Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to take part in today's debate on Motion No. 69.
Shutting down tax evasion and avoidance is a major priority for the government, and it is a priority we have made and been able to take great strides in advancing. It is only in its execution that Motion No. 69 would raise concerns. Canadians expect and deserve a tax system that is fair and effective in supporting their highest priorities. Canadian businesses should pay their fair share of taxes, but they should also be able to compete on a fair and equal footing with their international counterparts so they can grow, create jobs and pay taxes here in Canada.
It is in this regard that the deficiencies of this motion are most apparent. It includes elements that are poorly targeted at achieving their desired results and that could carry negative consequences for businesses and taxpayers. Moreover, the objectives it seeks to achieve would be better addressed through the government initiatives to address tax evasion and avoidance that are already under way.
I would like to discuss some of the consequences of Motion No. 69.
The motion proposes, for example, that income that Canadian corporations repatriate from their subsidiaries in tax havens ceases to be exempt from tax in Canada. In short, it would change what is known as the “exempt surplus treatment” within the income tax. These provisions allow foreign active business income earned by foreign subsidiaries of Canadian corporations to be repatriated to the Canadian corporation as dividends free from Canadian tax, provided the subsidiary is resident and earns the income in a jurisdiction with which Canada has a tax treaty or a tax information exchange agreement.
By changing these income tax rules, this proposal would represent a major change in Canada's international tax policy. At the same time, it would be well targeted toward achieving its apparent objectives and it could potentially have several other negative consequences.
First, the proposal would put Canadian tax rules out of step with international norms. Canada's exempt surplus treatment is long-standing and is consistent with the tax treatment that most other developed countries apply to active business income earned by foreign corporations owned by their residents.
Second, the proposal could adversely impact the competitiveness of Canadian businesses. Exempt surplus treatment is applicable only to foreign active business income. It ensures that foreign subsidiaries of Canadian companies carrying on business in tax treaty countries or countries with which we have a tax information exchange agreement face similar tax rates and compete on an equal footing with other businesses active in those countries. Restricting exempt surplus treatment could therefore undermine the international competitiveness of Canadian companies operating abroad.
Third, the proposal may not generate significant revenues, if any, and may at the same time reduce the amount of profits repatriated and invested in Canadian businesses. It would do so by encouraging Canadian companies that do not require access to their foreign profits in the short term to keep those profits offshore in order to avoid paying Canadian taxes on repatriation. This would result in less foreign profit being repatriated and invested in Canadian businesses, which would reduce taxable Canadian income generated from such investments or from distributions to Canadian shareholders.
It could also result in some Canadian companies paying more tax on their foreign profits to foreign governments and not to Canada. This would occur because the proposal would require setting a threshold foreign tax rate below which exempt surplus treatment would no longer be available. This would incentivize companies that need to repatriate their foreign profits in the short term and wish to benefit from exempt surplus treatment to earn those profits in subsidiaries located in foreign jurisdictions whose tax rates are higher than this threshold rate, but still lower than the Canadian rate.
This would leave less after-tax profits to be repatriated and reinvested in Canadian businesses, which would in turn reduce the taxable Canadian income that is generated when these profits are reinvested or paid out to shareholders. Moreover, the Canadian tax system already has a set of rules that are better targeted at shutting down the kind of tax avoidance at which this proposal appears to be aimed. These rules, known as the foreign accrual property income, or FAPI, rules, are designed to prevent taxpayers from avoiding Canadian taxes by earning investment income or certain types of highly mobile active business income, offshore in low-tax jurisdictions.
The FAPI rules subject these types of income to Canadian tax when it is earned by foreign corporations that are owned by Canadian resident individuals or corporations, thus ensuring that the tax treatment is the same as if the income had been earned in Canada. By targeting more mobile income, rather than active business income in general, the FAPI rules largely avoid the sort of adverse competitiveness effects that Motion No. 69 would entail, so what the motion is offering is a bad solution where a better one already exists.
Our government already recognizes the ongoing risks arising from tax planning arrangements used by multinational enterprises to minimize their taxes. The solutions we continue to implement are achieving their goals without hobbling Canadian businesses. Our government is currently working with the 138 nations of the OECD/G20 inclusive framework on base erosion and profit shifting, to develop a multilateral approach to modernizing the international tax rules. Part of this work involves the development of a global minimum tax regime, commonly referred to as “pillar two”. This new tax regime would ensure that large multinational enterprises pay tax at an agreed minimum rate by allowing countries like Canada to tax their foreign profits when they are earned, as opposed to when they are ultimately repatriated to Canada, if the profits have been taxed at a low rate in the foreign jurisdiction in which they are located.
Our goal is to discourage base erosion and profit shifting by reducing the benefits of earning income in low-tax jurisdictions, but do so through the multilateral consensus-based approach that is more effective than a unilateral action. That would mitigate many, if not all, of the concerns identified within this motion.
In conclusion, I have expended my allotted time addressing the serious problems related to just one element of this motion. This should be enough to give hon. members pause about supporting this motion. Should this debate continue, I would be pleased to present many more.