Debates of March 9th, 2021

Canada—United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement Implementation Act

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, when it comes to protecting supply management, Conservative governments and the NDP have stood up for it and the Liberals are standing up for it now. It is very important that certain sectors in Canada are protected.

When the CETA was being negotiated, it was a hard and fast bottom line for the Conservative government that we would not compromise on supply management. We were very aware of the dairy sector, which of course is alive and well in my province of B.C., as it is in Quebec and other provinces. We will always stand up for that and will always fight for it and protect it. Given what they do on the other side, we need strong negotiation at the table.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am concerned about the fact that under CETA, imports from the EU have increased while the trade deficit has increased for Canadian exports. This has obviously hurt a lot of businesses, so the fact that we are ultimately adopting the same agreement causes problems. What does the member have to say about that?

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, in my speech I addressed the fact that this is a placeholder agreement. It should have been negotiated specifically for the new entity, which is the United Kingdom, separate from the EU. We have a certain amount of time to negotiate, but there is no sunset clause. Again, it has to be a priority and a continuing objective to negotiate an agreement that is specific.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Madam Speaker, I will begin my speech, as I do with so many of my speeches, with an anecdote. I am privileged to have the opportunity to be here in the House to represent the good people of Calgary Midnapore and be their voice, and I am going to tell one of my favourite stories.

Several years ago, when I was a younger and fitter woman, I won the gold award from the Duke of Edinburgh. I was very excited to achieve and receive this award. I know that many young Canadians from coast to coast to coast strive for this award and the many different levels that can be achieved. I was very motivated by this gold award. It had numerous components. It had fitness, outdoors and community-service components. I undertook going after this award with great vigour and went on to achieve it, and it was presented to me by Prince Philip. It was wonderful to have the opportunity to meet him. I wish him and his family well at this time. That was one of my major introductions to the United Kingdom and all that it has to offer.

Of course, my interest in foreign affairs and diplomacy would continue, and in the early 2000s, when I wrote the foreign service exam and fortunately was accepted, I went on temporary duty to Argentina. I then went on to be the chargé d'affaires to El Salvador, which was a very proud moment for me.

It was a wonderful time to represent Canada abroad. As the chargé, when the head of mission is out of the country, I had the honour to act as Canada's representative. My accreditation ceremony was in El Salvador at the presidential palace. We had taken the motorcade through the nation, and when I received my accreditation along with my ambassador, I was told to always remain behind the ambassador except when she was out of the country. I was very proud to take on that role.

On one occasion I had an interesting bit of fortune. When Bill C-4, the Central American four agreement, was being negotiated with Canada, one round of negotiations was going to take place at a time when the head of mission was out of the country. As such, I became the representative. I was very excited and nervous. I went to the secure room, as a diplomat did back in the day, where a fax was printed out. I took the fax and read the notes over and over again about the positions on pork and sugar. I prepared and prepared.

The big moment came and I went off to the trade minister's office in El Salvador with my papers and my positions ready. The trade minister approached me, took the envelope out of my hand and told me to tell my government that El Salvador would get back to it in two weeks. The big moment I had prepared for had come and gone.

My point here is that diplomats only do what their governments ask them to do. I would later go on to speak about this in the chamber when our current leader of the official opposition asked me to respond to a situation that unfortunately took place at our high commission in India, after the government's administration organized an event and an accused terrorist was there. I went through the process of responding to this in the House. I walked the caucus through what goes into vetting a list of individuals who are invited to an event and what that looks like.

I still remain true to the fact that a diplomat and a trade negotiator only do what their government asks them to do, as was my experience with the Bill C-4 negotiation, which unfortunately did dissolve, and I believe ended up being a unilateral agreement with Honduras. Nonetheless something came out of it.

My sentiments right now in regard to the response of the government on so many things, but also in regard to this agreement as well, is disappointment, because so much more could be done. I think about what could have been the potential response for this pandemic in terms of trade opportunities. Certainly, it has been a very difficult year. We are coming up on the one-year anniversary, when we were all sent home from this beautiful chamber.

When this was occurring and we were seeing world forces shifting, I was considering the fact that it would be an incredible time for Canada to re-evaluate its position in the world. Were I the prime minister, I would have done a complete evaluation of our inventory from coast to coast to coast of natural resources, from energy, minerals, agriculture and textile, and really looked at how markets were changing and emerging, perhaps with less reliance on China and Europe turning inward to evaluate those opportunities.

We see opportunities missed within this legislation. This is a theme, unfortunately, with the government. What I am pointing to with the unfortunate situation that happened in India and with this trade agreement is that the government has had no guiding values for foreign policy. We have seen this time and time again. We have seen this with how it is handling the situation with China and the two Michaels who remain incarcerated. We saw this with the government's lack of will and gumption to stand up to China in regard to the Uighur motion. We saw this with the current deputy minister's tweets regarding Saudi Arabia. We saw this with a stance I wish would have been more firm regarding Venezuela.

All of these indicators have shown that the government has no foreign policy values. Again, this trade agreement is just a by-product of the government's inability to have a coherent strategic foreign policy that looks out for the best interests of Canadians and for Canada.

