Madam Speaker, in spite of the outburst from the member for Kingston and the Islands, I would note that as a courtesy to the House, I have combined multiple questions of privilege into this one. If the Chair would prefer, I can rise in succession on each point, but this will certainly be more brief than if I were to do that. However, I am not just raising one question of privilege. I note in your ruling that this does take precedence over the orders of the day. It is important to the function of this place. I will continue.
While the member for Kingston and the Islands continues to interrupt and is very concerned about the constituents in my riding of Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, I can assure him that Canadians are very disappointed that the government has found itself filibustering committees for 43 hours at ethics, 73 hours at Procedure and House Affairs and 35 hours at the Standing Committee on Finance. The Liberals shut down the study at the national defence committee by filibustering for more than 16 hours. I could go on with that list, so while the member for Kingston and the Islands continues to interrupt the proceedings of this place with his suggestions about how long this should take, I think that the precedents and the orders of this place have been quite clear and that for me to raise the multiple breaches of privilege of this place, which are older than any of us and are as old as this place itself, is tremendously important, so I will continue.
In response, the United Kingdom House of Commons on June 7, 2018, passed the following motion recorded at pages 1 and 2 of Votes and Proceedings:
Resolved, That this House takes note of the Third Special Report of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (HC 1115);
Ordered, That Mr Dominic Cummings give an undertaking to the Committee, no later than 6 pm on 11 June 2018, to appear before that Committee at a time on or before 20 June 2018.
Page 5 of the Votes and Proceedings for June 20, 2018, shows that the committee's chair reported to the House that Mr. Cummings failed to comply with the order of the House.
Then on June 20, 2018, the House referred the matter to its Committee of Privileges. After the privileges committee reported back to the House of Commons, the House on April 2, 2019, adopted a motion on the committee's recommendation finding Mr. Cummings in contempt, and admonished him as recorded on page 1 of the Votes and Proceedings.
In opening this segment of my presentation, I referred to Bosc and Gagnon adding a caveat of “without reasonable excuse”. The present case, I would argue, can be dealt with very quickly considering that none of the three witnesses offered any excuse for their absence.
I acknowledge that two cabinet ministers wrote to the ethics committee chair to indicate that they would appear on behalf of the witnesses, but that does not constitute an excuse from the witnesses personally. In the alternative, I would say it does not amount to a reasonable excuse.
While I plan to address the government's position that staff are not compellable witnesses when I make my argument that the government's interference with the March 25 order of the House constitutes prima facie contempt in its own right, I have a few brief points at this juncture.
First, the government, through its House leader, advanced this position in debate in the House on March 25, yet the House still adopted the motion for this order.
Second, the House's order did actually permit someone to appear on a substituted basis in the name of ministerial responsibility: the Prime Minister. However, he did not appear as permitted by the order.
Third, the ethics committee did not accept the government's position. This can be seen from the comments in the second report as well as from the records of the meetings the witnesses were due to attend.
Fourth, should the Chair hold the view that it could still be weighed as a possible reasonable excuse, I would submit that the place to do that at this stage is through an amendment to any privilege motion that might arise from this proceeding on the basis the government can test the will of the House for its perspective on these matters.
In this case, it is quite clear. The House adopted an order, and the order was breached completely. There was no effort by the witnesses to meet it in any way, nor was any excuse advanced by them to be weighed by the House or for the committee to assess and report its findings. Therefore, with respect to the first three matters of privilege, the absence of Mr. Theis, Mr. Singh and Mr. Chin, I respectfully submit that you, Madam Speaker, should find prima facie contempt here.
On the next question of privilege, I wish to turn to the government's role in preventing Mr. Theis, Mr. Singh and Mr. Chin from appearing as witnesses at the committee. The government has freely admitted to this course of conduct, both in advance and at the time of the scheduled appearances.
In his remarks to the House on March 25, the government House leader said, at page 5,234 of Debates:
I say here today that ministers will instruct their staff not to appear when called before committees and that the government will send ministers instead to account for their actions.
Though I find such an openly defiant attitude to be contemptuous in and of itself, I will speak to the specific instances of interference concerning the three witnesses.
In advance of the March 29 ethics committee meeting, the government House leader sent a letter to the chair of the ethics committee, further to his statement to the House the week before, writing:
Accordingly, Mr Rick Theis, Director of Policy to the Prime Minister, has been instructed to not appear before the committee. In his place, I will attend the meeting on behalf of the government on Monday, March 29th.
We are not talking about train robberies anymore.
On May 3, at a meeting of the ethics committee originally convened on April 23, the committee adopted a motion, which can be found in appendix A of the second report, that says, at paragraph 5, that the committee noted that the government House leader appeared on Monday, March 29, 2021 instead of Rick Theis, “who followed the government instructions that staff are not to appear before committees which were outlined during the debate in the House on Thursday, March 25, 2021”.
