about today, to reduce that period to seven days and to maintain the safeguard requiring two independent witnesses.
In the end, those amendments to Bill C-7 were not adopted. I think that is the right decision because I feel that changes to the existing safeguards are in line with feedback we got from practitioners across the country who participated in the January 2020 consultations. A number of the witnesses who appeared before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights reiterated that.
I do not think these changes will cause any harm or make the process any less safe for those whose death is reasonably foreseeable. We do believe that these changes will alleviate suffering.
The committee also discussed amendments that would have lengthened the assessment period when death is not reasonably foreseeable to 120 days, and transformed it into a reflection period. The majority of the committee members did not accept these amendments, as we feel they would have prolonged suffering for those whose deaths are not reasonably foreseeable, without necessarily improving the safety of the regime.
The 90-day period is meant to be an assessment period, not a reflection period. I have already mentioned that in the course of today's debate. During that assessment period, practitioners evaluate eligibility, canvass other options for relieving a person's suffering and discuss these options with the person in question. It is not intended to impose a minimum waiting period after a person is found to be eligible.
We believe that Bill C-7 strikes the right balance between safety and patient autonomy, particularly given that we are amending the Criminal Code, which sets out the minimum requirements for a practitioner to rely on exemptions to otherwise applicable criminal offences. A practitioner could always spend more time assessing a patient, if they believe it to be necessary in the given case, again, underscoring the individualized nature of the assessment.
The committee did adopt an amendment, which the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands just mentioned, which I think will improve the second track of safeguards for those whose deaths are not reasonably foreseeable.
As introduced, Bill C-7 required that one of the two assessors have expertise in the condition that is causing the person's suffering. The committee heard that this requirement could pose significant barriers to access since experts are rarely made assessors. While they may be willing to provide their expert advice in a case, they may not be willing to undertake the entirety of an assessment for a patient that they do not know and may feel their time is better spent delivering that expert care to others.
The amendment, moved by the NDP member for Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, would allow the assessors to consult an expert when neither of them has the relevant experience. We appreciate this evidence-based adjustment to the bill.
The committee also accepted an amendment proposed by the member for Nanaimo—Ladysmith. Here is the reference made by the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands. This amendment would require the Minister of Health, in carrying out her duties related to subsection 241.31(3), to consult, when appropriate, with the minister responsible for the status of persons with disabilities. These duties would include developing regulations in support of monitoring medical assistance in dying and establishing guidelines for the death certificate reporting of medically assisted deaths.
While I am confident that the current Minister of Health has been and would continue to do this in any event, I am very happy to see this enshrined in the legislative package to ensure that the voices of the disability community are heard in this process.
I want to thank my colleagues, including the members opposite, who participated in the justice committee for their thoughtful interventions and their thoughtful deliberations. I want to emphasize to my colleagues the importance of moving quickly on this legislation because of the court-imposed deadline by the Truchon decision.
I want to raise one point that has come up in the context of what was raised by the member for St. Albert—Edmonton. This was the idea that the proposed package actually perpetuates discrimination vis-à-vis persons with disabilities. The issue of disability discrimination was canvassed directly in the Truchon decision, and in that case the court said, and I will quote from paragraph 681:
...the challenged provision perhaps perpetuates another probably more pernicious stereotype: the inability to consent fully to medical assistance in dying. Yet the evidence amply establishes that Mr. Truchon is fully capable of exercising fundamental choices concerning his life and his death. As a consequence, he is deprived of the exercise of these choices essential to his dignity as a human being due to his personal characteristics that the challenged provision does not consider. He can neither commit suicide by a method of his own choosing nor legally request this assistance.
[682] Individuals in the same position as Mr. Truchon must be allowed to exercise full autonomy not only at the end of life, but also at any moment during their life, even if this means death, where the other eligibility conditions for medical assistance in dying are met.
[683] The Court thus concludes that s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code clearly infringes the applicants’ right to equality.
Equality is critical here. The point I am making is that discrimination against persons with disabilities cannot be tolerated and should never be countenanced. The point that was made in the court and the point we are making on this side of the House is that in order to entrench equality, to fulfill the promise of the charter in section 15, we must empower persons with disabilities to make the exact same choices, give consent and exercise the same autonomy over their bodies as persons who are not disabled. That is what the court drove at in the Truchon decision. That is what this bill reflects.