What makes me the most sad is when I think of the opportunities missed, comparably to the previous administration, of which the previous speaker belonged, and of the greats, of Harper and Kenney and Baird. I was very fortunate at the time to be a policy adviser. I took one year away from my foreign service career to serve the current member for Thornhill who was minister of state for the Americas at the time.

We had principles which guided us. Those included among them, democracy. Are we really standing up for democracy here in Canada and acting as an example to the world currently? I do not think we are. Are we standing up for justice? I do not think we are. Are we standing up for the prosperity of the world and the prosperity of Canadians right now? I do not think we are. I am certainly not seeing it within this trade agreement.

I extend this beyond this trade agreement. As I said, I feel as though the Liberal government has been a government of missed opportunities. We have seen this with the pandemic, the opportunity to prepare better, to prepare Canadians better, to avoid so much of the hardship, illness and death that we have seen as a result of this terrible last year, a result of not preparing better for the economy and missed opportunities here. I would include this trade agreement within this the inability to look forward.

This is the crux of the opposition motion that we have had here today, the inability to think forward for Canada's economic prosperity. Finally, it is the opportunity missed for foreign policy, to stand up for strong values, Canadian values, and that includes with this trade agreement.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Madam Speaker, I congratulate my colleague on her speech, in which she had positive things to say about international trade and took a strong stance on things that are unacceptable.

I want to ask her a question that I asked earlier. As members know, this will be a temporary agreement, and we have about three years to replace it with a new agreement.

Is the member not worried about any future demands from Great Britain on imports of cheese, for example, and the other products under supply management that we are trying to protect with legislation? Her party seems to be opposed to this bill, and I would like to understand why, because for years they have been saying they want to protect supply management. I would like to hear my colleague's thoughts on that.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.

Of course I have a lot of concerns about this bill, this agreement. I think that what the hon. member said complements my position that the government currently does not have a firm position on values. I think that the key to foreign affairs is to have values. I think the government currently has no values when it comes to foreign affairs in general, but also with regard to this agreement. I have many concerns about the government's positions. This government has been in power for almost five years, and quite frankly, I do not hold out much hope right now that it will embrace any values for foreign affairs. It has yet to do so for foreign affairs in general or for this agreement.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Madam Speaker, it is my understanding that the United Kingdom negotiated trade agreements with several other countries, but Canada did not. We came to a memorandum of understanding, but we did not finalize that agreement. What does say about the Liberal government's priorities when it comes to negotiating free trade agreements?

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Madam Speaker, as I said, I am very disappointed in the government's performance in looking out for Canada's interests comparative to the those in the previous administration, who were the masters and recognized the importance of looking for synchronicities and win-win situations with other nations. I definitely feel as though the current government has not done that. Once again, everything just seems to be last minute and thrown together, and it is very upsetting.

The member for Langley—Aldergrove also reminds me of another incredible opportunity, which I forgot to mention in my speech, and that is CANZUK. I know the leader of the official opposition is a big fan of it this. This is another example of another incredible opportunity beyond the U.K. to other nations that have similar values to Canada. As I said several times over both in English and in French, unfortunately the government lacks a moral-value compass not only with which to govern, but with which to govern foreign affairs.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, I want to begin by saying that I am rising as the Bloc Québécois critic for international trade.

As we have said, the Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-18 on the Canada-United Kingdom trade continuity agreement, but not enthusiastically so. Our position is and always has been clear. We support trade openness, which is necessary for our SMEs, and we support market diversification. Given our history, it is particularly interesting for us to see that it is possible for a country that is becoming independent or regaining its independence and trade sovereignty, like the United Kingdom is after Brexit, to quickly reproduce the agreements that were previously signed by the large bargaining group it is leaving.

Of course, the new country then has to renegotiate the agreements on a more permanent basis, but there is no black hole. There is no period of limbo when the newly independent country has no trade partners or international agreements. As Quebec separatists, we find this quite interesting, and we are taking notes. We have taken notes about this process, and we will be ready to address the issues and dispel the fears that Parliament is sure to raise next time Quebec's future is up for discussion.

We are in favour of open trade, but we will never give free trade our complacent and unconditional support if it compromises our agricultural model, harms the environment, supports the privatization of public services or makes it harder for our businesses to get contracts, nor will we support agreements that could undermine sovereignty and democracy for the benefit of profit-driven multinationals.

If we look at the Canada-United Kingdom trade continuity agreement, or CUKTCA, it looks like the worst was avoided. Supply management has not been chipped away at, thank goodness. Sadly, that job had already been done with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, or CETA.

In the end, this agreement is not particularly bold, but it does allow us to maintain access in the short term. I say “short term” because this agreement is supposed to be transitional. Let us not forget that we must reach a permanent agreement later.

When we talk about free trade, it always sounds very abstract, but in reality, at the grass roots level, it ends up feeling quite concrete. This bill is very likely to pass in the next few hours, and there is nothing stopping us from looking ahead now.

There is something frustrating about this kind of process. It has to do with the fact that we, as parliamentarians, always end up rubber stamping an agreement as it is presented to us. The text is there, here it is, there is nothing more to say. We are never consulted beforehand, when we should be consulted before the negotiators even go to negotiate. We should be able to give them mandates. We are parliamentarians; we are here to represent the positions of our constituents. We should be consulted far more often. We should be given reports at different stages of the negotiations. Unfortunately, we do not get any of that.