I would like to add that the ethics committee did not accept the government House leader as a substitute witness in satisfaction of the order. Indeed, the committee, at the March 29 meeting, adopted a motion that states, “in relation to its study on questions of conflict of interest and lobbying in relation to pandemic spending, the committee invite [the minister] to appear.” He was treated as a separate witness, invited independently of and without any link to the March 25 order of the House.
When the government House leader appeared at the committee, he said, at page 13 of Evidence:
Based on the instructions I gave the other day, it was clear to Mr. Theis and other individuals that they wouldn't appear before committees and would be replaced by the appropriate ministers....
The minister even acknowledged, at page 8 of the evidence, that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement to the majority of the House, when he said:
I am aware that some of the members of this committee would rather be hearing from a staff member from the Prime Minister's Office, Mr. Rick Theis, but as I told the House last week and I want to make clear again, we fundamentally disagree with [that] decision....
At page 22, I asked whether Mr. Theis would have been fired had he ignored the government instruction and honoured the order of the House of Commons. The government House leader denied it, but defensively added, “Why are you asking that?”
Now, we turn to the other two witnesses: Mr. Singh and Mr. Chin.
In a letter addressed to the chair of the committee on March 30, the Associate Minister of Finance wrote:
Mr. Amitpal Singh has been instructed to not appear before the committee. In his place, I will attend the meeting on behalf of the government on Wednesday, 31 March 2021.
In another letter to the committee's chair, on April 7, the associate minister wrote:
Mr. Ben Chin has been instructed to not appear before the committee. In his place, I will attend the meeting on behalf of the government on Thursday, 8 April 2021.
The same motion adopted by the committee on May 3 and recorded in appendix A of the second report acknowledged, at paragraph 6, that the committee noted that the Associate Minister of Finance “also requested to appear on [Wednesday] March 31 and [Thursday] April 8, 2021 on behalf of witnesses Amitpal Singh and Ben Chin who followed the government instructions that staff are not to appear before committees which were outlined during the debate in the House on [Thursday] March 25, 2021”.
Earlier in my remarks, I cited page 81 of Bosc and Gagnon on a description of privilege, which is equally applicable in this separate question of privilege. From the list, which I had mentioned can be found at page 82, I would refer the Chair to the 11th and 13th items: “interfering with or obstructing a person who is carrying out a lawful order of the House or a committee” and “intimidating, preventing or hindering a witness from giving evidence or giving evidence in full to the House or a committee”.
Clearly, Mr. Theis, Mr. Singh and Mr. Chin were prevented from, and maybe even hindered in their ability of, carrying out a lawful order of the House of Commons, namely giving evidence to the ethics committee.
For his part, Maingot comments on page 240:
Obstructing, interfering with, or preventing execution or orders of the House or of a committee would be akin to aiding and abetting a person to commit an offence. Taking action to prevent an order of the House from being carried out could result in contempt because it also represents an affront to the authority of the House.
McGee's Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, fourth edition, states at page 774:
Any attempt to intimidate, prevent or hinder a witness from giving evidence in full to the House or a committee may be held to be a contempt. Such intimidation or hindrance may be overt (for example, physically preventing a witness from attending and giving evidence) or less overt (for example, offering a bribe to give false testimony, or taking legal action to prevent a witness from giving evidence or from producing all the evidence in his or her possession).
Page 1080 of Bosc and Gagnon adds, “Tampering with a witness or in any way attempting to deter a witness from giving evidence may constitute a breach of parliamentary privilege.”
Erskine May, at paragraph 15.21, declares, “Any conduct calculated to deter prospective witnesses from giving evidence before either House or a committee is a contempt.” The same point is also made in paragraph 38.59. Erskine May expands upon the concept at paragraph 15.22:
A resolution setting out that to tamper with a witness in regard to the evidence to be given before either House or any committee of either House or to endeavour, directly or indirectly, to deter or hinder any person from appearing or giving evidence is a contempt, was formerly agreed to by the Commons at the beginning of every session. However, following a report from the Procedure Committee which concluded that the sessional passing of such resolutions, although they had some value as statements of intent, did not add anything to the House's powers to deal with contempts or (in the case of tampering with witnesses or the giving of false evidence on oath) the relevant statutory powers, the House agreed in 2004 to dispense with them.
There have been in the past numerous instances of punishment for offences of this kind. Corruption or intimidation, though a usual, is not an essential ingredient in this offence. It is equally a contempt to attempt by persuasion or solicitations of any kind to induce a witness not to attend, or to withhold evidence or to give false evidence.
This matter was considered in 1935 by a committee of the Commons which reported that, in its opinion, it was a breach of privilege to give any advice to a witness which took the form of pressure or of interference with their freedom to form and express their own opinions honestly in the light of all the facts known to them; and the House resolved that it agreed with the committee in its report.
The annual resolutions referred to in that passage can be traced as far back as February 21, 1700, when the English House of Commons adopted a resolution, at page 350 of Journal, which says:
That if it shall appear that any person hath been tampering with any Witness, in respect of his evidence to be given to this House, or any Committee thereof, or directly or indirectly hath endeavoured to deter or hinder any person from appearing or giving evidence, the same is declared to be a high crime and misdemeanour; and this House will proceed with the utmost severity against such offender.
