With regard to the Boeing 737 MAX 8: (a) during communication with the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) on or after October 29, 2018, including in the emergency Airworthiness Directive issued by the FAA, what information was received by Transport Canada, including (i) the findings of any FAA risk analysis into the airworthiness of the 737 MAX 8 and likelihood of fatal crashes during its service, (ii) any information concerning the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software and its role in the crash of Lion Air flight 610, (iii) any information about the risks of an angle-of-attack sensor failure, (iv) data indicating the cause of the crash of Lion Air flight 610, including black box recordings, (v) any explanation of the cause of the crash of Lion Air flight 610, including any description of the runaway stabilizer trim; (b) was this information communicated to the Minister of Transport or the Director General of Civil Administration, and, if so, when; (c) were any concerns with the absence of information regarding the crash of Lion Air flight 610 conveyed to the FAA, and, if so, what was the substance of these concerns; (d) did Transport Canada consider any order grounding the 737 MAX 8 between October 29, 2018, and March 10, 2019, and, if so, why was this option rejected; (e) at any time before March 10, 2019, did Transport Canada receive any concerns about the 737 MAX 8 from airlines or pilot associations and, if so, what were these concerns and who issued them; (f) after October 29, 2018, did Transport Canada consider undertaking its own risk analysis of the 737 MAX 8, and, if so, why was this option rejected; and (g) prior to March 10, 2019, did Transport Canada communicate the causes of the Lion Air crash, including an explanation of the runaway stabilizer trim, with any airlines or pilot associations?
In the House of Commons on January 25th, 2021. See this statement in context.