That is why one of the first things we need to do right now is demand more transparency. The provinces and parliamentarians need to be more involved in future discussions. The elected members of the House of Commons are responsible for protecting the interests and values of their constituents. They are not just here to rubber-stamp agreements that have been negotiated in secret. We are not just puppets.

Between 2000 and 2004, the Bloc Québécois introduced a number of bills on this matter in the House. With the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, our colleagues in the Liberal Party and the NDP came to an agreement on sharing more information with elected members. The Deputy Prime Minister made a commitment at the time. Unfortunately, although this seemed like a step in the right direction, the government asked us before Christmas to study the agreement with the United Kingdom without letting us see the agreement itself. We heard from witnesses like the Minister of International Trade, but we could not read the agreement.

That was when we needed it. Can members imagine how ludicrous and absurd this was? The Standing Committee on International Trade had to study this agreement without having a copy of the text. I do not think members realize the absurdity of it all.

As parliamentarians, we must be kept informed at every step of the process, even before the negotiator steps on a plane or prepares for the virtual meeting. This would prevent parliamentarians from having to speak to an agreement without having the information needed to make a well-thought-out decision. The negotiations would be more transparent.

With regard to the provinces, members will recall that during the negotiations with Europe, which led to the ratification of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement in 2017, Quebec was able to send a representative when talks were held. However, Quebec was not invited to attend by Canada, but rather it was invited by Europe, as the European Union had to go through the parliaments of its member states and therefore requested that the Canadian provinces be present.

The Canada-United Kingdom trade continuity agreement contains elements that the Quebec representative fought for. As a result, under the grandfather clause, the Société de transport de Montréal has a local content requirement of 25% in the procurement of rail cars, buses and so on.

That is a step backward from what we had before the agreement with Europe, but we can still say that we managed to salvage something in this new agreement with the United Kingdom. That did not happen because Canada fought for it, but because it was copied and pasted from CETA. That will be obvious when there is a permanent agreement, which is one more reason why the provinces and parliamentarians should come to an agreement before the negotiations in order to be able to give the negotiators clear mandates.

Quebec and the provinces can officially refuse to apply an agreement on their territory. We are taking a strong stand on extending Quebec's jurisdictions beyond its borders, something that the Privy Council in London acknowledged decades ago in a decision that led to the adoption of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, which is very important in Quebec.

In the end, independence is the only way we will be able to advocate for ourselves on the world stage. The Canadian negotiator will always be predisposed to protect Canada's interests at the expense of Quebec's. Until then, we have to do whatever we can to have our voice heard.

It is time for Parliament to look at procedures to give elected members more control over agreements. We have no choice. The minister responsible for ratifying an agreement should be required to table in Parliament an explanatory memorandum and provide a reasonable timeframe for obtaining the approval of parliamentarians before any ratification. This should be the bare minimum in the Parliament of a so-called democratic country. This should go without saying.

Let us also talk about what we might anticipate. I gave the example of awarding contracts and there has been much talk of buying local since the beginning of this pandemic. Fortunately, supply management currently remains protected, but we know that the United Kingdom would like to export more cheese. We dodged a bullet for now, but the permanent agreement could be worse and cause us problems in the future. I would say that is why we must adopt Bill C-216, which protects supply management and our agriculture model in its entirety. It would spare us from any new bad surprises. Our dairy, poultry and egg farmers have given enough. Enough is enough.

Another very important element, and this is one of the reasons we support the bill, is the infamous investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, which will not apply for at least another two years. In fact, it may not come into effect in two years if there is no agreement within the EU.

Let us imagine a political fiction scenario. Imagine those two years have gone by and there is an agreement with the European countries, that kind of mechanism is in place, and there is no further discussion about a permanent agreement. The parties would have to use something such as an exchange of letters for it to apply. Furthermore, this cannot be part of any future agreement. Most fortunately, the Canada-U.S.-Mexico agreement eliminated that possibility.

This is a very serious issue. Chapter 11 of the 1994 NAFTA included protection of foreign investors in a given state and enabled those investors, if expropriated, or the victims of what is known as the equivalent of an expropriation, to sue the state in an arbitration tribunal created for this purpose.

On paper, this seems to make sense. When a company invests money somewhere, it obviously does not want to fall victim to the policies of the local government. However, when we look at what it means in concrete terms, we realize that what is in there is extremely serious. There is a real risk of applying the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism to all rules or laws of an economic nature that could be detrimental to private profit. Could this open the door to the potential dismantling of national policies? It is certainly becoming increasingly difficult for governments to legislate on issues related to social justice, the environment, working conditions and public health, for example. If a given transnational corporation believes it has been hampered in its ability to make a profit, it will have recourse. My colleagues may be wondering exactly what that means. First of all, I would point out that trade litigation generally take a long time and is therefore extremely lucrative for law firms. A document from two non-governmental organizations has already demonstrated how eager large firms specializing in trade law are to engage in complex litigation.