David Sweet Conservative Flamborough—Glanbrook, ON
Madam Speaker, in a debate this important, I think it is important that my hon. colleague, whom I have respect for and have worked with on human rights, would not stoop so low as to impugn the motives of my colleague in regard to the 10-day period for reflection. The notion that he would want someone to suffer more is reprehensible.
It is a different situation, but my daughter took her own life and left a note. She took her own life in the context of having, at one point of her life, an unbelievable amount of stress so that she made a bad decision one evening, alone. It is not temporary. It is absolute.
The point that we are arguing is that, once this decision is made, it cannot be reversed. The notion that we are trying to make people suffer, as I said, is reprehensible. The idea is to make sure that someone who is in a bad situation, who might the next day find more light and hope, would not make a bad decision and completely eliminate the breath of their own life.
Arif Virani Liberal Parkdale—High Park, ON
Madam Speaker, I thank the member for his contributions today and in this Parliament. I offer my sympathies to him for the loss within his family.
The point I was making earlier in this debate was simply to reflect what we heard during the consultations. The 10-day reflection period is entrenched in the old Bill C-14. When Canada was embarking on this for the first time in its history, it was deemed necessary to do the work of ensuring that consideration and time for reflection was available.
What we have found four years after the fact, after extensive consultations, is that the goal of that 10-day reflection period was not actually doing what it was intended to do. As an unintended consequence it was actually prolonging suffering.
The point underscoring this difference in views on either side of the House is that when people get to the stage of asking for medical assistance in dying, they have already reflected upon it. They have already considered it and have gotten to that point after very appropriate and measured determination.
Sébastien Lemire Bloc Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC
Madam Speaker, in an article yesterday, Joan Bryden of the Canadian Press reported that the Minister of Disability Inclusion believes that health practitioners should not be allowed to discuss the issue of medical assistance in dying until a patient asks about it, and that she is open to amending the legislation to make that clear. Some health care practitioners, however, disagree with that position, arguing that they have a duty to talk about all options available to patients. Have they ever thought about it? What are their thoughts on life and death? These are very simple questions.
The Canadian Nurses Association has urged the government to specifically clarify in the law that health practitioners can initiate discussions on medical assistance in dying with their patients. I would add that Jocelyn Downie, a professor of law and medicine at Dalhousie University in Halifax, said that informing patients about all options available to them is a fundamental principle of Canadian consent law. In her view, an amendment that prohibits raising the issue would be a cruel amendment and would fly in the face of well-established statutory and professional legal standards. She went on to say that it would also likely chill discussions of medical assistance in dying, as clinicians may fear liability.
I would like to know what the government really thinks about this matter.
Arif Virani Liberal Parkdale—High Park, ON
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the question from the member opposite. I want to point out two or three things.
First, there are quite a few protections for all doctors and nurses in the current legislation.
Second, they are quite free to discuss all options and the medical assistance in dying process before proceeding with that process. They are even encouraged to do so. That is exactly what is stated in the provisions concerning the second track, that is, in a situation where death is not reasonably foreseeable.
Third, in committee we discussed the position taken by the Canadian Nurses Association. It was noted that there is already a fairly wide range of protections for practitioners, whether nurses or doctors, against litigation or a complaint about their action, because they continue to have conscience rights, as well as the right to have an open discussion with their patients.
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
Madam Speaker, as the saying goes, never two without three.
I rise today in the House of Commons to speak once again to the issue of medical assistance in dying as it pertains to Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code. However, this time we have a deadline set by Justice Baudouin, namely December 18, 2020, so there is a sense of urgency now.
I am likely repeating myself today, but many people here have had unique experiences involving the end of a loved one's life. I am thinking in particular of one of my old friends, Stéphane, who died in palliative care at a very young age, in his twenties. He was supported by the excellent Maison Au Diapason. He was one of the youngest patients to die there and one of the first as well. This type of assistance is essential and useful.
As the Bloc Québécois critic for the status of women and seniors, I naturally took a special interest in this bill. In this speech, I will be reminding everyone of all the work that my party has done on this important issue, while emphasizing the great sensitivity of Quebeckers when it comes to medical assistance in dying. I will conclude with the position that certain seniors' and women's groups have taken on this issue and the recommendations they made that are extremely useful, but that are already several years old. They too are starting to get impatient.
First, let's talk about the reason for this debate. In September 2019, the Superior Court of Quebec ruled in favour of Nicole Gladu and Jean Truchon, both of whom had incurable degenerative diseases. The court stated that one of the eligibility criteria for medical assistance in dying was too restrictive, both in the federal legislation covering MAID and in Quebec's Act respecting end-of-life care.
These two brave individuals, with whom I have mutual acquaintances, simply asked to be able to die with dignity, without needlessly prolonging their suffering. Mr. Truchon, who had cerebral palsy, had lost the use of all four limbs and had difficulty speaking. Ms. Gladu, who has post-polio syndrome, is not able to control her pain with medication and cannot stay in the same position for too long because of the constant pain. She has said that she loves life too much to settle for mere existence. That is what she said.
What we are talking about here is the criterion of a reasonably foreseeable death. Justice Christine Baudouin said it well in her ruling:
The Court has no hesitation in concluding that the reasonably foreseeable natural death requirement infringes Mr. Truchon and Ms. Gladu's rights to liberty and security, protected by section 7 of the Charter.
That is the crux of our debate. These advocates had been denied medical assistance in dying because their death was not reasonably foreseeable, even though they had legitimately demonstrated their desire to stop suffering. Jean Truchon had chosen to die in June 2020, but he moved up the date because of the pandemic. Nicole Gladu is still living, and I commend her for her courage and determination.
The Bloc Québécois's position on this ethical issue is very clear, and I want to thank the member for Montcalm for his excellent work. I will not be as technical as him, but he showed us that we are capable of working together, and I thank him for all of the improvements that he made to this bill.
As many members have already pointed out, legislators did not do their job properly with the former Bill C-14. As a result, issues of a social and political nature are being brought before the courts. We need to make sure that people who have irreversible illnesses are not forced to go to court to access MAID. Do we really want to inflict more suffering on people who are already suffering greatly by forcing them to go to court for the right to make the very personal decision about their end of life? This will inevitably happen if we cannot figure out a way to cover cognitive degenerative diseases.
Obviously, we agree that we need to proceed with caution before including mental health issues, but that is not the issue today, since MAID in mental health-related cases was excluded from the bill. Once again, this matter was brought before the Standing Committee on Health via a motion moved by my colleague from Montcalm.
Second, I want to talk about how important Quebec is in this context. Quebec enacted the country's first legislation on this subject. Wanda Morris, a member of a B.C. group that advocates for the right to die with dignity, talked about how a committee that got the unanimous support of all parties in the National Assembly was a model for the rest of Canada. She said it was reassuring to see how it was working in Quebec and that people were happy to have the option to die with dignity.
However, it is important to know that this bill was first introduced by Véronique Hivon and that it was the fruit of many years of research and consultations with individuals, doctors, ethicists and patients. Whereas 79% of Quebeckers are in favour of medical assistance in dying, only 68% of people in the rest of Canada are. Those numbers are worth knowing and mentioning.
In 2015, when all parties in Quebec's National Assembly unanimously welcomed the Supreme Court's ruling on medical assistance in dying, Véronique Hivon had this to say:
Today is truly a great day for people who are ill, for people who are at the end of their lives...for Quebec and for all Quebeckers who participated in this democratic debate...that the National Assembly had the courage to initiate in 2009.
I believe that, collectively, Quebec has really paved the way, and and we have done so in the best possible way, in a non-partisan, totally democratic way.
For the third part of my speech, I would like to tell you about a meeting I had with the Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale in my role as the Bloc Québécois critic for status of women, gender equality and seniors. At this meeting, these brave women shared with me their concerns about this issue.
I will quote the AFEAS 2018-19 issue guide:
Is medical assistance in dying a quality of life issue? For those individuals who can no longer endure life and who meet the many criteria for obtaining this assistance, the opportunity to express their last wishes is undoubtedly welcome. This glimmer of autonomy can be reassuring and make it possible to face death more calmly. ... As the process for obtaining medical assistance in dying is very restrictive, those who use it probably do so for a very simple reason: they have lost all hope. ... This process cannot be accessed by individuals who are not at the end of life. ... People with degenerative diseases, who are suffering physically and mentally, do not have access to medical assistance in dying.
A brief submitted in 2010, or 10 years ago, to the Select Committee on Dying with Dignity, explained that the last moments are not always difficult because there are standards to guide medical practice and medical advances help relieve pain. However, despite everyone's goodwill, some people do have unfortunate experiences. Consequently, to prevent prolonged agony from depriving some people of their dignity and control over their lives, there are those calling for as a last resort the right to die with dignity, or the right to die at a time of one's choosing with assistance in this last stage.
