Mr. Speaker, I am rising to respond to the question of privilege raised by my hon. colleague across the aisle, with respect to the order made by the House in the previous Parliament for a public release of documents from the Public Health Agency of Canada relating to the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg.
I will put aside the question of the appropriateness or the ability of an order made in one Parliament to bind a future Parliament. Rather, I will stick to the substance of the matter raised in the previous Parliament, and our government's desire to work collaboratively with opposition parties to find an appropriate mechanism to deal with the request for documents that contain information subject to national security confidentiality.
As we all know, in the 43rd Parliament all opposition parties pressed the government to publicly release documents that contained information subject to national security that would have been injurious to Canada's reputation with its international security partners. In the previous Parliament, members should know that the Public Health Agency worked diligently to try to comply with the order of the House. In undertaking this work, the agency attempted to balance the right of parliamentarians to have access to information and the duty of the government to protect such information from public disclosure.
Accordingly, the former minister of health referred the matter to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, given the committee members' expertise on matters of national security.
The committee, made up of both House and Senate members, has a broad mandate and can review any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence.
The government continues to believe that this is an appropriate mechanism for parliamentary review of documents, and the best way to ensure the protection of information subject to national security confidentiality.
Unfortunately, the opposition parties did not find this to be an acceptable approach.
If the matter is revived again in this new Parliament by way of a substantive motion, our government believes that with the co-operation of the other members a solution to this impasse can be found.
This spirit brings to mind Speaker Milliken's ruling of April 27, 2010, respecting the right to institute inquiries and to order the production of documents. I will quote from Speaker Milliken's ruling:
Certainly from the submissions I have heard, it is evident to the Chair that all members take seriously the sensitive nature of these documents and the need to protect the confidential information they contain. The Chair must conclude that it is within the powers of the House of Commons to ask for the documents sought in the December 10 order it adopted. Now it seems to me that the issue before us is this: Is it possible to put in place a mechanism by which these documents could be made available to the House without compromising the security and confidentiality of the information they contain? In other words, is it possible for the two sides, working together in the best interests of the Canadians they serve, to devise a means where both their concerns are met? Surely that is not too much to hope for.
Building on the approach taken by the House in 2010, our government believes there is good reason for hope of a resolution. I would like to walk members through a proposed vetting mechanism that would allow certain parliamentarians to see unredacted versions of the documents while ensuring the ongoing protection of sensitive information.
The proposed mechanism is based on the ad hoc committee of parliamentarians and the panel of arbiters used in 2010 for records related to the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Armed Forces to the Afghan authorities.
The proposed model balances two key principles: first, accountability to Parliament by maximizing disclosure and transparency to the greatest extent that is possible; and second, the protection of sensitive and confidential information from disclosure where it would be injurious to our nation. It reflects the government's understanding of the House of Commons' role in holding the government to account and its need for complete and accurate information in order to fulfill this role.
At the same time, it reflects the House of Commons' understanding of the government's responsibilities in matters of national security, national defence and international relations. It further reflects that information subject to solicitor-client privilege or cabinet confidences are classes of information that Parliament has long recognized are sensitive and may require protection from disclosure.
I would now like to walk members through the proposal detailing the composition of the committees, the panel of arbiters, appropriate security measures to safeguard the information and the methods for screening records.
Let me begin with the proposed composition of the committee and the panel of arbiters. The government and opposition parties would sign a memorandum of understanding to create the committee and select a panel of arbiters. The committee would be comprised of one member from each of the signatory parties and one alternate member from each party. The panel of arbiters could be comprised of three former senior judges who were agreed upon by the signatories.
Second, let me address the security measures to safeguard information. Members of the ad hoc committee would conduct their business within a secure government facility and be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard sensitive and confidential information. This includes procedural, physical and technical security measures and the requirement that members of the committee would undergo the same security screening as members of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians in order to obtain the appropriate security clearance. The work of the ad hoc committee and the panel of arbiters would be supported by security-cleared, non-partisan public servants.
MPs on the committee would be provided with both the redacted and non-redacted versions of the documents provided by the government. Where there is a disagreement concerning what information should be released publicly, the committee would refer the disputed information to the panel of arbiters. The panel of arbiters, agreed upon by all parties, would make a binding determination regarding how that information could be made available to members of Parliament and the public without compromising national security, national defence or international relations. This could occur by redaction, the writing of summaries, or the full or partial release of the material.
Finally, let me touch upon methods for the screening of records. The proposed model has a method for screening records containing information, the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations, otherwise collectively known as national security confidentialities.
Madam Speaker, as you can see, our government has taken seriously the need to provide a reasonable oversight mechanism for the review of documents containing confidential national security information, as stipulated in Speaker Milliken's April 2010 ruling.
Members will note the similarity to the approach taken in 2010, which was deemed by a majority of the recognized parties at the time to be both reasonable and an effective balance between the interests of parliamentarians in obtaining the information they need and ensuring that confidential national security information is treated with the discretion necessary to protect the interests of Canadians and our great country.
I was a critic at that time in 2010. I can say the system worked with great effectiveness at achieving that balance.
I look forward to fruitful deliberations with my colleagues on the opposition benches and, as Speaker Milliken stated, I believe that collaboration among all parties is truly not too much to hope for. I thank members of the House for their attention to this important matter and for their indulgence in responding to this question of privilege.
In closing, we believe this proposal constitutes a good-faith effort by the government to resolve this matter responsibly. It recognizes the role of the House of Commons to do its work, and it also respects the government's obligation to protect Canadians from the harm that could occur with the release of sensitive national security information. In the end, it is a responsibility that we each bear as a member of Parliament. We must do our jobs in this place, and we must fulfill our duties in a responsible manner to uphold the principles of national security designated to us to protect this great country.
