I am ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on September 25 by the member for Louis-Saint-Laurent requesting that a question of privilege found to be prima facie in the previous session be considered once again in the current session. At the time, the matter involved the premature disclosure of the content of Bill C-7, an act to amend the Criminal Code with regard to medical assistance in dying, while it was on notice awaiting introduction and first reading.
In this intervention, the member reminded the House that the question was raised earlier this year, on February 25, and was referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on March 10, when the Speaker gave leave to move the appropriate motion. I want to thank the member for the clarity of his remarks and for the precedents he cited to bolster his case. Both helped me to understand the issues in play. The parliamentary secretary to the government House leader also intervened, focusing his remarks on the timelines for raising the questions of privilege.
As members are well aware, when questions of privilege are raised, the role of the Chair is to determine if the claim relates to the breach of privilege or a contempt that deserves priority of consideration over all other business before the House. It is not the responsibility of the Chair to decide whether there is an actual offence or its seriousness. Such a matter is determined by the House itself. This is one of the two criteria that the Speaker has to consider in assessing an alleged breach of privilege. The second criterion is whether the matter was raised at the earliest opportunity. In considering the revival of a question of privilege in this new session, the Chair is bound by the same criteria and has to take into account current circumstances.
In reviewing the precedents raised by the member, the character of the complaint in each case is important in determining if and to what extent it is relevant to the case at hand. For example, in his ruling of February 6, 2004, Speaker Milliken was considering the extent of privilege afforded to a member when called before the courts as a witness, more specifically the immunity from testifying in court during a parliamentary session. The other case related to the evident gap in the law and the practices of the House relating to members found to be in contravention of the Canada Elections Act. Both cases had far reaching implications that were not bound by the limits of the session.
The circumstances involved in the issue before the House are now substantially different. Bill C-7 is no longer before the House, nor is the infraction of its premature disclosure. Eight months have elapsed and as a result of prorogation, all proceedings including any outstanding legislation as well as any order of reference have been terminated.
With regard to the notice requirement, the Chair has observed that the issue was not raised at the earliest opportunity. While we might understand why there would be reluctance to raise a question of privilege on the opening day of a new Parliament or session, notices should be submitted early. This seems particularly pertinent in a case that seeks to revive a question of privilege from the previous session.
Given these circumstances, the Chair does not find that the matter should take precedence over all other business of the House. Grounds are not sufficiently compelling in this case. I therefore rule that the question of privilege has not been made out.