Another brief pointed out that there have been four separate attempts to introduce similar legislation, specifically in 1994, 2005, 2008 and 2009, but these bills have never gone further than first reading. This needs to pass.
I will now read the conclusion from the AFEAS brief, as it is really powerful:
Over the next few months, AFEAS members will continue to reflect on the framework in which individuals losing their autonomy or suffering from an incurable, disabling illness, or experiencing acute physical or mental pain without any prospect of relief will be able to clearly and unequivocally express their desire to stop fighting to live and seek assistance to die.
Establishing the framework in which these decisions are made will be critical to ensuring that abuse cannot occur. The guidelines must be clear and precise so that all individuals can freely express their own choices, without any constraints and with full knowledge of all available options. It will be essential that all end-of-life services, including palliative care, be available and effective throughout Quebec so that patients have a real choice and do not feel forced to accept a “default” option because of a lack of adequate services or undue pressure from others.
I will also close now, in the hope that all of these comments and the lived experiences of the people in Quebec who made the request and wanted to die with dignity will afford Bill C-7 the same unanimous support from all members of the House of Commons so that we may all freely choose when we die. Let's take action.
Arif Virani LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Madam Speaker, I really appreciated the comments and speech from the hon. member on the other side.
On a number of occasions, here in the House today and in the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, it has been suggested that we are wrong not to appeal the Truchon decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
On this side of the House, we believe that Justice Baudouin's ruling in Truchon and Gladu was well documented, well expressed and well supported by the evidence.
What does the member think about the possibility of appealing this decision to the Supreme Court? Would that risk prolonging the pain and suffering of Canadians?
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his comments.
I remind members that we have a deadline: December 18, 2020. This is our deadline to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, after the original deadline was extended because of the COVID-19 crisis.
However, I think we are ready to make a decision. Everyone in the House can move this forward and pass the bill.
Gabriel Ste-Marie Bloc Joliette, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Shefford for her excellent speech.
She mentioned my colleague from Joliette, Véronique Hivon, who did outstanding work in the Quebec National Assembly. She did politics differently. She talked to every party and said that they all needed to put partisanship aside, because this matter was too important.
Does my colleague from Shefford believe that the same kind of work has been done here, in the House?
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague from Joliette for the question.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. I recently had some conversations with Mrs. Hivon and she looks forward to seeing this file come to a close. She brought this legislation to Quebec City with a lot of heart and passion.
I do not want to pass judgment, but it is too bad that here in the House certain religious beliefs have coloured the debate on medical assistance in dying and delayed passage of the bill. There was not the same unanimity in the House of Commons as there was in the National Assembly.
It is a shame because this file should go beyond our political persuasions. This issue should be rooted in science and based on the advice of ethicists, doctors and experts. I think everyone has the right to choose freely how they will die, and that goes beyond beliefs. People who do not want to use medical assistance in dying can make that choice, and the bill allows for that.
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Shefford for bringing the individual situations of the plaintiffs in the Truchon case before the House again and for recognizing their bravery.
My question has to do with the unfortunate line I have heard in public, and even from some members of the official opposition, that somehow we have no obligation in Parliament to meet the deadline imposed by the decision of Madam Justice Beaudoin in the Truchon case. Not meeting that deadline would have serious consequences in Quebec.
I would like to hear the hon. member's comments on the question of the importance of meeting the court deadline.
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.
Indeed, the Superior Court of Quebec ordered federal and provincial legislation to be changed. That was supposed to be done before March 11, 2020. An extended deadline was granted by Justice Christine Baudouin and the deadline was pushed to December 18. I think there will be problems if we do not meet the December 18 deadline. That is why we must all move forward together and meet this deadline to avoid the problems that will come up if we do not comply with Justice Baudouin's order.
Elizabeth May Green Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC
Madam Speaker, I thank my Bloc Québécois colleague for her very interesting and very important speech.
The details she shared about Jean Truchon's case enabled us to understand the situation and the plans that have to be made in such a case. As my friend from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke said, we really have to understand the importance and wisdom of Justice Baudouin's decision.
I just want to emphasize how important this bill is for reducing suffering across Canada. This bill will finally—
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The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès) Alexandra Mendes
Unfortunately, I have to ask the member for Shefford to keep her comment very brief.