Madam Speaker, the member indicated that the message being sent is that persons who are mentally ill are not needed, valued or worthy.
What I would reiterate for her is that this issue about persons with disabilities and their competence and autonomy was squarely before the court in Truchon. What the court squarely found in paragraph 681 of the decision is that there is a “pernicious stereotype” about persons with disabilities, and that is “the inability to consent fully to medical assistance in dying.” The decision goes on to say:
Yet the evidence amply establishes that Mr. Truchon is fully capable of exercising fundamental choices concerning his life and his death. As a consequence, he is deprived of the exercise of these choices essential to his dignity as a human being due to his personal characteristics that the challenged provision does not consider.
As such, he must be provided access.
The issue is clearly about providing value and dignity and worth to persons—all persons, including persons with disabilities—and ensuring that they have the competence and autonomy to make decisions, including very serious decisions, after careful consideration, about the timing of their passing.
I wonder if the member for Yorkton—Melville would like to comment on that aspect of the Truchon case.