Over the past few years, fewer multilateral agreements have been signed, but this does not change the fact that there are more than 3,000 bilateral investment protection treaties in the world. I will give one example and I will again be asked what this means in concrete terms. I will give a list of the trade actions against states resulting from these mechanisms. It is chilling.

In 1997, Canada decided to restrict the import and distribution of MMT, a fuel additive, which was believed to be toxic. Ethyl Corporation filed a suit against the Canadian government for an apology and $201 million.

In 1998, S.D. Myers Inc. filed a complaint against Canada concerning the ban on exporting waste containing PCBs between 1995 and 1997. PCBs are synthetic chemical products that are extremely toxic and used in electrical equipment. Canada lost before the tribunal established under NAFTA.

In 2004, under NAFTA, Cargill, a producer of carbonated soft drinks, won $90.7 million U.S. from Mexico, which was convicted of creating a tax on certain soft drinks that caused a serious obesity epidemic in the country.

In 2008, Dow AgroSciences filed a complaint after Quebec took steps to prohibit the sale and use of certain pesticides on lawns. The case was settled amicably once Quebec, which wanted to put an end to the challenge, agreed to acknowledge that the products posed no risk as long as users read the label.

There are many other examples. In 2009, the Pacific Rim Mining Corporation sued El Salvador for the loss of potential profits. El Salvador had refused to issue a permit for a gold mine because the company was not complying with national standards. El Salvador finally won the case in 2016. At least the government won, but the plaintiff only paid two-thirds of the defence's legal fees. El Salvador is obviously not rolling in money. The $4 million U.S. that this struggling country lost could have gone towards social programs.

In 2010, AbitibiBowater closed some of its facilities in Newfoundland and laid off hundreds of employees. The provincial government responded by taking over its hydroelectric assets. AbitibiBowater did not accept that and filed suit. To avoid a lengthy legal battle, Ottawa offered the company $130 million. There was an amicable agreement with a cheque on the way out.

In AbitibiBowater there is the name Abitibi. Abitibi is in Quebec, which unfortunately is still part of Canada. Considering that its headquarters are in Montreal, how is it a foreign investor?

This goes to show all the schemes that are at play. The company is registered in Delaware, a tax haven, in order to present itself as a foreign investor.

Let us look at other examples. In 2010, Tampa Electric got $25 million from Guatemala, which passed legislation to put a cap on electricity rates. The complaint, which dated to the previous year, was made under the Central America free trade agreement. In 2012, the Veolia group went after Egypt because of that country's decision to increase the minimum wage.

There are many other examples, but it would take a long time to list them all. The most recent case dates back to 2013, when Lone Pine Resources announced its intention to sue Ottawa because of Quebec's moratorium on drilling in the St. Lawrence.

It all goes to show that the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism allows democracy to be hijacked by powerful multinationals whose only goal is to make a profit.

As I was saying earlier, it is important to note that many companies were suing their own country, when there was a way to register or incorporate elsewhere. Fortunately, the transnational corporations did not always win these cases, but they continue to multiply. States must provide the financial and technical resources to defend themselves. This mechanism is one-sided. The government is always the defendant, while the multinational corporation is always the plaintiff.

According to a 2013 report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 42% of the cases were decided in favour of the state and 31% in favour of the business. The rest were settled out of court. That means that the plaintiffs were able to fully or partially rebuff the states' political and democratic will in 60% of cases.

These numbers are enormous, but they do not reveal an unquantifiable factor: the permanent pressure of this mechanism on states. Public policy-makers are censoring themselves. Behind departmental doors, they are deciding not to apply such and such a policy because they do not want to be sued. This pressure and self-censorship is real. A 2014 report by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union said this clearly served a a deterrent during policy decision-making.

I will give an example. In 2012, Australia imposed plain packaging for cigarette packs, banning the use of logos. The tobacco company Philip Morris International, which had also sued Uruguay in 2010 for its tobacco policies, sued the Australian government based on a treaty between Hong Kong and Australia. As that was going on, New Zealand decided to suspend the coming into force of its plain packaging policy, and the United Kingdom decided to postpone the debate that was supposed to begin on the matter. As we can see, there is an atmosphere of self-censorship. France waited three years before implementing this policy within its borders.

Multinational corporations are sometimes more powerful than governments, and if the will of the people, or even their safety, might affect profits, they are pushed aside. This is extremely serious. Especially in these pandemic times, we do not need this mechanism in future agreements. If it does not apply in the short term in the agreement with the United Kingdom, that is even better. We will do everything we can to ensure that it never applies. We demand that Canada oppose it in future negotiations with the United Kingdom for the permanent agreement.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech.

I spoke a lot about values in my speech. My colleague spoke a lot about transparency.

I would like to know if he can give more examples about this government's lack of transparency, especially with regard to the pandemic.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, there are many examples. I gather from my colleague's question that we are not just talking about the issue of trade and free trade, but about things in general. We know that the government does not like committees that study its role. We saw this with several proposals where parliamentarians were to closely examine COVID-19 spending.

The government had to spend in the context of COVID-19, but we are retroactively entitled to have a very high standard of transparency, especially in light of certain matters such as the WE Charity or the respirator scandals, and when contracts or spending of that magnitude are involved. It is understood that the opposition has a duty to show good faith in a crisis. That also applies to the government, which must open its books.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot for his speech.