Insight into just how severe, even in the case where contrition had been expressed, can be gleaned from Speaker Shaw-Lefevre's admonition of a witness at the bar of the United Kingdom's House of Commons on March 22, 1842, which is recorded at page 143 in Journal. It says:
John Ashworth, any interruption of the proceedings of this House, or of any committees of this House, can only be regarded as contempt of its authority, and your offence is much aggravated by the circumstances under which it took place. By improperly interfering with the testimony of a witness under examination, you did your utmost to obstruct the discovery of truth, and defeat the ends of justice. Such conduct cannot be allowed to pass entirely without censure; but that the House, always anxious to act with lenity, and taking into its consideration the contrition you have expressed, and believing that your offence was unpremeditated, has directed me to admonish you as to your future conduct; and I trust that this admonition will be a warning to others that this House will not deal so leniently with an offence of this description, if repeated by another individual. You are now discharged from further attendance upon this House.
Of course, in today's case, we have had defiance, not contrition, and coordinated planning, not unpremeditated actions.
Maingot, at pages 236 and 237, addresses the protection afforded to witnesses and others besides members and officers when they are engaged in parliamentary proceedings and committees. He says:
There do not appear to be any Canadian precedents of persons being so obstructed; yet, because the House of Commons need not be so constrained by lack of precedent, it may in its judgment find a person or persons in contempt after an examination of the facts in any particular case.
In Speaker Milliken's much-celebrated ruling on Afghan detainee documents on April 27, 2010, which we have heard about in recent days, he also made some less well-remembered comments on witness matters, including at page 2,041 of Debates, which says that “the procedural authorities are clear that interference with witnesses may constitute a contempt.”
Beyond the matter of the government's so-called “instructions”, at page 13 of the ethics committee March 29 evidence, the government House leader made the claim that “ministerial responsibility means that a minister can replace an employee who reports to the minister, not to Parliament.”
That is just not so. In fact, it is, in my view, a gross misstatement of several constitutional principles. Even if accepted, the government House leader's position is defeated by the facts. Two of the witnesses are employees of and answer to the Prime Minister, while the third is an employee of the Deputy Prime Minister. Neither of those two ministers offered to replace their employees. Of course, the House contemplated the very possibility of the Prime Minister attending on behalf of his employees, something he failed to do, either in accordance with the order of the House or with the policy articulated by the government House leader.
Ministerial staff enjoy no special status in law. Pages 981 to 983 of Bosc and Gagnon state quite clearly that:
The Standing Orders place no explicit limitation on this power. In theory, it applies to any person on Canadian soil.... In practice, certain limitations are recognized on the power to order individuals to appear. Because committee powers do not extend outside Canadian territory, a committee cannot summon a person who is in another country. The Sovereign (either in Canada or abroad), the Governor General and the provincial lieutenant governors are also exempt from such a summons.
This applies as well to parliamentarians belonging to other Canadian legislatures, because each of these assemblies, like the House of Commons, has the parliamentary privilege of controlling the attendance of its members and any matters affecting them. The same logic explains why a standing committee cannot order a Member of the House of Commons or a Senator to appear. At issue in all these examples is the power to order someone to appear; nothing prevents such individuals from appearing voluntarily before a committee following a simple invitation, apart from the obligation incumbent upon some of them to obtain leave from the House to which they belong....
Although they can send for certain persons, standing committees do not have the power to punish a failure to comply with their orders in this regard. Only the House of Commons has the disciplinary powers needed to deal with this type of offence. If a witness refuses to appear, or does not appear, as ordered, the committee’s recourse is to report the matter to the House. Once seized with the matter, the House takes the measures that it considers appropriate.
No where on those lists are ministerial staff exempt or political staff more generally. Moreover, there is no general authority for a minister to come as a substitute, though I would again observe that the House, in crafting its March 25 order, accommodated ministerial responsibility by permitting the Prime Minister to appear on behalf of his employees.
To contrast the government's selective approach to parliamentary accountability for those who work under them, let us look at the 1891 case of Mr. Senécal, the public servant whom I discussed earlier. In that case, Mr. Senécal's own minister sat on the committee to which he was ordered to attend, and according to the public accounts committee minutes of evidence for August 27, 1891, the minister did not claim some kind of higher principle of ministerial accountability to excuse the witness's absence. The minister stated:
In connection with the letter which has just been read from the Superintendent of Printing, I may say I have had no communication with Mr. Senécal, nor even with his family, and did not even know that such a letter would be sent to the Chairman of the Committee. In justice, however, to a man who is absent, and against whom I suppose it is necessary that the ordinary proceedings should be taken to force his attendance here....
I wish it to be well understood, as I stated before, I know nothing about the whereabouts of Mr. Senécal. I do not want to justify his action in writing a letter, or his leaving. I only think it is just for an absent man, to state what I know to be the case....
A former general legal counsel for this House Diane Davidson wrote in a 1994 paper provided to the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations—