Mr. Speaker, this is the last stage of debate before Bill C-7 is passed.
I would like to remind members of the first thing I said when we began the clause-by-clause study of the bill. I said that we must not forget that while we are debating, people are suffering and are waiting for the results of our efforts. Today, I would say that they want to know whether we will take care of them and listen to their voices, or whether they will once again have to bear the burden of going before the courts to have their final wishes heard.
I also said that I was certain, from the start of the debate on Bill C-7, that all parliamentarians in the House were caring and compassionate, but that we are could not be caring and compassionate if we infringed on the autonomy of a person who is dying or suffering and has reached their breaking point.
I have to say that I am disappointed by the Conservatives' attitude. It is one thing to want to make a point, but it is another to engage in what amounts to filibustering. However, what bothers me even more is that they seem to be claiming that they know better than the person who is dying what is best for them. I cannot make such a claim. I prefer to give the person the choice, and my role as a legislator is to preserve that choice.
Unfortunately, the Conservatives are practising government-imposed moral paternalism, which is odd because they are economic libertarians. That means they want less government intervention in the economy, yet they also want full government intervention in a matter as intimate as our own death.
The Conservatives are practising government paternalism, but they are not alone, because we have heard some practitioners say and demonstrate that in 2020, they still apply a medical paternalism that I would describe as appalling. Why on earth are these omniscient practitioners doing that? How are they better equipped than a person who is dying or a suffering patient who has reached their threshold of tolerance to know what is best for them? Only God knows, but they do not mention that.
Those few medical practitioners continue to frustrate us to this day because they practise in Quebec. Five years after Quebec's Act Respecting End-of-Life Care was passed, they consider palliative care and medical assistance in dying to be mutually exclusive, when they are and should be complementary, since medical assistance in dying is part of the care continuum under Quebec's end-of-life care legislation. However, that is still not enough. They believe that the patient must change their mind if they request medical assistance in dying, and they say they manage to make them change their minds. They have no qualms about saying that they would not want to refer the request for medical assistance in dying to a doctor who can perform the procedure, even though that is enshrined in Quebec law. They say they are obviously doing it for the good of the patient, even though they refuse to listen to the patient and heed their wishes.
That is the testimony that provides the basis for the Conservatives' filibustering. They claim to know better than the dying patient what is best for them. That is not caring. That is a violation of the principle of self-determination.
I will let the 88% of Quebeckers who support the freedom to choose medical assistance in dying judge the Conservative Party's position and attitude. However, what I heard in committee worries me, because five years after Quebec adopted its end-of-life care legislation, some institutions can and do circumvent the law, as was the case before the Morgentaler decision, to hinder someone from receiving medical assistance in dying. I was shocked to hear that.
If a patient is no longer receiving aggressive treatment and has finally been given the right to die, which is known as palliative care, I hope that this patient will not be subjected to aggressive palliative care.
Dying with dignity implies respect for human dignity. It is not an intellectual conceit; it is intrinsic. Treating people as ends in themselves and not as mere means involves respecting a person's capacity for self-determination, free will and freedom to choose. A person must never be subjected to an analysis or an ideology, religious or otherwise. A person is the master of their own destiny.
Furthermore, self-determination is enshrined in law. No one can undermine our intellectual or bodily integrity or our self-determination without our free and informed consent, even in an emergency.
That means that when a sick patient is at their most vulnerable, when they are suffering and dying and have reached the point where they can bear no more, the person at their bedside must not impose their own ideology on that person, be it religious or otherwise.
That is why they say in clinical ethics that the patient comes first. The patient's wishes, which are based on how much they are suffering, need to be heard. Palliative care providers should not see medical assistance in dying as a failure. If a palliative care patient, who is irreversibly committed to dying, wakes up one morning completely at peace and ready to let go, then the palliative care provider should not see that patient's request for medical assistance in dying as a failure.
I have said it before and I will say it again: I hope that, when they are on the threshold of death, all my parliamentary colleagues will be able to feel that peace and let go with a clear conscience. That is the best we can hope for for any human being.
Bill C-7 responds to the Gladu-Truchon ruling. The courts determined the appropriate response by examining the limits of the government's power to intervene in end-of-life decisions in Carter and Gladu-Truchon. The courts told us that the provisions of the Criminal Code infringed on the right to life, liberty and security of the person.
They infringe on the right to life—that says a lot—because they cause people who are suffering to shorten their lives through suicide, which is decriminalized in Canada, rather than waiting for the moment when their threshold of tolerance of tolerance is reached. This is significant.
During the committee deliberations, I heard people say that 90 days is not long enough. In saying that, they were assuming that someone who has a degenerative disease of any sort might wake up one morning and suddenly decide they want medical assistance in dying, without having ever discussed it with their doctor or health care professionals throughout their care process. It is as though they thought this all came out of a Cracker Jack box one morning and the person was wondering whether they could access medical assistance in dying that very moment or whether 90 days was enough time to be sure of that decision. That is not how it happens in real life.
The right to life is not something to be cast aside lightly. People want to live as long as possible. People want to live, and when they receive a diagnosis and are in a suicidal state, they can be treated to reverse that state. When someone finds out that they have cancer they are not going to tell their doctor that they want medical assistance in dying. They are going to ask what can be done to help and when their treatment will begin. Sometimes it takes 15 or 20 years, and other times the cancer is more aggressive, but there comes a point when the doctor announces that all treatments have been exhausted and it is time to begin the palliative stage. In any case, this does not happen overnight.
If someone who receives such a diagnosis tells their doctor they want medical assistance in dying, the doctor will prescribe anti-depressants and tell the patient that they will take care of them. They will tell the patient to get their affairs in order and talk to the family. They are not going to provide medical assistance in dying. That is not how it works. Sometimes in committee I would hear people describe catastrophic scenarios out of some sort of house of horrors, as if that were how things happened.
Bill C-7 is based on principles the Bloc Québécois believes in. Who can dispute the fact that death is the most intimate moment in a human being's life? Neither the state nor my neighbour will die in my place. The decision can only be made by the person requesting it, not by the family or anyone else.
The criteria must of course be met. We in the Bloc Québécois have confidence in our health workers. We have confidence in our health professionals. There is something that I find rather perplexing. Just this Tuesday, the Conservatives supported our motion that commended the work, dedication, care and concern of health workers and health professionals. However, when it comes to the most intimate decision a human being can make, to decide one's own death and not to suffer, and when it comes to respecting a person's right to self-determination, the Conservatives no longer have confidence in them. They believe that there are people who may have bad intentions.
If there are people who are not well-intentioned or caring in the health system, let us show them the door right away. I would also say that if there are any health professionals who claim to know better than the patient who is at the end of the process and who has made the choice that is right for them, it is time they reflected or took a course on respect for human dignity.
Throughout this debate, I have gotten the sense that some people are against freedom of choice. When people support freedom of choice, that does not mean they want to get rid of palliative care and go around signing all kinds of people up for MAID. What we are saying is that an individual who wants to die at the end of the process should be able to do so. MAID should apply to people whose suffering is intolerable and cannot be alleviated.
Yes, Bill C-7 leaves a number of things unresolved. There are two main elements here. One major improvement is that Bill C-7 tossed out the reasonably foreseeable natural death criterion, which is not a medically valid criterion. That is understandable. However, it was retained for use in defining two safeguards. I would have liked to see a more specific definition of “reasonably foreseeable death”.
For terminally ill people, there is a safeguard of up to 10 days, and a second consent may not be necessary. In cases like Ms. Gladu's, Mr. Truchon's and Ms. Carter's, where death is not reasonably foreseeable, it is supposed to be 90 days. I would have liked some clarification on this criterion because doctors need things to be clear and specific. I do not know why this criterion was brought back. There is always room for improvement.
The bill removes the need for second consent to put an end to people's suffering when palliative care no longer eases their pain, when death is irreversible and the process has already begun. That seems like a good thing to me.
Bill C-7 obviously excludes mental illness as an eligible reason when it is the sole underlying medical condition. It also does not cover all of the issues associated with advance requests, particularly in the case of neurodegenerative diseases, or the issue of mature minors.
Under Bill C-14, a parliamentary committee was to examine those provisions and the matter of palliative care last summer. Today, the Bloc Québécois is calling for that review to begin as soon as possible, not in in five years or even one year, because there are people who are suffering. What is more, this time, we must not make them bear the burden of having to go to court to be heard. Who is more vulnerable than a person who is enduring unbearable pain, who has reached or is about to reach the limit of what they can endure and who has to decide to go before the courts to make their voice heard?
It is time for us as legislators to take up the torch, show some leadership and do our job. The courts can issue orders for us to do something, but obviously when they do there is a fixed timeline. Right now, we have a deadline to meet, December 18. I really hope that we can pass this bill and begin the review process so that we can deal with the sensitive issues that are not addressed by Bill C-7.