One of the things I find odd about this agreement is that representatives of the current government have repeatedly condemned investor-state dispute resolution provisions even though 20% of the agreement, which is only five or six pages long because it references the agreement with Europe, relates to keeping the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism option open.

In the member's view, why has so much time been spent on this resolution mechanism, which the government says it does not want in free trade agreements?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, that is very hard to understand and justify, especially since this provision was removed from the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA, even though it had originally been in the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, with the United States and Mexico. It is hard to understand and explain how a government can want to censor itself so much or set back democracy and political sovereignty in favour giving for-profit companies the right to make money. That is very hard to understand.

At the Standing Committee on International Trade, my New Democrat colleague and I pressed the government in an attempt to understand. The minister is very good at avoiding our questions when she appears in committee. This has happened many times. As my colleague knows, when it came time for the clause-by-clause study of the bill, the NDP and I voted against the investor-state dispute settlement system. He can count on me to fight any such potential provisions in future agreements, including the agreement with the United Kingdom that will replace this temporary agreement.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Madam Speaker, I very much appreciated the comments from my esteemed colleague, who expressed concerns about matters such as transparency and the future of national sovereignty. It should come as no surprise that I want to pick up on this, but he also expressed concerns about our supply-managed sectors and Great Britain's ambitions.

Could my colleague comment on the government's negligence, given that here we are, on March 9, discussing an agreement that has theoretically been in effect since the beginning of January? What does he think of possible future concessions or breaches in supply management? What solutions could be used to avoid all this?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, I suspect that my esteemed colleague is not disinterested in the issue. That said, I understand his total devotion to agriculture and supply management.

Agriculture is a jewel, and our model is based on food sovereignty and land use. We must protect and defend it. Farmers have heard enough empty promises.

I am very concerned about what comes next, not just a potential permanent agreement with the United Kingdom, but also the fact that the United Kingdom could join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, and then hold quotas. The same goes for the United States, which withdrew from the CPTPP and did not get its hands on the quota that had already been released. That could happen with both the United Kingdom and the United States. I am quite concerned about that.

Because we toured Quebec together virtually last week, my colleague obviously knows that we have to pass Bill C-216 and never touch our agricultural model again.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Madam Speaker, my colleague talked a lot about the investor-state dispute resolution chapter and gave a number of interesting examples of lawsuits where things went wrong. Any time that parties, corporations big or small, or countries are doing business with each other, there is the risk of commercial disagreement that could lead to litigation.

Therefore, we need a dispute resolution mechanism. If not this, then what? We could be sued in a foreign country's court system. At least here we have a recognized dispute resolution mechanism. What would be a better way to do it?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, the mechanism in question was removed from our main agreement, the one we signed with the United States and Mexico that covers 80% of our exports.

No one has died so far. I understand that there needs to be a way to resolve disputes. However, it must not be limited to for-profit companies and the state. There should also be clauses to protect the public when their environmental and social rights are violated by the multinational investors.

As for a dispute between a corporation and a state, just look at the agreement with the United Kingdom. Our two countries are governed by the rule of law, and our highly developed legal systems are even quite similar in many respects. I think that we could just use the existing legal systems to handle any disputes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am so happy to hear my colleague speak. One of the things he mentioned was supply management. Under CETA, dairy farmers lost quite a large percentage of their supply-managed sector in the market, but they were provided with compensation. Under CUSMA, the government has not provided compensation. I spoke to the Dairy Farmers of Ontario a few weeks ago and they are terrified about what will happen under this new U.K. trade agreement and the further chipping away at the supply-managed sector.

Could the member talk about why it is so important to not give away any more of that market share, and not just to promise compensation but to hold firm?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, that is quite the question.

First, I believe that my colleague clearly showed us that the compensation process is quite long. We are in favour of compensation and will fight to defend it. There is no question about that.

The fact remains that this process takes a long time and does not fully make up for the breaches in every case. We have a system that works. If the breaches are offset by providing compensation, which does not last forever, only for a few years at most, the supply management system is transformed into a subsidized agriculture system, which is something else entirely. It is not true that the compensation just makes up for breaches in the system. Compensation transforms the system. This system makes it possible to buy local, which is a cherished value that results in jobs and quality products, generates local economic spinoffs and lets us stand in solidarity with our fellow citizens.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise again to speak to the question of how Canada trades with our counterparts in the United Kingdom. I think I would do well to begin by talking a bit about what we are not debating here. We are not debating whether it is a good idea to have a trade relationship with the United Kingdom; everybody is on board with that. Obviously there is a long-standing trade relationship with the United Kingdom going right back to the very origins of Canada.

The question is what the terms and conditions will be for our trade with the United Kingdom. I appreciate very much the extent to which some of the debate so far has focused on the question of the investor-state dispute settlement chapters in trade agreements, because these have been a long-standing irritant for many Canadians and which the NDP has been very proud to give voice to over the years.

The member who just spoke went through the list I know many MPs, including many New Democrats, have gone through in the past of all the ways in which Canada has been taken advantage of and lost money and opportunities to implement good public policy as a result of investor-state dispute settlement clauses. When we are talking about the terms of trade, just as any business would, we want to talk about at which the terms and conditions of trade make sense or when we are paying too high a cost for a particular kind of benefit.

The fact of the matter is that investor-state dispute clauses have had a chilling effect on good public policy, whether in respect to the environment, workers' rights or public health. When we consider the impact and what Canada has received in return, these clauses have have never been worth it and are not worth it now.

I have had the honour of sitting on the trade committee in this Parliament, and what we have heard in one breath from groups is that they are very keen to have Canada sign the next free trade agreement, but then they turn around and talk about all of the problems with the trade agreements and why they are not getting the market access they are so excited to get on paper but are not realizing, including the cattle industry under CETA, which is very frustrated not to get the market access it wants. Canadian manufacturers, despite being advocates of free trade, will tell us they are not able to take advantage of the opportunities that exist for them on paper through these deals. A recent report shows that Canada's trade deficit with Europe has grown considerably since CETA was signed.

These are all things that we eventually have to take a look at and ask if these deals are working rather than our just inhabiting the kind of ideologically blinded position of, frankly, the Liberals and Conservatives. There has been a consensus between those two parties and the mainstream media in Canada for a long time now that whatever is in a trade agreement is good.

I have had opportunities to ask business representatives at committee what empirical evidence, not just currently but in principle, could ever convince them that a free trade deal might not be in Canada's best interest, and on more than one occasion I have heard them say there is none. There is none, so as long as we call it a “free trade agreement”, as long as there is lipstick on that pig, they are going to think it is a good idea. It does not matter if it is a pig. As long as we put the right lipstick on it, they are going to go full bore, if the House will forgive the pun.

What New Democrats have been trying to make a case for over the years, which one would think we would hear from a prudent business person, is that the terms of trade matter. What do we have before us? We have a so-called trade continuity agreement, which is sometimes referred to as a “transitional trade agreement”, which of course is an untruth. I have made that case here before.

I just want to go back to kind of the slow train wreck that this process has been. I recall in the last Parliament that we were debating CETA, and of course at that time there was a pending referendum in Britain about whether it would remain a part of the European Union or leave it.

We thought, on the New Democratic benches, that this made a difference in whether CETA was a good deal or not. Given that 40% of Canada's trade with Europe was with the United Kingdom, we might think that whether the U.K. was in the deal or out of the deal would matter. We were told that New Democrats do not understand trade or business. Again there was that same theme that it did not matter what was in the deal. Apparently it did not even matter who was a party to the deal: As long as it was called a free trade deal, it must be a good thing. We did not even need to know what was in it. Who cares? We were just being told by business magnates that this was a good idea, so sign us up. Where do we sign? It was ridiculous.

Nobody was pretending to predict the outcome of the Brexit referendum. We were just saying that it mattered how the referendum would go and that maybe using time allocation to force the ratification of CETA before we knew whether the United Kingdom was in or out did not make sense. We were told no, we have to ratify it right away. All of that was signed, sealed and delivered before we knew the outcome of the referendum, and then, of course, the referendum did not go the way may people hoped. It went the way many other people hoped, and the whole Brexit saga kicked off.

The disadvantaged position that Canada found itself in was in having already signed up for a deal, and not long afterward, the fundamental terms of that deal were already changing. It was clear for all to see, before Canada ratified that deal, that there was a very real possibility that we would find ourselves in the position that we ultimately did.

What happened next? Not much. A couple of years ago, there were some initial conversations around trying to get to a deal. There was a lot of fanfare about how excited the Liberal government was to be one of the first to sign a deal with the U.K. It did not end up being one of the first to sign a deal with the U.K., of course, because it walked away from negotiations for over a year. Then it was all this eleventh-hour stuff that we have seen from the government on many other files.

The government finally decided to come back late last summer to the negotiating table. What we got was a carbon copy of an agreement, and it was quite misleading. All along what we were being told was that the opportunity for a substantial agreement had passed. The opportunity had passed to try to have a model agreement for progressive trade, not just one to hand over the keys to public policy-making to multinational corporations. The opportunity to have a trade agreement with terms and conditions modelled on the needs of everyday people and workers, rather than just multinationals, had passed.

We ragged the puck until that opportunity passed us by, but we were told not to worry, because we would just have a transitional deal. I think any reasonable person would have thought it was a temporary deal, a stopgap measure or something that carried on the status quo for a certain period of time so that eventually we could get back to the table. We would then know that we were going to have either something new and different and hopefully better, nothing at all, or maybe an agreement to extend things.

This agreement turns up, and no meaningful consultation happened at all. We know that this is true because we have asked people at committee if they were consulted about this deal, and they told us they were not, some very clearly and loudly, others somewhat sheepishly, but nobody has claimed that they were well consulted when it came to this agreement.

The government, quite disingenuously, has tried to pretend that the consultations for CETA were somehow adequate for this agreement. The CETA consultations were for a deal that was going to include 26, 27 or 28 different member states; this is nothing like a bilateral deal with the United Kingdom. In a bilateral deal with the United Kingdom, there are clearly a very different set of considerations. The possibilities, risks and rewards are different from what there are in a deal with the entirety of Europe. That is a point that the Liberals did not appreciate in the last Parliament with the pending Brexit referendum. The same mistake occurred again when they said that the consultations for CETA were essentially good enough for a deal with the United Kingdom. It is that same blindness that we see.

However, that notwithstanding, the Liberals do not recognize that much of that consultation on CETA also happened—in fact, the entirety of it happened—when the U.K. was part of Europe, so even the nature of CETA has changed considerably. Therefore, to tell anyone that the CETA consultations—when companies and others were giving their feedback on a trade agreement with a Europe that included the United Kingdom versus a Europe that did not—were also adequate for a bilateral deal with the United Kingdom is just false.

We find ourselves now with a last-minute deal to perpetuate the terms of an agreement that I do not think were very good in the first place, frankly. The agreement was trumped up on a supposedly temporary basis, and lo and behold, when it is announced, no, it is a permanent agreement. When this agreement goes through, this is it. These are the terms and conditions of trade between Canada and the United Kingdom unless a new agreement is started. These terms do not expire at any time.

We tried at committee to at least amend the enabling legislation so that something would have a hard deadline, but that did not go through. The government was very much opposed to that. We now find ourselves in a deal that was made for an entity that does not exist anymore, a European Union that included the United Kingdom. It is dictating the terms of trade with two important trading parties: what is left of the European Union and the United Kingdom. We have a deal that was never conceived for either of these trade arrangements that is going to dictate the terms of trade with both. It does not seem to me to make a lot of sense. I am not a business guy, but it does not seem to make a lot of sense to me.

It seems to me that Canadians ought to have had the opportunity to have a conversation about this agreement and to have been consulted about it, except they were not. The government went ahead and signed this permanent deal, and as far as I am concerned, it had zero mandate to do so, because as the Liberals talked about it in the lead-up, it was to build a mandate for a temporary agreement, not a permanent one. However, when they finally had the reveal, it was a permanent agreement. They were saying not to worry about the fact that they had pissed away all that time that could have been used to consult, that could have been used to negotiate a deal that was actually made to fit the entity that we are trading with, like a real bilateral trade deal and not a carbon copy of a multilateral deal. They said, “Do not worry about it. There are three reasons we are going to get a new deal, and you do not have anything to worry about, Mr. Blaikie, thank you very much.” Okay, what are they?

There are some issues around rules of origin for certain products that recognize the European supply chain in order to facilitate getting U.K. goods into Canada. Fair enough. That is one reason the U.K. might decide that it wants to come to the table, but I do not know that it is enough on its own. I do not know that anybody does, frankly.

The other reason, which I would get a kick out of if it were not such a serious issue, is that the Liberals say that the way the United Kingdom cheese producers are able to trade cheese into Canada is under some World Trade Organization TRQs right now, and those are going to expire, so the United Kingdom is going to want to come to the table. For what? Is it to get access to the Canadian cheese market that it does not currently have?

Government members have sworn up and down many times at committee, in this very House and anywhere anyone will listen to them that they are not going to sell out dairy farmers even one more time and that dairy farmers should not worry, because there is no Canadian market share on the table. Well, then, why would the U.K. come back to the bargaining table to get a different deal if the reason it is supposed to be coming back is to get market access for cheese?

It is one or the other. Either it is a leverage point to get the U.K. back to the table, which very clearly implies that there will be concessions on dairy, or it is not a reason for the U.K. to come back to the table. Which is it? We do not know. I have asked the question, but I have not had an answer. It would be nice to have that before we vote, but I will not hold my breath.

The final reason is that there is a good faith commitment in the agreement. It is not legally binding. It does not say a new agreement has to be signed, it just says it is going to commit. That is great. That is very nice. That is how things start and that may well turn out to be a success. I cannot say that, but what I can say is that there may well be another government in Canada before then, preferably a social democratic one. We are working to make that happen and I would like to see it happen. Maybe it will, maybe it will not. There may well be a new government in the United Kingdom. It may be that the two governments, even if they are the same governments, sit down and start talking about what a bilateral deal would look like. Just one of the parties, because this is a permanent agreement, has to decide that it cannot get a better deal.

Maybe this deal is not perfect for either side, but the sides just have to feel that they cannot get a better deal and throw in the towel. We all know that trade relationships and considerations can change on a dime. We just lived that over four years with the Trump administration in the United States. There is nothing to say that something like that, or even a far less extreme case of that, might come to pass between Canada and the United Kingdom going forward, such that one or the other party decides that it is not content with the terms of trade.

Look at what CETA has been producing for Europe. Canada's trade deficit has doubled under that agreement. If things are going that well for the U.K. under this agreement, it may decide that it is good enough, thanks very much. We have all heard that in order for the U.K. to accede to the trans-Pacific partnership, it needed to have a permanent trade agreement with at least one of the parties. This does that. It was not supposed to do that. We have been told from time to time that the U.K. will be incentivized to make a new agreement with Canada because it needs to have an agreement with at least one other country in order to get into the TPP, but this does that. There is no clause in this agreement that says it does not count for the purposes of a permanent trade agreement that could get the U.K. into the TPP.

The fact that this ended up being a permanent trade agreement, as opposed to a temporary stopgap measure, does not mean a short timeline. It does not mean inherent and cyclical uncertainty for Canadian or U.K. business. It could have been a three-year timeline. It could have been a five-year timeline. It could have been whatever timeline was chosen for those two governments to get together, hash it out and feel pressured to get a deal. Instead, the option taken was to absolve future governments of that pressure and hope for the best. I just do not think that is good enough, particularly when, if we look at the trade continuity agreement itself, the infrastructure for CETA is already there.

The agreement itself is very short. It is about five pages. Fully 20% of that agreement is about how to have a mechanism to keep the investor-state dispute settlement clauses of CETA alive. A lot of Canadians are concerned about those provisions, and they have a right to be. Canada has been the biggest loser on the international stage when it comes to having to pay out to multinationals for trying to make good public policy. What a farce it is that governments should have to back down from good public policy, apologize to some multinational company and then pay them damages. What a farce.

We know it is, because the Deputy Prime Minister has stood in the House, in Parliament, and said as much: that she is really proud that there are no longer any ISDS provisions in CUSMA. Why was fully 20% of this TCA dedicated to keeping ISDS clauses alive and who was asking for them? We do not hear from Britain that they are part of its global trade agenda, or that they are a priority to negotiate it into the deals that it is doing around the world, so who is asking for them? Why is it that the Liberal government swears up and down it is proud that ISDS clauses are out of NAFTA or CUSMA, whatever we want to call it now, and why has so much effort been expended to keep ISDS clauses alive in this agreement that was never envisioned for a bilateral trade relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have a lot of respect for this member. We sit on the PROC committee together. I think we get along great.

One of the issues that it is difficult for NDP and Liberal members to see eye to eye on is trade. It would appear as though the NDP members are against all trade, even though they say they are in favour of it, if it is a good agreement. However, in order for it to be a good agreement for the NDP members, they have to get absolutely everything they want. That is just not how a deal is made. A deal is based on compromise and negotiation, understanding that parties have to give a little sometimes in order to get something on the other end.

My question to the member would be as follows. This agreement is literally just to keep us going. It is to continue on. It says in the name of it that it is a continuation agreement to continue going with the agreement had from the former set-up when the U.K. was part of the European Union.

Why would the NDP, at the very least, not just support this continuity agreement in order to then have a discussion about what is to be expected in a new agreement?

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I have a few things to say to that.

One is that I would remind the hon. member of an instance earlier in this Parliament when we voted in favour of CUSMA in exactly that spirit, a spirit of trade-offs. Getting rid of the investor-state dispute settlement clause in NAFTA was important to us, as was getting rid of the energy proportionality clause, negotiated originally by Conservatives and later signed by the Liberals. We hear a lot about energy sovereignty in the House, but the fact is that Conservatives and Liberals sold out Canadian energy sovereignty under NAFTA for 30 years when they signed that deal.

Those were things that were important to us. It is not because we liked everything in CUSMA. If the member would like to have a conversation about the deficiencies of the agreement, I am happy to do that. We recognize that there have to be trade-offs.

The question is, on ISDS for instance, the member speaks about trade-offs, but who was asking for it? The British government was not asking for ISDS. Canada says it does not want it anymore, purportedly. Who is asking? Who are we negotiating with?

Are we negotiating with the other country, or are they just going, cap in hand, to multinationals and asking, “What is it you want in this agreement, and how do we please you?” That is a very different kind of negotiation.

[Tracy Gray, Conservative, Kelowna—Lake Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for his intervention. We sit on the trade committee together. We are able to question witnesses there, and that is what I wanted to ask the member about.

When we were having witnesses come and present on this initially, I think all of us who were not in government were quite surprised to hear about the lack of consultations with stakeholders. We heard from a number of organizations and labour groups that there was not a rigorous consultation. Government officials were there to answer questions, but that was about the extent of it.

Can the member maybe speak to that, on his experience of hearing from stakeholders at committee?

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, it really was a surprise, particularly given that this is a permanent trade agreement with the United Kingdom, that there was not more consultation.

I was only somewhat joking in my earlier remarks. We heard pretty widely, sometimes somewhat reluctantly from folks who I think were trying to protect their relationship with the government, that there was no real consultation. Some were pretty clear about it. Nobody was clear that they had really been consulted and felt really good about it.

I respect that organizations want to try to maintain good relations with the government of day, but I think it came across pretty clearly that there really was not a lot of communication.

The member may remember that when the deal came out in late November or early December, we were studying not the deal itself, because it was not public, but the issue of Canada-U.K. trade relations. We had witnesses the next day at committee when we all kind of found out that there was no sunset clause on the agreement.

I remember a lot of those witnesses being quite baffled and frankly unsure of what to say. I think the way that this was talked about in the lead-up was very much as a temporary transitional agreement, and suddenly it was a trade continuity agreement, which meant it was going to be permanent. That is a big difference. It is a difference that makes a difference. It is an outrage that Canada is getting a permanent trade agreement without a better process.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleague the question that he asked me earlier.

Why does Canada keep leaving the door open for multinationals to take governments to court? Why do public decision-makers always want to reduce the scope of their decision-making?